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Abstract
THE CAPITALISATION OF BUSINESS RATES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
OF TAX INCIDENCE IN SIX LONDON BOROUGHS
ABSTRACT
This work is concerned with tax shifting and capitalisation of recurrent taxes on 
immovable property, known as business rates in the United Kingdom and payable by 
occupiers of business property.
The empirical research seeks to identify to what extent business rates are transferred into 
rents and thus capitalised. If the tax is capitalised, then freehold owners will bear the 
burden of the tax. If not, the tax may be shifted in some other way, for example, reducing 
the occupiers’ profits or increasing the prices charged to customers. The extent of any tax 
shifting will be affected by the value of any benefits received by the occupier in exchange 
for the tax paid.
Previous studies of business property tax incidence in the UK have met with mixed results 
and problems of poor and inadequate data have hampered research efforts. In this work 
particular emphasis has been given to detailed data collection, which has been carried out in 
the field at the property unit level and, by using this meticulous approach, it was possible to 
control for data issues that have confounded earlier studies.
The empirical research is based on data collected for business properties in six London 
boroughs. Matched pair data has been collected for industrial, retail and office property.
The study takes advantage of a one-off historic situation that existed before the 
introduction of the Uniform Business Rate in 1990. At that time, large differences in the 
property tax burden existed between many local authority areas and these differentials 
had been present for several years.
The chief hypothesis predicts that property values will gradually adjust so that total 
occupation costs between matched pairs of properties will be equalised over time. The 
results of the empirical study confirm the hypothesis and show that total occupation costs 
do tend to be equalised in the long term. The results justify the painstaking approach to 
data collection that was an important part of the overall research design.
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Chapter 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets the context to the study and outlines the structure of this 
thesis. The aim of this work is to examine the long-term impact of tax shifting 
and the capitalisation of recurrent taxes on immovable property, known as 
business rates in the United Kingdom and payable by occupiers of business 
property. The empirical research, which is focused on London, seeks to 
identify to what extent business rates are transferred into rents and thus 
capitalised.
Taxation is by far the most important source of government revenue in the 
modern economy, representing 93% of revenue raised in 2000 (ONS 2002a). 
In this work a tax is defined as a levy made by a public authority for which 
nothing is received directly in return. That is not to say that no benefit 
accrues to the taxpayer but rather that no directly attributable benefit is 
received in exchange for the tax payment. Taxes represent a transfer of 
resources from the private sector to the public sector but, in addition to this 
transfer, they can introduce distortions into the economy and so impose an 
additional burden on the community over and above the amount of tax paid.
These costs can be described as the excess burden of taxation and one 
obvious example of such a distortion is the reduction in spending power 
experienced by income tax payers. This distortion will affect consumers’ 
choices and influence economic behaviour; taxes may also influence 
producers’ choices between factors and, in these ways, taxation imposes an 
additional burden on society. The ideal tax is economically neutral and will 
raise revenue in such a way as to avoid distortionary effects (see Kay and 
King 1990 at p. 19 for a more detailed discussion of fiscal neutrality in the tax 
system).
An examination of the excess burden is a central part of this research, which 
seeks to identify the extent to which the UK property tax is capitalised. Tax 
capitalisation describes the effect on the market price of an asset because of 
the impact the tax has on the expected yield or return from the asset. The 
capital value of a property reflects the present value of expected future net 
rental income. If the net income is reduced by the imposition of the tax, this
18
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reduction will be capitalised, resulting in lower capital values. In this thesis, 
any reduction in rental value caused by the imposition of a property tax will 
be treated as causing a corresponding reduction in the capital value. This 
simplification is discussed in more detail in 2.9.
1.2 TAX CLASSIFICATION
It is possible to classify taxes in a variety of ways. A detailed classification is 
made by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD 1976). Taxes are grouped into categories and each group is further 
subdivided (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Extract from the OECD Classification of Taxes
1000 Taxes on Goods & Services
2000 Taxes on Income Profits and Capital Gains
3000 Social Security Contributions 
4000 Taxes on employers based on payroll or manpower
5000 Taxes on net wealth and immovable property
5100 Recurrent taxes on net wealth
5110 Paid by households and institutions
5120 Paid by corporate enterprises
5200 Recurrent taxes on immovable property
5210 Paid by households
5220 Paid by enterprises
5230 Paid by institutions
5300 Non-recurrent taxes on net wealth
5310 On net wealth
5320 On immovable property
6000 Taxes and Stamp Duties on gifts, inheritances and on capital and
financial transactions 
7000 Other taxes
Source: OECD Revenue Statistics (1976)
This thesis is concerned with OECD Class 5220, recurrent taxes on 
immovable property paid by enterprises. It focuses on business property, 
giving no consideration to the residential sector. OECD Class 5320 deals
19
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with non-recurrent taxes on immovable property. This is represented by 
inheritance tax in the United Kingdom and is not considered in this thesis.
In the UK, recurrent taxes on business property are known as non-domestic 
rates or business rates. They represent a local business tax that is charged 
on commercial and industrial properties. Business rates are paid by the 
occupiers of business property and the tax base is assessed on the imputed 
annual rental value of a property, known as the rateable value. This 
represents the basis against which the tax payable is calculated. The annual 
tax rate is a multiplier, expressed as an amount per pound of rateable value 
and the tax payable is calculated using the tax rate as a multiplier against the 
rateable value. The operation of the UK rating system is explained in more 
detail in Appendix 1.
1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF BUSINESS PROPERTY
Business property is defined to include all types of urban commercial and 
industrial property, including shops, offices, factories and warehouses. 
Factories and warehouses are grouped together and treated as industrial 
property in this thesis.
Business property is an essential factor of production in every sector of the 
economy. Unlike the housing sector, which has long been recognised as 
having a profound economic influence, the importance of commercial 
property is less often considered and it is only in the past two decades that 
the importance of business property in the economy has begun to be 
appreciated.
The following extract from the Commercial Property Quarterly Review (BPF 
2002) illustrates the importance of business property to the UK economy:
The broad contribution of business property as a factor of 
production in all sectors of the economy is 5.6% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).
As an asset, the total value of business property in 2000 stood at 
over £625 billion, which was more than double the value of 
outstanding government securities and about one half of the value 
of the total UK equity market.
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Business property accounted for 27% of the total UK investment 
in 2000.
Rental income from business property in 2000 amounted to £79 
billion per annum (representing 8.48% of GDP in that year).
Business property represents 46% of private sector non-financial 
assets, 71% of total assets of financial corporations and 75% of 
public sector assets.
Given the clear importance of the business property sector to the economy 
as a whole, it is surprising how little attention is given to the sector by 
economic commentators.
In a report on the role of business property in the UK economy, Currie and 
Scott (1991) conclude that coverage of the sector in the official statistics is 
substandard in quality and deficient in coverage. This problem has been 
exacerbated in recent years by cutbacks and discontinuation of some 
valuable and informative aggregate statistics (Pratt 1994 at p. 57).
1.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BUSINESS RATES
The importance of business rates as a proportion of taxes raised in 2001-02 
is shown in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3. Business rates are the sixth largest 
source of government revenue, representing 5.1% of all government revenue 
and the second most important source of revenue from business taxes.
In the fiscal year 2001-02, the yield from business rates was £18.2 billion 
(Inland Revenue 2002). GDP in the same period was £989 billion (ONS 
2002b). Business rates accounted for 1.84% of GDP in the year, which 
represents a fairly significant proportion. If business property as a factor of 
production made a contribution of 5.6% to GDP (BPF 2002), then business 
rates can be seen to represent a sizeable tax on the business property 
sector.
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Table 1.2: UK Tax Revenue for All Taxes 2001-02
Amounts: £ Billion
Tax £ Amount % of Total
Income tax (net of tax credits) 107.6 29.9
National Insurance Contributions 63.2 17.6
Value Added Tax 61.1 17.0
Corporation Tax 32.4 9.0
Fuel Taxes 21.9 6.1
Business Rates 18.2 5.1
Council Tax 14.9 4.1
Tobacco Duties 7.8 2.2
Stamp Duties 7.1 2.0
Alcohol Related Duties 7.0 1.9
Vehicle Excise Duties 4.4 1.2
Capital Gains Tax 2.9 0.8
Inheritance Tax/Capital Transfer Tax 2.3 0.6
Customs Duties 2.0 0.6
Petroleum Revenue Tax & Oil Royalties 1.9 0.5
Insurance Premium Tax 1.9 0.5
Betting, Gaming & Lottery 1.4 0.4
Air Passenger Duty 0.8 0.2
Climate Change Levy 0.6 0.2
Landfill Tax 0.5 0.1
359.9 100.0
Source: Inland Revenue Statistics (2002); Local Government Financial Statistics, ODPM
(2003); HM  Customs & Excise Annual Report (2002); Financial Statistics, ONS (2002).
Figures are ranked in order of contribution size.
Table 1.3: UK Tax Revenue for Business Taxes 2001-02
Amounts: £ Billion
Tax £ Amount % of Total
Corporation Tax 32.4 61.7
Business Rates 18.2 34.7
Petroleum Revenue Tax & Oil Royalties 1.9 3.6
52.5 100.0
Source: Inland Revenue Statistics (2002); Local Government Financial Statistics, ODPM  
(2003); Financial Statistics, ONS (2002). Figures are ranked in order of contribution size. 
Excludes taxes paid partly by businesses and partly by individuals.
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It is clear that the impact of the tax is worthy of detailed consideration, yet, in 
proportion to their importance in the economy, business rates have been the 
subject of limited research effort. In part this problem arises because of the 
difficulty of obtaining satisfactory data for analysis. At the local level property 
information is difficult to obtain (see 1.6) whilst at an aggregate level the 
statistical coverage of the sector is sparse, and these data may not be 
appropriate to answer empirical questions about tax incidence (see 4.5).
1.5 SOME POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF BUSINESS RATES
In the first systematic consideration of local business taxes in the UK, 
Bennett and Krebs (1988), identify five possible tax impacts from the point of
view of businesses.
1. Influence on overall profitability
2. Influence on investment
3. Influence on reinvestment
4. Influence on choice of factors
5. Influence on other economic entities through tax shifting
These points are interrelated and the impact of the tax is both complex and 
difficult to analyse effectively. This thesis concentrates on the last point, 
seeking to identify the extent of tax shifting for business rates. This is the 
question of tax incidence, which can be considered at two levels, formal 
incidence and economic incidence.
The formal incidence of any tax is easy to establish. This falls on the person 
who is legally responsible for payment of the tax, but it would be a great 
oversimplification to assume that the burden of rates falls entirely on the 
person who pays the tax demand.
Economic incidence is a more useful concept, which has concerned 
economists for many years (see for example Marshall 1897; or Ramsey 
1927). Urban economists have also long been interested in answers to the 
more specific question ‘Who bears the burden of the property tax?’
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The identification of economic incidence requires an analysis of the extent of 
tax shifting. Property taxes can be shifted, either forwards through increased 
prices, or backwards through reduced payments to suppliers or factors of 
production (such as land or labour). The burden of the tax could, of course, 
remain with the occupier, in which case the formal incidence and the 
economic incidence might appear to be the same, but even then the effect of 
the tax would be to reduce profits, which would be borne by shareholders 
and might even be capitalised in the form of lower share prices caused by 
reduced equity earnings.
Economic incidence can be analysed at different levels, because there may 
be several intermediate bearers of the economic incidence before the final 
economic incidence of the tax is identified. Any analysis of final incidence will 
include an assessment of the full effects of a tax on the economy as a whole, 
known as a general equilibrium analysis of taxation. Any analysis that does 
not seek to identify the full effects of a tax on the economy as a whole is 
known as a partial equilibrium analysis.
It is also necessary to consider the time frame of the analysis. The short run 
impacts will differ from the long-term impact and this research is directed 
towards a long-term analysis. This long-term analysis is essential when 
analysing tax impacts on property values, due to contractual rigidities in the 
property market and the slowly changing nature of the spatial relationship 
being observed.
There is a further important point that needs to be considered before the 
burden of the tax can be analysed in a meaningful way, and that is the value 
of any benefits that accrue to the taxed entity and which can be attributed to 
the tax payment. This is known as a benefit offset The value of any benefit 
offset needs to be taken into account in assessing the extent of any tax 
shifting. Related to the idea of a benefit offset is the possibility that the 
benefits from the local public goods exceed the value of the tax and are 
themselves capitalised, resulting in increased property values in the 
jurisdiction concerned.
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It is a singular characteristic of the UK empirical research into business 
property tax incidence that the benefits received by businesses are almost 
completely disregarded. This may in fact be an acceptable approach, due to 
the centralised nature of government and the homogeneity of local 
government services across the UK. What is surprising in nearly all UK work 
on business tax incidence, is that the question of benefits is not even 
considered.
1.6 DIFFICULTIES WITH DATA
Reference has already been made to the problem of inadequate statistical 
coverage of the property market and the related problem that is encountered 
by academic researchers in the field of real property, namely the difficulty of 
obtaining adequate data. This problem was explored in the context of 
business property by Dunse et al. (1998).
Partly as a consequence of the difficulties of obtaining adequate data, the 
opportunity to identify the long-term economic incidence of business rates in 
the UK has proved elusive and those studies of tax incidence that have been 
undertaken have met with mixed results.
None of the British studies found significant results for the long-term impact 
of business rates, which is the focus of the present work. Some studies have 
obtained short-run results (see for example Bennett and Fearnehough 1987; 
Bennett and Krebs 1988; Bond et al. 1996a), but the results of UK studies 
are not always as strong as the authors had expected (e.g. Sibley 1989 at p. 
340; Crosby and Keogh 1990 at p. 25; Bond et al. 1996b at p. 31).
Moreover, problems of data availability have hampered research efforts. 
Bond et al. (1996b at p. 30), commenting on the data used in the most recent 
UK research on the incidence of business rates, state ‘Unfortunately, we had 
very little information on the attributes of the properties within our sample’. 
This research was carried out for the Department of Environment by the 
Institute of Fiscal Studies and the final report states that ‘It would be of great 
interest to extend this analysis to data on a wider range of properties, but it is 
not clear where such data could be obtained.’ (DOE 1995b at p. 63).
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In this thesis particular emphasis is placed on detailed data collection, which 
has been carried out at the level of the individual property and which gives 
complete information on the attributes of the properties used. This follows the 
approach to data collection adopted by Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) in a 
hedonic analysis of residential property (which was not concerned with tax 
incidence). Instead of a hedonic analysis, which would require a very large 
data-set, the empirical research in this thesis is based on data for a small 
sample of matched pairs that were collected for industrial, retail and office 
property in adjoining local authority areas. By using this approach it was 
possible to control for the issues that have confounded earlier studies.
There is a full discussion of the data requirements and data collection in 
Chapters 6 and 7.
1.7 AIMS OF THIS RESEARCH
This study sets out to establish the economic incidence of business rates. In 
particular, it seeks to identify to what extent business rates are reflected in 
rents, and thus capitalised, in the long term. There are no previous long-term 
studies of the impact of business rates in the UK.
The chief hypothesis employed is that property values will adjust so that total 
occupation costs between matched pairs of properties will be equalised over 
time in response to variations in property taxes. It is not assumed that this 
process of market adjustment will be instantaneous, especially given the 
peculiar institutional constraints on rent adjustment in England (see 2.6.5).
The empirical research involves an investigation of industrial, office and retail 
properties in adjacent local authority areas, having a comparable property 
type, but with large differences in rate burden at the time of the study. This 
includes the need to consider what differential tax benefits (if any) are 
provided between the local authority areas under analysis.
The analysis of economic incidence is complex and it will differ in the short 
run from the long run and will be affected by conditions of demand and 
supply, which will differ for each property type and according to prevailing
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economic conditions. This makes the task of estimating the economic 
incidence of the property tax difficult. To help reduce the complexity, this 
thesis undertakes a partial equilibrium analysis of tax incidence, rather than a 
general equilibrium analysis. This means that there is no attempt to identify 
the final incidence of the tax, which can only be established on an aggregate 
macro-economic basis, whereas this research study is local in its nature. The 
empirical work seeks to identify any long-term statistically significant causal 
relationship between business rates and business property rents.
In identifying the incidence of business rates it is possible to gain a better 
understanding of the impact of the tax on property values. The thesis 
provides new insights into the behaviour of firms in assessing competing 
property options, as well as having important implications for property market 
efficiency.
1.8 TIME FRAME OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK
This research takes advantage of a one-off historic situation that provides a 
unique opportunity for study. Before the Uniform Business Rate was 
introduced in April 1990, high rate differentials were present in many areas. 
By using these differentials as an analytical device, the aim is to identify who 
bears the burden of business rates.
The chief empirical work is based on cross-sectional data at April 1988 which 
are supplemented by data both before and after April 1988, giving a 
longitudinal element to the study. Figure 1.1 shows the time frame 
graphically.
There are other persuasive reasons for basing the study around the April 
1988 date, first amongst these being availability of sufficient data at that time.
The property recession that started with high interest rates in late 1988 was 
not foreseen in the early part of that year. Market commentators were 
predicting continued rises in the property market as late as September 1988 
(Key et al. 1990).
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The choice of the 1988 date for this study is therefore useful, since the 
analysis of tax incidence is difficult enough without the additional 
complication of falling property values. The analysis of tax capitalisation in 
stable or rising market conditions is expected to allow the tax capitalisation 
effect to manifest itself through the bids of competing tenants.
Also important to the choice of the 1988 date is that business occupiers must 
not have adjusted their occupation decisions to take account of expected 
changes following Uniform Business Rates that were introduced in 1990. The 
two year antecedent date helps to eliminate this possibility from the analysis.
A full explanation of the research design and the reasons for the date chosen 
is set out in Chapters 6 and 7.
In this thesis, no consideration is given to the most recent government 
proposals for changes to the system of business rates, as embodied in the 
Local Government Bill 2002/03 that was published in draft by the Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister in June 2002.
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
In this thesis references to other sections appear in the text without any 
prefix (e.g. 4.6.5) and references to sections of an appendix are prefixed with 
'A1 (e.g. A1.3.2 or Table A5.2). Tables and figures will always be shown with 
the full prefix (e.g. Figure 6.1). Acts of Parliament and Statutory Instruments 
appear in full in the text and are not listed in the bibliography at the end of the 
thesis.
Chapter 2 studies the theory of urban land use, reviewing the theory and 
developing a model of how rental values are determined. It then considers 
the determinants of rental value, applying the theory to each of the three 
main types of business property. A brief look at the assessment of property 
capital values is made: any shifting of tax incidence to landlords in the form 
of reduced rent represents a capitalisation of the tax.
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Chapter 3 examines taxes on property. Theories of taxation are discussed 
first, followed by a review of developments in tax incidence theory and their 
application to the property tax. It considers the different ways that the tax 
burden can be shifted and a model of tax capitalisation is explained.
Chapter 4 reviews the existing empirical studies in both the UK and the US, 
considering business property studies that are relevant to the theory that was 
examined in Chapter 3. Residential studies of tax capitalisation are reviewed 
in Appendix 4.
Chapter 5 considers the UK property tax, its history and recent development, 
placing it in the context of this thesis. Discussion of the political background 
takes place along with an explanation of the London local authority areas 
selected for the study.
Chapter 6 develops the methodology that is to be employed for the empirical 
study and sets out the research hypothesis that is to be tested. The results of 
a telephone survey of prospective occupiers are presented and these help to 
validate the research hypothesis and give an understanding of the factors 
(including benefits) that prospective occupiers consider when making their 
rental bid. Data requirements are also outlined in this chapter.
Chapter 7 deals with the data requirements in depth, explaining how the data 
were validated and the matched pairs of properties selected before 
considering the data collection process itself.
Chapter 8 contains an explanation of the statistical analysis undertaken and 
presents the results of the data analysis, including the pilot study and 
triangulation of the results.
Chapter 9 is a discussion of the results and the conclusions that can be 
drawn and points the way for further research.
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Appendix 1 outlines the legal framework of business rates in the UK. It briefly 
sets out the historical background to the UK property tax and provides a 
technical outline of how the rating system was implemented in England and 
Wales prior to 1990, together with a summary of the changes made in 1990.
Appendix 2 presents a discussion of the difference between prices and 
valuations. It also includes a review of the technical aspects of the tax from a 
valuation perspective.
Other Appendices, listed in the Table of Contents, are introduced into the text 
as appropriate.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DETERMINATION OF RENTAL VALUE
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter considers how the rental value of a property is determined. The 
theory of rental value determination needs to be considered so that the likely 
impact of business rates on rental value can be assessed.
The chapter starts with some definitions and then considers a few of the 
problems encountered in the economic analysis of land. After a brief look at 
the early analysis of land by economists, the work of contemporary urban 
economists is reviewed.
An elementary theory of rental value determination is then developed and 
this is integrated with a demand and supply analysis, which is applied to 
each of the three types of property that are used in the empirical study.
Finally, a short review of the valuation and determination of capital values is 
set out.
2.2 DEFINITIONS
An interest in real property represents a complex bundle of rights: legal, 
economic and environmental, and an understanding of these concepts is 
necessary for an understanding of property markets.
The property considered in this thesis will be property in an urban context 
and it can be more precisely described as urban property, which is defined to 
mean pure land together with buildings and other capital improvements 
attached to the land, as well as the legal, economic and environmental rights 
associated with the relevant interest in the property. Urban property, thus 
defined, will be referred to as business property in this work, which does not 
consider residential property in any detail.
In this thesis minimal consideration is given to pure land, meaning land that is 
totally undeveloped. In the UK there is little such land in existence today. 
Where it is mentioned, primarily for theoretical reasons, it will always be 
referred to as pure land, to distinguish it from developed land or other urban 
property, which will be referred to simply as land.
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Economic rent is a term having special significance to economists and is 
defined as the difference between total earnings and transfer earnings of an 
economic factor. It will always be called by its full name of economic rent. 
Alonso (1964, p. 16) avoids the ‘thorny definitional problems that abound in 
the theory of rent’ by placing the ‘emphasis on the process by which the 
value of land is determined rather than on the nature of this value’.
This concept of economic rent should not be confused with rental value in the 
property market. The rental value of a property is defined to mean the 
amount that would be paid by a tenant to a landlord for the right to use a 
property for a given period of time. This chapter seeks to explain the 
economic process by which rental value is determined. Appendix 2 contains 
a discussion of rental value and its estimation from the technical perspective 
of a property valuer.
2.3 LAND -  SEPARATE FACTOR OR SPECIES OF CAPITAL?
Modern land economics draws heavily on the work of early classical (Malthus 
1820; Ricardo 1821; Von Thunen 1826) and neoclassical economists (e.g. 
Marshall 1890). In many aspects the traditional principles hold true, but there 
are some important parts of the traditional theory that have been modified. 
This draws us to the definition of what constitutes land, which is developed in 
this section.
Early economists treated land as a separate factor of production, especially 
as agriculture was a much more important component of total output. Today 
this view still serves a useful analytical and pedagogic purpose, but, whether 
land is a separate factor of production or simply a species of capital, is to 
some extent a philosophical question that has little bearing on the problem of 
tax incidence considered in this thesis.
Land is referred to, by mainstream economists, with labour, capital and (less 
frequently) enterprise, as one of the basic factors of production. Evans 
(1983) is critical of the way economists routinely neglect the supply side 
analysis of land. As a factor of production, land is usually thought of as being 
fixed in supply, indestructible and a ‘free gift of nature’. Land is certainly 
durable but it cannot be considered to be indestructible, especially from an
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economic standpoint and, in a modern industrial society, land cannot be 
considered as ‘free’ (Barlowe 1986 at p. 11). Most importantly, land (both 
pure and developed) cannot reasonably be treated as being fixed in supply. 
Setting aside (for the moment) the constraints imposed on supply by 
planning and zoning legislation, land is quite frequently treated as being fixed 
in supply in fundamental economic analysis and this idea is an ‘integral part 
of the belief system of many contemporary economists’ Thrall (1987 at 
p.136).
Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), for example, state ‘turning to tax on income 
from land, we find the supply to be fixed. With supply totally inelastic...’ (at p. 
256). This would suggest a perfectly inelastic supply curve, in which case all 
earnings of land are economic rent. Figure 2.1a illustrates the traditional 
standpoint. It assumes that the supply of land is fixed. Supply cannot 
respond to increased demand and the same quantity of land is supplied 
regardless of price.
It is true that the supply of pure land at a particular location is fixed 
(DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996 at p. 35) and that the supply of urban 
property is relatively inelastic, but even a single site can be more intensively 
developed, through the addition of more capital to the pure land.
The consequence of this is that short-run supply is less elastic than long-run 
supply and it is possible to draw more than one supply curve for land, 
depending on how much time is allowed for supply to react to any given level 
of demand.
In practice, land is supplied by a number of different economic agents 
(current owners) who will respond to demand by increasing the supply of 
land available on the market. This is achieved through the signalling function 
of price.
Supply should therefore be considered as a flow and the supply of land as a 
flow is not fixed. What is fixed is the total stock of pure land, but this 
fundamental distinction between stocks and flows does not seem to be 
commonly made.
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Another essential factor affecting the supply of land is the differing land uses 
that are possible. Harvey (1992) puts it like this:
...the supply of land can never be regarded as fixed from the 
viewpoint of any one use ... additional supplies can always be bid 
from other uses if the proposed new use has a higher value than 
the existing use. Additional supplies of land can usually be 
created in response to additional demand by a using it more 
intensively by the addition of capital (at p. 35).
This analysis ignores legal controls on land use, which, in the UK, means the 
comprehensive planning controls (zoning) that have existed for the greater 
part of the twentieth century (Cullingworth 1992). By imposing controls on 
development density and restrictions on the permissible land uses, the 
planning system can increase or decrease the supply of land on the market 
(e.g. in a conservation area) and in certain circumstances this could result in 
a perfectly inelastic supply of urban land (Balchin et al. 2000 at p. 389).
Intensification of land use is usually achieved by the addition of capital to an 
existing property. Urban property will benefit by large-scale capital 
investment, either directly in the plot of land itself, or by infrastructure 
investments and adjacent property development.
Figure 2.1 b shows the true nature of the supply curve for property. The 
treatment of supply as a flow, and the large investment of fixed capital, 
changes the elasticity of supply shown by the curve ‘s 1 \  Undoubtedly, the 
analysis of property is complicated by the dual components of pure land and 
fixed capital. The overall stock of pure land cannot easily be increased, 
whereas the stock of buildings can; the pure land component is perpetual, 
whereas the building component will depreciate. The proportion of pure land 
and fixed capital that comprise any property will determine the elasticity of its 
supply (Fraser 1986 at p. 356). This point is important to the consideration of 
tax shifting that is discussed in Chapter 3.
It can be seen that there is a very close relationship between the concepts of 
land and capital, and it can be difficult to distinguish between them.
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Many ‘observers feel that it is both theoretically and practically impossible to 
separate the land and improvement components’ (Netzer 1966 at p.35). But 
developments in hedonic analysis over the last 30 years have resulted in 
techniques that allow the different components of a property to be analysed, 
making it possible to separate heterogeneous properties into more or less 
homogeneous parts. Hedonic pricing techniques treat a property as a 
composite heterogeneous good, which is made up of a bundle of 
homogeneous characteristics or attributes, each traded in an implicit market 
place and which can be valued separately to give the explicit market price for 
the bundle as a whole (when aggregated across attribute prices). See 
Sheppard (1999) for a clear and comprehensive explanation of the hedonic 
approach.
Recent hedonic studies by Cheshire and Sheppard (1995; 1998) in the UK, 
and earlier work by Jackson et al. (1984) in the US, have included location in 
the hedonic price function and this makes it possible to assess the ‘price of 
land as “pure space with accessibility” ’ (Cheshire and Sheppard 1997). This 
unbundling of individual characteristics allows the land component to be 
distinguished from the capital improvements and other composite parts of 
urban property.
Unless there are analytical reasons for wanting to know the price of pure 
land, it is more realistic in a modern economic context to distinguish pure 
land from urban land, which should be more appropriately treated as capital. 
In this thesis no attempt is made to distinguish returns to the pure land 
component of business property. Returns to business property are treated as 
a whole, in the same way as returns to other capital. In other words, rent is 
viewed from a landlord’s position, as a return on investment. The issue here 
is one of perspective and scale. From the stand-point of society, pure land 
may be a free gift of nature, but from the standpoint of the individual 
economic agent, land must be purchased or leased like any other capital 
good and, from this standpoint, land is usually treated as capital (Barlowe 
1986 at p. 11).
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2.4 EARLY ECONOMIC THEORIES OF LAND VALUE
Demand for land, as with any factor of production, is a derived demand that 
results from the demand for the products it is used to make. This basic 
principle has not always been recognised. The controversy that raged over 
the Corn Laws in the early nineteenth century hinged on two alternative 
views of why the price of corn (the generic term for all grain) was high. One 
group believed that the price was high because of the high rents charged to 
farmers by landowners. The other group maintained that demand for corn 
was high due to the Napoleonic Wars, the Corn Laws themselves and poor 
harvests; they maintained that the high price of corn created competition 
amongst farmers for land, with a consequent bidding up of rents. Prominent 
amongst this latter group were David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus, to whom 
the origins of modern rent theory can be attributed (Malthus 1820; Ricardo 
1821).
The derived nature of demand for land leads to rent being viewed as a 
residual. Malthus recognised this when he defined rent as:
the excess value of the whole produce, or if estimated in money, the 
excess price of the whole produce, above what is necessary to pay the 
wages of labour and the profits of capital employed in cultivation.
This is the classical definition of economic rent. Most early rent theory tended 
for obvious reasons to take the case of agriculture and Ricardian rent theory 
provides a treatment of agricultural rent, which is still the foundation of most 
present day rent theory.
Ricardo explained that the more fertile land would be employed first and less 
fertile land is only put to use as demand for agricultural product increases. 
Rent on the most productive land is based on its advantage over the less 
productive land and competition amongst farmers acts to ensure that this 
advantage is passed on to landlords in the form of higher rent. He recognised 
that transport costs were lower for land that is located closer to the market 
for agricultural produce and he also identified that this advantage would be 
passed on to the landlord as an increased rent.
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This theory of locational differences was developed more fully by von Thunen 
(1826), again in the context of agricultural land. Von Thunen’s theory 
introduced the bid rent approach, which is a cornerstone of modern land use 
theory and is the model used later in this chapter to illustrate the theory of 
rent as a residual.
The work of von Thunen has entered the economic mainstream relatively 
recently as a result of Isard’s efforts to revive location theory and make the 
established German tradition available to the English speaking world (Isard 
1956).
Samuelson (1983) provides an excellent analysis of von Thunen’s 
contribution but, even today, the dimension of space is ‘almost completely 
absent from the standard corpus of economic theory’ (Krugman 1995). This 
neglect of spatial issues is described by Blaug (1997 at p. 596) as a ‘major 
puzzle in the history of economic thought’, although spatial analysis has for 
many years provided fertile ground for geographers, urban economists and 
regional scientists.
Early economists gave analytical primacy to agriculture, paying little heed to 
urban property and it is not until 1890 that attention is devoted to the topic by 
none other than Alfred Marshall (1890, Book V Chapter XI). He identifies 
situation rent as the additional value that accrues to urban land over the rent 
it would command as agricultural land. Situation rent arises on an urban site 
as a result of its access to markets for goods, transport links and labour 
markets and if a site has no situation value it is treated as agricultural land.
Although Marshall was influenced by von Thunen’s work, it was not until 
1964 that William Alonso formally applied von Thunen to urban land (Alonso 
1964). A common problem with many early analyses is the lack of attention 
to the size of any particular site. To carry out an economic analysis of price 
without regard to quantity is hard to justify, but many early writers, with the 
notable exception of Marshall, appear almost universally to ignore the size of 
the site (Alonso 1964 at p. 5).
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2.5 CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF URBAN LAND RENT
The 1960s and early 1970s saw the development of an important group of 
lineally related urban land models. The development of these models in the 
US is summarised concisely by Edwin Mills (1972 at pp. 63-80) and the 
outline below is based on his review.
Wingo’s (1961) model is focused on the way urban transport costs affect land 
rent and the residential demand for land. He assumes that residential 
demand depends on the rental value of the land and the elasticity of demand 
is constant. Wingo sets out to explain and investigate the effect of changes in 
the transport system on urban land use. Wingo assumes that the outlay on 
land at any point in the urban area is equal to the difference between 
transport costs from the edge of the urban area to the city centre and from 
the point in question. This assumption implies that land at the edge of the 
urban area has no value beyond its agricultural value and that land closer to 
the city centre will command a rent equal to the savings in transport costs.
Alonso (1964) sets out to construct a general theory of land rent and, unlike 
the other models considered in this section, it is not devoted exclusively to 
residential property, although this still forms the primary focus. Alonso 
provides the most complete and general model of urban location theory and 
he succeeds in generalising von Thunen’s central concept of bid rent curves 
to an urban context.
This model assumes urban space is continuous and one dimensional and 
that the only relevant dimension is distance from the centre. Alonso does not 
actually say why distance from the centre is important, but the presumption is 
that jobs and sales are located there (Mills 1972, at p. 67). In fact, this is a 
problem with von Thunen’s original agricultural model: it simply assumes the 
existence of a central urban market with no further explanation.
Alonso’s theory of the firm defines profit as total revenue minus the sum of 
land and non-land production costs. Revenue and non-land costs depend on 
quantity sold and on location. Land rent is exogenous to the firm but is 
dependent on location. Land cost equals land rent multiplied by the quantity 
of land demanded. The firm maximises profits with respect to quantity 
produced and location.
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Both Wingo and Alonso explain patterns of location only in terms of demand 
for space and this assumption is modified by Muth (1969), who incorporates 
both supply and demand into his model of how the urban housing market 
operates.
Fujita (1990) builds on the work of these writers to provide a basic theory of 
urban land use and city size in a unified framework, again with the emphasis 
on residential property in the US. He includes the analysis of local public 
goods and neighbourhood externalities in his model.
In the UK, the work of Alan Evans (1972; 1973) is very important. Focused 
on residential property, Evans explains residential location decisions in the 
first British work of its kind.
These models result in a theoretical expectation that land prices will 
systematically vary within the urban area but, in practice, there is an 
observed difference between the prices that the models predict and the 
prices achieved in the market. Hedonic analysis seeks to explain these other 
factors influencing price using hedonic price functions, which were discussed 
at 2.3.
Wingo, Alonso, Muth, Evans and Fujita all make the neoclassical assumption 
of perfect competition, which is a basic assumption that underpins many 
theoretical analyses of property markets (see 2.6.3). All of them use the bid 
rent function approach and they also assume a city that is located on an 
isotropic or featureless plain, which is based on the original bid rent model 
introduced by von Thunen in 1826. This is the basis of the model adopted for 
the rent theory developed in the next section.
2.6 THE THEORY OF RENT AS A RESIDUAL
2.6.1 ELEMENTARY RENT MODEL
In Location and Land Use, Alonso (1964) demonstrates the relationship 
between location, land use and land values. The model presented here is 
adapted from this pioneering work and is used in a simplified form to illustrate
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the residual nature of rent. The diagrams are based on the work of 
Launhardt (1993).
The following assumptions are made:
1. Only one commodity is produced and there are a large number of 
competing producers.
2. The city is monocentric and the market for all output is situated at one 
point in the centre of an isotropic plain.
3. There is a dense radial transport system. Transport costs are the only 
costs that vary for each producer and they are directly proportional to 
the distance from the centre.
4. Each producer requires the same level of profit and is possessed of all 
necessary knowledge to that end.
5. Producers rent land on an annual basis and the rent is open to re­
negotiation at the end of each year.
6. All land parcels are identical and ready for productive use.
7. Tax rates are uniform, no local public goods are in evidence and there 
are no neighbourhood externalities.
Under these assumptions land values are a function of transport costs. See 
Figure 2.2a.
All costs and prices are measured per unit of output. The market price of 
output (p) and the cost of production (c), which includes an allowance for 
profit, are both fixed, irrespective of the distance from the market, whereas 
transport costs (t) vary with the distance from the market.
Total costs, (c + 1) will rise until they equate to the market price of output, at a 
distance (d) from the market. Production beyond ‘d ^  is not profitable.
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At ‘di ’ the residual rent accruing to the land is zero. At the market the 
residual rent is represented by the difference between market price and the 
costs of production (p -  c). Between the market and ‘d •, the residual 
available to pay rent diminishes as transport costs rise.
The rent at any given location can be expressed as: 
r(dj) = n [ p -  c - t ( d j)  ] 
where
r(dj) = rent per unit of land at distance dj from the market
n = number of units of the commodity produced per unit of land
p = price per unit of the commodity at the market
c = cost of production per unit of the commodity
t(d j) = cost of transporting one unit of the commodity a distance 
dj to the market.
The residual rent of the land can be derived from Figure 2.2a and is shown 
separately in Figure 2.2b as a surplus. The surplus available can be seen to 
be an inverse function of distance from the market, resulting directly from the 
difference in transport costs.
If costs rise and this rise is not matched by a corresponding increase in the 
market price of the commodity, producers will adjust their rental bids to 
reflect the changed surplus. In this case the surplus will be reduced, but it 
could equally have risen, with existing producers being obliged to increase 
their rental bids if they are to maintain occupation of the land.
2.6.2 A LOOK AT THE ASSUMPTIONS
It is not intended to develop a more rigorous model of rent determination as a 
part of this thesis. Instead, the theory of rental value determination is 
explored in so far as is necessary to understand the impact of business rates 
on property values. The elementary model has been introduced to illustrate 
the important principle of rent as a residual or a surplus. The assumptions 
made earlier are not intended to be realistic and it is necessary to relax the
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assumptions before the theory even begins to approximate to reality. A 
discussion of the more important relaxations takes place below.
The assumptions of a central market, an isotropic plain and a single 
proportionally varying cost are simplifying assumptions made for illustrative 
purposes.
The assumption of a single commodity precludes the possibility of more 
profitable land uses commanding the more expensive land. In a diversified 
market, where firms are in different businesses, there will be widely differing 
cost structures and levels of expertise, and the most profitable firms will gain 
the use of the land.
In a situation where there are a large number of competing producers, it is 
not likely that they will all have the same required level of profit. It is of great 
importance to note that the profits being considered here are prospective or 
expected profits, calculated by the land user before he takes occupation. 
These are target profits and, if a great deal of competition is anticipated for a 
particular property, then tenants will be prepared to consider lower target 
profits and the rent enjoyed by the land will be consequently higher.
From here on, it will be assumed that total costs always include a sufficient 
return to the land user in the form of profit to reward him for the risks involved 
in his business. Businesses are concerned with target profits and, when 
making a rental bid, they will make a calculation of costs, including their 
target profit, with the residual being the rent that can be paid. This is 
important because it shows how a prospective occupier will view the 
business rates payable on a particular unit before making a bid; as a tax 
payable by occupiers, business rates are factored into the total expected 
costs of property. This is also borne out by market practice, both in the 
statutory definition of rateable value, which excludes any tenants’ rates or 
taxes, and also in rating valuation practice, where ‘equation theory’ is applied 
to the division of the residual between the rent and the rates. Emeny (1984 at 
p. 187) puts it like this:
...equation theory is based on the idea that a tenant is not...
concerned with the amount of rent he pays nor with the amount of
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rates he pays bu t... with the combined figure of rent and rates. In 
other words if a tenant’s rates increase he will want to pay less rent, 
whereas if they go down he would be prepared to pay more rent.
2.6.3 PROPERTY MARKET PERFECTION AND EFFICIENCY
The important assumption of a perfectly competitive market needs to be 
considered further. Evans (1995) examines the whole question of property 
market efficiency, stating (at p. 5) that ‘most of the literature on the property 
market is written as though it were the very paradigm of a neoclassical 
perfect market’.
There are a number of characteristics of the property market that make it 
unlikely to conform to the model of the perfectly competitive markets used in 
micro-economics. The most important issue is the heterogeneous nature of 
property: it is not correct to assume that in every property market there is a 
single homogenous product, especially in small sub-markets. Likewise, within 
sub-markets, a large number of buyers and sellers and a high level of 
knowledge cannot be assumed. The complexity of diverse legal interests in 
property contributes to the problem. This leads to the conclusion that the 
property market is imperfect.
Many economic theories do not advance beyond the assumption of perfect 
competition and the Elementary Rent Model presented here is no exception. 
The conventional assumption of a perfectly competitive property market 
applies to the majority of the empirical work on tax incidence that is 
considered in Chapter 4 and it is an assumption underlying hedonic pricing 
techniques. For exceptions refer to the recent work of Oktem (2001) on the 
subject of property tax incidence under imperfect competition or Anderson et 
al. (2001), which is not specific to property tax.
A different but related aspect of market ‘perfection’ is the concept of market 
efficiency. Even if a market that cannot meet all of the economic 
requirements for market perfection, it can still be an efficient market. The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) argues that the price of a share or other 
marketable security should accurately reflect all available information at any 
given time, and if it does, the market is efficient. Modern theories of market
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efficiency have evolved from the work of Eugene Fama in the context of the 
stock market. Fama (1970) suggests three tests for efficiency: the weak test, 
the semi-strong test and the strong test. There is an extensive body of 
literature that develops Fama’s concept of market efficiency and one thread 
of this literature has attempted to apply the theories of stock market 
efficiency to property markets. For a review of the applications of the EMH to 
property see Brown and Matysiak (2000 at pp. 431-462) or the earlier work 
of Brown (1991 at pp. 62-138).
However, it is submitted that property markets are not likely to be efficient in 
the instantaneous way envisaged by the EMH, particularly since the 
conditions for a perfect market are not even approximately fulfilled by 
property markets. Rather they are likely to offer what Alan Evans describes 
as ‘efficiency over time’ (1995 at p. 12). After reviewing the empirical 
evidence, Evans concludes that the property market is not efficient even in 
the weak form of Fama style market efficiency and the most recent work by 
Wang (2000) also confirms this finding.
Evans explores theoretically the idea that property markets are efficient in the 
long term. He puts forward a definition of efficiency that is appropriate to the 
property market and which takes account of the special characteristics of 
both property itself and the property market, including the institutional lease 
(see 2.6.5). This analysis includes location, market segmentation, 
infrequency of trading, and even the role of the agent in the operation of the 
market. He concludes that the property market is relatively inefficient when 
judged by the yardstick of stock market efficiency but that the property 
market in the long term can be treated as being 90 per cent efficient.
It is concluded that the property market offers a long-term efficiency that 
reflects the rational decisions of tenants and other occupiers. This ‘efficiency 
over time’ is necessary if the expected shifting of business rates into rents is 
to be successfully isolated but it implies the need for a long time frame in any 
empirical work that seeks to explore property tax impacts.
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2.6.4 DEVELOPING THE THEORY
In seeking to explain the theory of rental value determination, Fraser (1993 at 
p. 169) asks three questions, each of which can be answered from the 
elementary model developed earlier.
1. What causes rent to be paid for the use of land?
Rent will be paid for land when potential users consider that the 
revenue earning potential of the land exceeds all factor costs, 
including profit (but excluding the land itself).
2. What determines the amount of rent paid for the use of land?
The amount of rent that will be paid for land can be viewed as the 
residual surplus expected from using the land in its most profitable 
use. The surplus referred to here is the residual that is left after 
deducting all costs, including an allowance for profit.
3. What causes rental value to change over time?
Rental values will change over time if the expected surplus of revenue 
over costs of use changes. This may result from a change in the costs 
of produce from the land, from changed factor costs or from a 
combination of both.
It is Fraser’s second two questions that are of special significance to this 
study. In answering these questions, the effect of the imposition of, or 
change in, a property tax on occupiers can be explained.
2.6.5 THE IMPACT OF THE UK INSTITUTIONAL LEASE
On the basis of the theory discussed so far, rental value is represented 
directly by the amount of the surplus after deducting costs.
One of the key assumptions was that the tenancy was for one year, following 
which it could be renegotiated. This renegotiation will reflect changes in the 
surplus that could be paid as rent.
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In the UK, properties are actually occupied under a lease contract for a fixed 
term of years, with a term of 20 years or more being the market norm for 
institutional investment property before 1990, since when the trend has been 
towards shorter lease lengths (Crosby and Lizieri 1998).
Each year the tenant pays the amount of rent agreed under the lease. The 
lease will specify, inter alia, provisions for a periodic rent review, with the 
predominant rent review frequency in a modern lease being at five-yearly 
intervals (BPF/IPD 2002). In between rent reviews the rent paid under the 
lease is usually fixed. This is referred to as the contract rent or passing rent 
and this rent is reviewed as provided for in the lease at the date of rent 
review.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between contract rent, rental value and 
rent review. This relationship affects the way changes in rental value are 
transmitted to the rent payable by tenants in occupation.
In the case of a new letting, in a reasonably efficient property market, the 
contract rent and rental value will be the same at the time that the letting is 
agreed. Thereafter, depending on changes in rental values, the two may 
diverge. If the letting market is absolutely static, then no change will occur 
between contract rent and rental value but, if rental values increase after the 
contract rent is agreed, the contract rent will be lower than the rental value 
until the next rent review when the process of divergence may start again. 
Figure 2.3a illustrates this situation graphically.
It is common for the contract rent to be reviewed to full rental value at the 
rent review date, but there is often a provision for the review to be ‘upward 
only’. This means that, if rental values have fallen since the contract rent was 
agreed, there would be no decrease in rent payable. This is described as ‘a 
ratchet effect’ by Baum (1989 at p. 75). In this case the contract rent would 
remain unchanged at rent review even if the rental value had fallen. This is 
illustrated graphically in Figure 2.3b.
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RELATIONSHIP OF RENTAL VALUE TO CONTRACT RENT
Rent
Rental Value 
Contract Rent
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Figure 2.3a: Relationship of Rental Value to Contract Rent
Assuming Steady Rental Value Growth
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Figure 2.3b : Relationship of Rental Value to Contract Rent
Assuming a Fall in Rental Value
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The lease represents a binding commitment for both parties for its duration. 
Only at the end of the lease (or a contractual break point) are the parties free 
to renegotiate terms, at which time the effect of any general fall in rental 
values could be passed on to the tenant.
The mechanism of rent review has some important implications for tenants, 
because they are not free to reduce their rents to reflect increased costs of 
operating. Under a lease with upward only rent reviews, and no break option 
for the tenant, no decrease in rent can be expected, even when the rent is 
reviewed. Only at the end of the lease will falls in rental value be passed on 
to the tenant and the length of leases makes such falls less likely. Even if 
rental values have faltered during the lease term, no reduction in rent would 
accrue to the tenant unless there was a sustained fall in values; this is one of 
the explanations for shorter leases in the early 1990s (Crosby and Murdoch 
1998 at p. 6).
The periodic rent review, in a rising market, means that tenants are not faced 
with an annually increasing rent bill, and experience has shown that even a 
three-yearly review pattern is impractical, given the costs associated with 
agreeing the revised rent.
Given that rental bids are based on the expected profitability of operating a 
business from a property, the rent review pattern will have an influence on 
the tenant’s rental bid. If inflation or income growth is expected to increase 
the surplus expected each year, rational tenants, in a competitive market, will 
increase their rental bid to reflect the higher surplus in the latter part of the 
rent review period. They might be expected to bid the average expected 
annual surplus for the whole of the rent review period. Baum and Crosby 
(1995 at p. 17) accept that rental values will reflect ‘the fixed nature of the 
review period and are higher than their annual equivalent would be’ but they 
go on to point out that ‘there is no published empirical proof for this’. Even so, 
mathematical models of this ‘uplift’ have existed for many years (e.g. Rose 
1979) and recent theoretical work has produced more complex stochastic 
models (see Ambrose et al. 2002).
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The contractual rigidities introduced into the property market by the lease 
represent an externality and in other markets there have been several 
studies of this problem. See for example Ball (1987) or Taylor (1980).
The lease contract influences the way the price of occupation is set. For an 
open market letting, the rent is determined by the forces of demand and 
supply but, when the rent is reviewed to market value, the amount of the rent 
is settled by negotiation between the landlord and the tenant and the lease 
contract will specify a legal definition of market value. This will be based on a 
valuation (itself based on market values) but that is not the same as a 
transaction in the open market. Rent review and lease renewal evidence 
cannot be treated as a true market transaction (Crosby and Murdoch 2001 at 
p. 130). The difference between rental values from market transactions and 
rental valuations (that are based on a valuer's opinion of rental value) is 
important and it is discussed in Appendix 2. This thesis is concerned with 
rental value as determined in the letting market (the price) and, apart from 
careful discussion of the rental proxy used in this thesis for the empirical 
study, the distinction between rental value and rental valuation is not 
considered further.
2.6.6 THE IMPACT OF A RISE IN COSTS RELATIVE TO REVENUE
The concept of rent as a residual is central to the chief hypothesis of this 
research and it is useful to examine briefly the effects on the residual rent of 
changes in costs, such as changes in rate burden.
If revenues rise at the same rate as costs, the impact on rental values 
(viewed as a residual) will be neutral. If costs rise faster than revenue, the 
annual surplus can be expected to fall, but the contractual rigidities of the 
institutional lease mean that the changes in residual rent will not be 
immediate and the increased costs will not be reflected by an immediate fall 
in rent payable (at least for existing tenants). In times of rental value growth, 
increases in costs will tend to manifest themselves through a slower rate of 
rental value growth. This reduced rate of rental growth can be used to 
explain the long-term impact of business rates on rental values.
Appendix 3 illustrates and explains this situation, which can be described as 
a ‘gearing effect’.
53
Chapter 2
2.7 RENTAL VALUE -  A DEMAND AND SUPPLY ANALYSIS
The model above shows the nature of rent as a residual, but the level of rent 
will be set by the interaction of demand and supply, as occupiers compete to 
take properties that will allow them to earn profits.
The work in 2.7 is based around the important contribution of Fraser (1986; 
1993) and also draws on the work of Barlowe (1986) and DiPasquale and 
Wheaton (1996).
2.7.1 INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY LEVEL
The rental value of an individual property is determined by the occupation 
demand for it and, the greater the difference between a property’s revenue 
earning potential and the factor costs involved in using it, the greater will be 
the occupation demand. This difference is referred to by Fraser as a 
property’s ‘revenue productivity’. He goes on to explain that the features of a 
property will affect its revenue productivity and the factor costs of use, which, 
in turn, will determine its rental value.
Features that affect an individual property’s revenue productivity will include 
physical features such as design, layout and construction, but Fraser 
identifies location as being of dominant importance in explaining the demand 
for any urban property. Location is important in both a regional and a local 
context, and once built, ‘property in areas of low demand cannot move 
physically to satisfy high demand in another location’ (Fraser 1993 at p. 106).
The location of a property is critical to business premises, because it affects 
the transfer of goods, convenience for the labour force, customers and 
others. The movement of both people and goods is expensive and time 
consuming and accessibility is one of the most important factors in assessing 
the quality of location. A world where distance has little meaning, suggested 
by Cairncross (2001) since the advent of fast internet communications, is not 
supported by the empirical evidence (see for example Jones Lang LeSalle 
2001). Transport is still of central importance in location decisions and the 
physical features of a property, combined with its location, will determine its 
revenue productivity, even in these days of internet communications.
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2.7.2 AGGREGATE PROPERTY LEVEL
The property market has to be thought of as a number of interconnected sub- 
markets (Evans 1973), distinguished according to use, type, location, quality 
and size. The value of any individual property or subgroup of properties is 
determined by the forces of demand and supply acting in its own sub-market.
Occupation demand is dependent on the surplus that can be expected from 
carrying on business activity in that property. This surplus depends in turn on 
the demand for the goods or services that can be produced in that property, 
so that demand for property is determined by the level of demand for goods 
and services in the economy. This demand is affected by macro-economic 
variables, such as interest rates, the level of employment and the level of 
disposable income. Changes in real personal disposable income are a 
crucial determinant of aggregate occupation demand.
The general level of rental values is determined by the flows of occupation 
demand and supply of property to let, with rental values at any point in time 
being determined by demand from tenants seeking accommodation and the 
supply of floor-space being offered to let on the market (not the stock of 
property that exists in any one area). Stock of property may be significant in 
explaining long-term market supply but, in the short run, supply can vary 
independently of changes in stock.
Fraser (1986; and 1993, Chapter 15) gives a comprehensive treatment of the 
supply elasticity of business property which is used as the basis for the 
following discussion.
In the short run, both the new and existing elements of supply tend to be 
relatively inelastic. The supply of business property to let can be defined as 
the amount of space flowing onto the letting market at any point in time. It is 
made up of existing property being offered for re-let, new property being let 
for the first time and, to a lesser extent, owner occupier property being let for 
the first time. Existing property is a close substitute for new property of the 
same quality and these two elements of supply can be considered together 
for the purposes of this analysis.
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The supply of new property onto the market at any point in time depends on 
development decisions that were made some time previously, sometimes 
years earlier. The amount of development activity depends on the expected 
profitability of development, which in turn is dependent on the expected 
difference between the value of the completed property and the total cost of 
development. In times of rising occupation demand, the volume of 
development activity tends to increase, leading, after a time lag, to an 
increase in new supply. The time period involved in development projects 
means that supply cannot respond immediately to changes in demand.
The supply of existing property to let is expected to be more stable than 
tenant demand, because the terms of the institutional lease will tend to 
increase the stability of supply (see 2.6.5 above). At any point in time, the 
supply of existing property available on the letting market will depend on the 
decision of tenants to vacate their premises on lease expiry. These decisions 
are influenced by the same factors that determine occupation demand. 
Decisions by occupiers to give up a lease and vacate a property depend on 
the tenant’s expectations of future profitability, just like decisions to take up a 
lease in the first place. In times of anticipated profits growth tenants will not 
wish to vacate and supply will be constrained. On the other hand, in times of 
falling profitability, the supply of property to let can be expected to rise. Even 
if tenants cannot give up their lease until it expires they may be able to sublet 
their property and this will further increase supply at that time.
Rental value changes in the short term will tend to result from changes in 
occupation demand. This is due to the relatively stable supply of property to 
let compared with more changeable occupation demand.
In the medium term, both the new and existing components of supply in the 
letting market are much more elastic than in the short run and they tend to 
vary cyclically. In times of recession the supply of existing property to let will 
tend to increase as tenants exit the industry or otherwise reduce their 
demands for space. On the other hand, existing supply will tend to decline as 
businesses become more profitable when economic conditions improve. 
Increases in tenant demand are likely to result in more new development 
starts, but the supply of new property can only respond to increased demand 
after a time lag, represented by the development period. This lagged
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response of new supply will vary with changing values and changing demand 
over the economic cycle.
The analysis of long-run supply elasticity for urban business property is 
complicated by the dual components of urban land. Buildings are essentially 
a manufactured product and their supply is elastic. The proportion of land to 
buildings that comprise a property will influence its supply elasticity and 
rental value. The proportion will vary according to property type, the location, 
building specification and the intensity of use.
2.8 RENTAL VALUE AND PROPERTY TYPE
The discussion below considers in turn the three types of property that are 
the subject of the empirical work contained in this thesis. In the past two 
decades technological and business changes have blurred the boundaries 
between these sectors, such that the property and locational requirements of 
high technology manufacturing firms, out-of-town retailers and service 
businesses seeking space can be very similar (Ball et al. 1998). The specific 
areas and property types selected for this thesis are not affected by this 
blurring of boundaries, except perhaps in the industrial area, where planning 
considerations are mentioned below. Otherwise, no further consideration is 
given to this issue. Again, the discussion is based around Fraser (1986;
1993) with additional reference to Lewis (1979).
2.8.1 INDUSTRIAL
The occupier of industrial property is most likely to be a business seeking to 
make a profit from occupation, but the link between rent as a residual and 
expected occupation costs is not as strong for industrial property as it is for 
retail. The link is clear for a small business operating from a single location 
but, where the occupier is a larger business with multiple branches, the 
profitability of one location cannot be measured in the same way. In the long 
run, the value of industrial property will tend to reflect building and 
development costs rather than profitability, but this relationship is closest 
when land availability is good (which is less likely to apply in established 
urban areas).
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Modern industrial property is likely to be located on an estate. Industrial is 
taken to include factories, light industrial units, warehousing and distribution 
depots. Unlike retail property, the precise location is less critical with easier 
substitution between one industrial property and another. Except in specific 
contexts or sectors, few benefits arise for an industrial occupier being located 
in close proximity to other related businesses and there is less need for 
industrial occupiers to attract customers to their premises. This makes the 
precise location for industrial premises much less important than it is for 
shops or offices. The key factors that affect industrial occupiers are access to 
transport and the road network and proximity to a suitable workforce.
Planning policies in the UK have usually provided for an adequate supply of 
land with planning permission for industrial property but, in fully developed 
urban areas, which form the subject of this thesis, the scarcity of land (as a 
result of higher paying competing uses) and the inability to satisfy industrial 
demand by vertical development will result in a relatively inelastic supply of 
industrial property.
Changes in planning policy in 1987 and 1988 resulted in much more flexible 
zoning of different industrial users. Light industrial use was merged with 
offices under the Town & Country Planning Use Classes Order 1987, 
creating a new B1 use class. This was an amalgamation of the previous 
1972 Use Class II (offices) and Class III (light industrial) and these changes 
resulted in greater effective supply for some uses, as changes of use 
became Permitted Development and did not require planning permission.
The intention was to allow ‘high-tech’ occupiers to utilise their floor space 
more flexibly, overcoming a problem with the previous sui generis planning 
permissions, which tended to specify the proportion of a building that could 
be used for office (e.g. 20%) and the proportion that could be used for light 
industrial use (Fuller Peiser 1985).
In 1988 a new General Development Order introduced further flexibility. This 
allowed changes between the 1987 use classes B8 (storage and distribution) 
and B2 (general industry) to be treated as Permitted Development (for 
buildings under 235 m2).
One consequence of these changes was a reduction in the overall supply of
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industrial, light industrial and storage buildings: those that were suitable for 
office use could now be occupied as offices without the need for planning 
permission. Within a couple of years the majority of new B1 development that 
was carried out was built to full office specification (King & Co 1989).
Research commissioned by the Department of the Environment into the 
operation of the planning changes found that ‘... every site with a light or 
general industrial use or allocation is potentially an office location’. The report 
went on to state ‘With the return from office space significantly greater than 
from other types of business space, then if the location is right it is office 
space that will be built’ (Wooton Jeffreys Consultants and Bernard Thorpe 
1991 at p. 21).
In this thesis industrial property is defined to include all of the industrial use 
classes, including B1. The blurring of the boundaries between office use 
within an industrial building and traditional office use does not affect the 
selection of properties for the industrial study, which is based on the location 
and physical design of the buildings.
2.8.2 RETAIL
Retail units are occupied by businesses who expect to make a profit from 
their occupation and the link between shop rents and the theory of rent as a 
residual is the strongest out of the three classes of urban property 
considered in this thesis. One reason for this is that the profitability can be 
judged at unit level, even for a multi-branch retailer.
The stock of town centre retail space is very inelastic even in the long run. It 
is worth noting that this inelasticity applies within a shopping area, but not 
between shopping centres; the overall stock of shops within a city will be 
much more elastic as a result of new development of both shopping centres 
and out-of-town retailing.
The inelasticity within an established urban shopping district arises because 
of the inability to increase the retail space and because of the crucial 
importance of location and even micro-location relative to pedestrian flow, 
and other determinants of prime pitch. For town centre shops it is typically 
not possible to satisfy demand in a given location by horizontal or vertical
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development. Shops on one side of a street may have rental values 
substantially different from similar shops on the other. Even on the same side 
of the street, shop values can change dramatically within a few metres.
In a given town centre shopping area, demand by tenants is highest for retail 
space fronting the street (at street level) and that space cannot be 
significantly increased. This is known as Zone A space (see Baum et al.
1997 at p. 50) and is very inelastic. With an inelastic supply, shop values are 
primarily demand determined and demand will vary according to the 
spending power of the local population.
The planning changes of 1987 resulted in relaxations of retail uses, allowing 
more flexible changes between different types of use, without the need for 
planning permission. This created a new class of use, known as A1, which 
represented ordinary retail use and this is the type of shop that is considered 
in this work.
2.8.3 OFFICES
Offices are occupied by all types of tenants, not exclusively businesses. 
Possible office occupiers include local and national government, charities 
and other not-for-profit organisations. Business occupiers include 
professions, financial services and even manufacturing businesses. It can be 
seen that office-based activities serve all sectors of the economy and 
demand will reflect the general level of economic activity. The link between 
the profitability of occupying a particular office and the rent that can be paid 
is weaker for offices than it is for shops. Public sector occupiers have no link 
with residual profitability and the costs of a business headquarters building in 
London cannot be planned on the profitability of the administrative activities 
that take place in the building. Occupation demand and rental values will tend 
to follow a cyclical economic trend.
Compared to retail property, the stock of office property is much more elastic 
in the long run. Office demand can be met by building vertically and by 
transferring land from other urban uses, subject to the constraints of planning 
control. As with industrial property, one office property is easily substituted 
for another, and this will affect the elasticity of demand for office property.
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This stock elasticity means that the supply side analysis is closer to that of 
industrial property and in the long run it is expected that values will show a 
close relationship with development cost. However, in Central London, where 
sites are scarce and office development is strictly controlled, values will be 
demand determined. Only in locations where supply is elastic can it be 
expected that values will have a close long-term link with development cost.
Office property is used to house people and carry out administrative 
functions. Location relative to other offices and to transport facilities for 
customers and staff makes the city centre the traditional location for offices, 
but traffic congestion and lack of car parking explain the trend to out-of- 
centre business parks.
The 1987 planning use of B1 applies to the offices selected for the empirical 
work, but the location and physical design of the buildings involved makes 
this an office study, even though the planning use is more flexible (B1 users 
also include light industrial use).
2.9 THE DETERMINATION OF FREEHOLD CAPITAL VALUES
Discussion in this chapter is primarily concerned with the determination of 
rental values but it is the goal of this thesis to examine tax capitalisation.
Even though the tax is imposed on the occupier of the property, the burden is 
expected to be borne by the owner of the property (in the form of a reduction 
in capital value). This necessitates a brief look at the way in which rental 
values of business property are translated into capital values.
The actual price of an investment property is determined by the forces of 
demand and supply in the investment market (see Fraser 1993 Part II for a 
detailed explanation of the pricing of property investments). No consideration 
is given in this thesis to leasehold investment properties.
The capital value of any income-earning investment can be stated to be the 
present value of the expected future income flows from the investment. In the 
case of business property the income is represented by the rent. The 
investment price of a property is determined by the underlying income that 
will be received, from which it can be seen that any reduction in rental value
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caused by the imposition of a property tax will result in a fall in capital values.
In this thesis it is assumed that the full amount of any reduction in rental 
value that is attributable to the tax will be fully capitalised into property values 
(see 3.6).
The magnitude of any tax capitalisation will be affected not only by the extent 
of any reduction in rental values caused by the tax but also by any effect that 
the tax has on investment yields. The UK property tax does not place an 
administrative burden on property investors (unless they are also owner 
occupiers) and the impact of the tax is expected to have an effect on 
investment income, making it less likely that investors would adjust their 
required yield.
The position may be different for taxes levied on the owner of a property, 
such as in the United States or if the political environment introduced 
uncertainty. In a climate of frequent and unpredictable changes in tax burden 
or a policy of tax change, for example, from occupiers onto property owners, 
investors may alter their required investment yield to reflect the expected 
consequences of the tax. Any actual yield change would take place through a 
process of market adjustment in the investment property market.
Adjustments to investment yields as a result of the UK property tax are not 
considered further in this thesis.
2.10 CONCLUSIONS
Whilst there is disagreement amongst economists about the precise 
definition of land, especially in an urban context, there is a more general 
neglect of spatial economics in mainstream economic theory, which ‘has 
confined itself to a wonderland of no spatial dimensions’ (Isard 1956). This 
aspatial view is compounded by a failure to recognise the ownership 
interests in land, which Krugman (1995) identifies as a serious oversight 
when the role of economics in explaining activities in a capitalist economy is 
considered. (Turvey (1957) shows an unusual appreciation of the role played 
by different ownership interests).
There is, nevertheless, a large body of work by urban economists that
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explains the way land values are determined, ranging from the early work of 
von Thunen (1826) in Germany, through to the pioneering urban analysis of 
Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), Mills (1972) and Evans (1973). More recent 
British contributions have been made by Fraser (1986; 1993), and Cheshire 
and Sheppard (1995; 1998).
The rent of a property can be viewed as the residual left after all costs are 
deducted and in a competitive market this rent will be determined by the 
forces of demand and supply, with location as the dominant influence on 
price.
Business rates in the UK will be capitalised if they impact on rental values. 
The precise effect of the property tax on rents will depend on several 
different factors: most importantly on the type of property; whether a short-, 
medium- or long-run analysis is made; general economic conditions; and 
equilibrium conditions in the local market.
Chapter 3 now considers the economics of property taxation, with the 
emphasis on tax capitalisation.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY TAXATION
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the economics of the property tax, with particular 
reference to the United Kingdom, where the tax is known as business rates 
and is used for the finance of local government. Appendix 1 gives an 
overview of the legal framework of business rates.
The chapter reviews the economic principles of taxation, including the 
benefit principle and the ability to pay principle and then goes on to consider 
developments in the economic analysis of tax incidence. A straightforward 
model of tax capitalisation is explained.
A discussion of the theoretical developments is made with the emphasis on 
the three ‘views’ of the property tax that have emerged over the past 30 
years.
No lengthy analysis is made in this thesis of the large areas of public sector 
economics that are concerned with the rationale of the modern state, the 
analysis of public goods, public choice and welfare economics; coverage of 
these topics is given in any of the standard texts (see for example Musgrave 
and Musgrave 1989).
Table 1.1 set out the OECD Classification of Taxes and it is worth reiterating 
here that this thesis is concerned only with OECD Class 5220: recurrent 
taxes on immovable property that are paid by enterprises. The history of 
other (non-recurrent) taxes on urban property is long and notorious (see 
Prest 1981), but these taxes are not considered in this thesis.
3.2 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Property taxes, that is, taxes on land and buildings, have long formed an 
important part of government revenues in many countries throughout the 
world, but the mechanics of the tax vary from country to country.
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A report on taxes on immovable property within member countries was 
prepared by the OECD (1983) and a comparative review by McCluskey 
(1999b) provides a more recent and comprehensive coverage of property tax 
systems in 21 countries, 14 of which are outside the OECD membership.
The common feature is that the tax base is always assessed by reference to 
the value of real or immovable property and there are two principal 
alternative methods adopted for defining the tax base around the world: the 
tax is based either on the rental value of property or on the capital value of 
property.
In the UK the tax base is assessed by reference to rental values of 
properties, whilst in the United States it tends to be assessed by reference to 
capital values. In the US both tax base and tax rate are set locally, whilst in 
the UK the tax base has long been assessed centrally and the same tax 
base applied to all local authorities. In the UK the tax base is periodically 
reassessed on a national basis. In the US, assessment is by jurisdiction and 
it is unusual for wholesale reassessment of the tax base in any particular 
administrative area.
A further important difference in practice between the UK and the US is that 
the legal incidence of the property tax in the US falls on the building owner, 
whereas in the UK it falls on the building occupier.
Administrative issues also play a part, affecting the scale of the analysis. 
Following successive reorganisations of local government boundaries in the 
UK (see 5.2.1), there were fewer than 500 separate local authorities in 1998 
with power to levy a rate. Contrast this with the US where, in 1997, there 
were 39,000 separate governments with authority to impose a property tax 
(OECD 1997b). Another, more important, difference in the US is the 
prospect of overlapping tax jurisdictions, which does not exist in the UK, 
even allowing for rate precepting by higher level authorities (rate precepts 
are explained in A1.3.4).
In many countries, especially those that are federally organised, there are 
significant differences in both the tax base and the tax rate between different 
jurisdictions. Until 1990 local authorities in the Britain set their own tax rate,
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which resulted in wide differences in the tax burden between jurisdictions 
and this facet of the UK system is used in the empirical study carried out as 
part of this work.
In nearly all systems there are exemptions and reliefs from the tax 
(Youngman and Malme 1994), for example, religious bodies and charities in 
many countries and in the UK for the whole agricultural sector.
3.3 PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION
In 1776, Adam Smith (Smith 1776) set out four canons of taxation: equity, 
certainty, convenience and efficiency. When measured against these criteria, 
property taxes can easily comply with the requirement for certainty and 
convenience. The difficulties arise with the question of equity and efficiency.
In dealing with equity, there are two questions that need to be 
considered:
Who bears the burden?
Is the tax fair?
The first question is absolutely central to this work and is considered in detail 
in 3.4. The second question is also reviewed but in less detail in 3.3.3.
Dealing with efficiency and recasting it in the modern language of public 
finance, the tax burdens related to efficiency can be classified into two 
categories (James and Nobes 2000), the excess burden of the tax and costs 
of the tax, both administrative and compliance.
3.3.1 EXCESS BURDEN
It is to be hoped that the overall burden of taxation will be more than offset 
by the benefits to society and the economy from the resultant government 
activity. But taxes are compulsory and, given the lack of choice by taxpayers, 
the levying of a tax may alter economic activity. This is called the excess 
burden or deadweight loss. The excess burden of taxation can be defined to
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mean the reduction in economic efficiency that is introduced by and 
attributable to the tax system.
Income and substitution effects can be distinguished as part of the excess 
burden. As the taxpayer’s income is reduced by the imposition of the tax, 
spending power is reduced and there is a transfer of resources between the 
taxpayer sector and the public sector. The substitution effect arises when 
relative prices are affected by the tax and this results in substitutions of one 
form of consumption for another.
Excess burden tends to be analysed as part of the tax incidence in an 
analysis that can take place at several different levels. One analytical device 
that is often used to examine the excess burden at a theoretical level is the 
imposition of a specific tax on a single commodity (see James and Nobes 
2000 at p. 23 for an example of this analysis).
3.3.2 ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMPLIANCE COSTS
The costs of running the tax system can be ascribed to the heading of 
administrative costs if they are borne by the public sector and as compliance 
costs if they are borne by the private sector. Those features of a tax that 
impose costs on one sector also tend to impose costs on the other (James 
and Nobes 2000 at p. 38).
The degree of complexity is the single most important feature that influences 
these costs and this will tend to influence costs on both sectors in the same 
direction. After complexity, the most obvious other factors that determine the 
administrative and compliance costs are the amount of work required to 
determine liability and the frequency of payment.
Administrative and compliance costs for the UK property tax are relatively 
low and this has always been one of the advantages of the tax.
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3.3.3 IS THE TAX‘FAIR’?
Everyone can agree that taxes should be fair, but there the consensus 
stops. Over a period of 200 years two alternative equitable principles of 
taxation emerge from the literature: the benefit principle and the ability to pay 
principle (Brown and Jackson 1990 at p. 299). The benefit principle is an 
attempt to assess the basis of taxation on how much benefit is received by 
the taxpayer from the expenditure, whilst the ability to pay principle is based 
on how much a taxpayer can afford to pay.
The original rationale of business rates was as a benefit tax used to pay for 
local services and today the tax is still used for this purpose. The problem is 
that, as the breadth of local services has increased and the size of local 
authority administrative areas in the UK has grown, the attributable benefits 
become more remote from the taxpayer. This is especially true since the 
introduction of the Uniform Business Rate in the UK with the tax revenue 
being pooled and redistributed by central government (see A1.4)
3.3.4 BENEFIT TAXES
A general benefit tax would operate on the principle that taxes are paid in 
direct return for the benefits received. The benefit principle likens the tax 
system to the market system and in its most pure form it considers taxes as 
a voluntary payment for public goods. This is a big departure from the true 
position, taxes being compulsory and non elective.
A further difficulty arises in the analysis of who benefits most from the 
consumption of public goods, especially pure public goods, such as defence, 
which are both non-rival and non-excludable (see Samuelson 1954).
Furthermore, the benefit principle cannot be applied to the redistributive 
function of government as defined by Musgrave and Musgrave (1989). This 
is considered to be a significant flaw in the benefit principle, because it 
cannot be applied to expenditures that are designed to be straight 
redistributions, such as Income Support or Working Families Tax Credit.
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Benefit taxes are attractive to economists because they necessarily take 
account of both the raising of the revenue and the expenditures made by 
government. But a general benefit tax is only of theoretical interest and it will 
not be considered further.
The alternative to general benefit taxes is a specific benefit tax. Such taxes 
are more feasible and are encountered in practice in several cases, such as 
television licence fees and planning fees, which are really ‘user charges’. For 
a benefit tax to be truly specific, the funds collected should be earmarked 
and allocated to the expenditure concerned, a technique known as tax 
hypothecation. The UK Treasury does not maintain a separate 'pot' for any 
individual taxes, with the exception of National Insurance contributions. 
Names like 'Road Fund Licence' for vehicle taxes suggest a separate 
earmarked fund but, since 1937, the vehicle licence fees have been used for 
general purposes.
Since 1990, business rates have been collected by local authorities and paid 
into a central pool for redistribution according to population (see A1.4). This 
does not make it a benefit tax in the sense being discussed here. In fact, it 
removes doubt about the relationship of the tax (paid by business) and the 
benefit (distributed according to the residential population).
The Water Rate, a close relative of the Business Rate, was an example of a 
specific benefit tax, which existed until privatisation of the water industry in 
1989.
3.3.5 THE ABILITY TO PAY PRINCIPLE
This is today the generally accepted principle of distributing the tax burden. 
The ability to pay principle has its foundations in the writings of Adam Smith 
(1776) and John Stuart Mill (1848), although Smith advocated both the 
ability to pay and the benefit principles at different times.
The main debate about this principle is how to measure the ability to pay. 
Much has been written on the subject and the Meade Committee (1978)
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gives a comprehensive review of the alternatives, as does Kaldor (1965) in 
his famous proposal for an expenditure tax.
Property taxes, whether based on capital or rental values, are loosely related 
to the ability to pay. An occupier of a large or expensive property is, on the 
face of it, more able to pay higher tax. There is also the benefit principle 
argument that the taxpayer will use more local services. The difficulty arises 
when the tax base is unrelated to the actual ability to pay the tax today. This 
can arise for a number of different reasons. Where the tax is based on 
capital values, the occupation of a large, expensive office building in a city 
centre does not necessarily imply an ability to pay high taxes out of current 
income. Changing patterns of value in the urban area can result in 
anomalies and in the UK the infrequent reassessment of the tax base has 
allowed such inequalities to remain in place with a resulting loss of 
confidence in the rating system (see for example Birdseye and Webb 1984).
The relationship between occupation of a property and the profitability of a 
business requires consideration. If a business has low or even no profits, the 
tax burden can be crippling. This is known as tax exhaustion and can be a 
significant problem for new businesses and start ups, as well as firms in 
positions of marginal profitability. One feature of the UK property tax is its 
deductibility from profits as an allowable expense against the central 
government taxation. This reduces the average rate for the combined tax 
burden on the business but the benefit of central deductibility is of no use to 
a tax-exhausted firm. It could be argued that occupation of property without 
the ability to pay the costs is a signal of misallocated physical resources. On 
the other hand, occupation of a property is a long-term commitment, 
influenced by the contractual rigidities of the institutional lease and business 
profitability is a residual with profits varying from year to year according to 
prevailing business conditions.
That it does not conform to the ability to pay principle has been a major 
criticism of the property tax (see for example Becker 1969; or in the UK 
Plimmer et al. 2000). This means that the tax is regressive in terms of 
income, with the average tax rate falling as income rises. For a progressive
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tax, the average tax rate should rise as income rises; this criticism is at least 
partly caused by the irregular revaluations of the tax base in the UK.
3.3.6 HORIZONTAL EQUITY
Due and Friedlaender (1981 at p. 234) identify the concept of horizontal 
equity- that those with equivalent circumstances should be treated equally.
Horizontal equity is most frequently compromised when administrative 
arrangements are unsatisfactory (Kay and King 1990 at p. 41). For the UK 
property tax in the period 1979-1990, horizontal equity was seriously 
compromised. It was possible for two occupiers of identical properties in 
adjacent administrative areas to pay vastly differing amounts of business 
rates, depending on the tax rate applied by the local authority.
Of course, if each received different services in exchange for the tax, then 
this may not have been so serious. In this case the benefit principle might be 
applicable and it would mean that horizontal equity was maintained. In 
Chapter 5 it is suggested that any additional benefits that are provided in 
high tax areas, flow to the residential sector and give few, if any, benefits for 
businesses. For the preservation of horizontal equity it is important that 
these benefits are attributable at least loosely to the taxpayer and not simply 
redistributed at local level to others in the jurisdiction.
Administrative fairness is another measure of the horizontal equity in a tax: it 
can clearly be argued that a tax system that allows identical neighbouring 
properties to be taxed at a greatly different level is a breach of this principle, 
again unless the benefits derived are demonstrably different.
3.4 TAX INCIDENCE
It is the issue of tax incidence, sometimes known as the distributional 
burden, that is the main subject of this thesis. The goal in analysing tax 
incidence is to understand and identify the tax impacts on entities other than 
the taxpayers themselves. The central question in its classic form is ‘Who 
bears the burden of the property tax?’, and answers to this question are
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important, because they help explain how the property tax affects owners 
and occupiers of property, as well as property markets themselves.
Five possible tax impacts were identified in Chapter 1 from the point of view 
of businesses.
1. Influence on overall profitability.
2. Influence on investment.
3. Influence on reinvestment.
4. Influence on choice of factors.
5. Influence on other economic entities through tax shifting.
These points are interrelated and the impact of the tax is both complex and 
difficult to analyse effectively. Simple models require unrealistic 
assumptions. Complex models can be unmanageable and the results 
impossible to test empirically.
The influence of the tax on other economic entities will depend on a number 
of issues, two of the most important being the mobility of labour and the 
degree to which the firm’s goods are locally consumed. The labour mobility 
will influence the extent of any wage effect, with immobile labour potentially 
bearing the impact of the tax in the form of lower total employment costs. 
That is, firms will employ fewer people rather than make an absolute cut in 
wages paid. Price effects may arise if the market for the firm’s goods is 
concentrated locally and the firm enjoys an element of monopoly. If not, and 
the goods are sold nationally or internationally in competitive markets, the 
tax may be shifted back to owners of capital, showing a capital effect, either 
in the form of reduced profits or in the form of reduced rents and thus lower 
capital values for property.
There are two basic approaches to the analysis of tax incidence. The partial 
equilibrium analysis is the traditional approach developed by Alfred Marshall 
and central to neo-classical economics. A partial equilibrium analysis is used 
to identify the initial impacts of a tax and at a theoretical level it is based on 
the assumption that all other commodity and factor prices remain 
unchanged. This obviously does not reflect all impacts of the tax analysis,
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which will depend on how the economy as a whole responds to the 
imposition of the tax and it is to address this weakness that a general or full 
equilibrium analysis is carried out.
A number of attempts have been made at a general equilibrium analysis 
over the years and the model that is now most generally accepted is the 
Harberger model (Harberger 1962), with modifications for the property tax by 
Mieszkowski (1967; 1969) and McLure (1971; 1975). McLure and Thirsk 
(1975) give an excellent graphical exposition of Harberger’s model. After a 
series of simplifying assumptions, the Harberger model makes the analysis 
in terms of two factors of production and two goods or sectors and for this 
reason it is often known as the ‘two sector general equilibrium model’. Other 
assumptions include perfectly inelastic supply of factors, perfect competition 
and a starting position of Pareto-efficient allocation before the tax is 
imposed. This last assumption underlies nearly all tax incidence analyses.
3.4.1 FORMAL INCIDENCE
Formal incidence is easy to establish, referring to the person or organisation 
(the taxed entity) who is legally obliged to pay the tax. In the case of the UK 
property tax, it is the occupier of the property.
3.4.2 ECONOMIC INCIDENCE
The identification of economic incidence requires an analysis of the extent of 
tax shifting, as well as the excess burden imposed by the tax. Property taxes 
can be shifted, either forwards -  through increased prices, or backwards -  
through reduced payments to suppliers or factors of production such as 
labour or property. These are the price, wage and capital effects referred to 
at the beginning of this section.
The burden of the tax could of course remain with the occupier, in which 
case the legal incidence and the economic incidence might appear to be the 
same. Even then, the effect of the tax would be to reduce profits, which
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might be borne by shareholders and capitalised in the form of lower share 
prices.
A more rigorous analysis of this initial incidence can be made by assessing 
effective tax rates on the taxed entity and this approach can be used to 
identify the fiscal wedge that exists between pre-tax and post-tax rates of 
return (Bennett and Krebs 1988). The fiscal wedge is a measure of the 
distortion introduced by the tax system (the model of tax incidence at 3.5 
also depicts the fiscal wedge).
Because there may be several intermediate bearers of the economic 
incidence before the final incidence of the tax is identified, economic 
incidence can be analysed at different levels. Final incidence analyses 
include an assessment of the full effects of the tax on the economy as a 
whole and this would require a general equilibrium analysis of taxation. Any 
analysis that does not seek to identify the full effects of a tax on the 
economy would be a partial equilibrium analysis and it is this level of 
analysis that is contemplated in this thesis.
Many incidence studies have dealt with local taxes in isolation from the 
benefits that arise, but the extent to which businesses benefit from local 
taxes is important. The whole problem of tax incidence comes about when 
tax and benefits do not match, and local property taxes on businesses in the 
UK can be seen as being only partially offset by the benefits. This may give 
rise to further incidence effects between businesses in high-tax areas and 
those in low-tax areas, if there is a greater benefit offset for one or other (as 
a proportion of tax paid).
Marshall (1890 at p. 794) identifies onerous rates as those where no 
compensating benefit is given to the person who pays them and beneficial 
rates as those that provide benefits for the taxpayer and which can be 
provided more cheaply by the local authority than any other way.
Another important part of this question relates to the relative share of the tax 
base composed by the business and residential sectors. Where the relative 
levels of service do not match the relative share of the tax base, the local 
authority action can be seen as redistributive (see 5.5.2).
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Finally, there may be uneven impacts, depending on how the tax is defined. 
Just as a payroll tax will bear disproportionately on labour-intensive 
businesses, so a property tax will be a greater burden on property-intensive 
businesses (disregarding the possibility of tax shifting). This has traditionally 
been seen as bearing most heavily on industry with its high property needs 
and rating assessments that include plant and machinery. As the industrial 
sector contracted during the 1970s this has changed and more recent 
figures suggest that industrial users spend on average 4.3% of their 
overheads on business rates compared to retailers, who spend 6.7% of their 
overheads on business rates (DOE 1995a at p. 39).
3.5 A MODEL OF TAX INCIDENCE
The most influential body of literature on tax incidence is cast in terms of a 
neoclassical economic framework and can together be taken as the modern 
neoclassical incidence theory.
The economic analysis of tax impacts under perfect competition is well 
established and a model of tax incidence is now developed from the 
perspective of the UK business rates, which are paid by the occupier.
This is an analysis of tax shifting effects between occupier and landlord (or 
building owner). There are other ways in which the occupier could shift the 
tax, both backwards or forwards, and these have already been discussed 
(see 3.4).
It should be noted that, for an analysis of incidence, it makes no difference 
whether the tax is imposed on occupiers or landlords. It is the relative price 
elasticities of demand and supply that determine the tax incidence.
For any analysis with tax, there will always be two prices in the system, the 
demand price and the supply price. The difference between the supply price 
and the demand price is described as a ‘fiscal wedge’ (King and Fullerton 
1984) and it was used by Bennett and Krebs (1988) in their macro-level 
analysis of UK property tax incidence and latterly by Bond et al. (1996a) in a 
micro-level analysis of tax incidence (see Chapter 4).
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The following analysis is based on the standard micro-economic model of 
tax incidence (Varian 1992 at pp. 228-230; Stiglitz 1999 at pp. 490-493; 
Varian 2003 at pp. 294-300). The figures are adapted from Stiglitz.
The demand price is the price paid by the occupier and the supply price is 
the price received by the landlord. The demand price and the supply price 
will differ by the amount of the tax:
Ps =  P d - f  (1)
where
ps = supply price 
pd = demand price 
t = the amount of the tax
The price paid by the occupier is less than the price received by the landlord 
by the amount of the tax. The behaviour of the occupier and of the landlord 
will depend on the price faced. The equilibrium condition is that demand 
equals supply:
D(pd) = S(ps) (2)
where
D = Demand 
S = Supply
Combining equation 1 and equation 2 gives either:
D(Pd) = S(Pd -  t) (3)
or
D(ps + t) = S(ps) (4)
Equation 3 represents the position if the tax is paid by the occupier but the 
solution for pd or ps is independent of whether equation 3 or equation 4 is 
solved. The amount by which the demand price falls (the extent to which the 
landlord will bear the tax) depends on the slope of the demand and supply 
curves. The flatter the demand curve or the steeper the supply curve, the 
more tax will be borne by landlords. The steeper the demand curve or the 
flatter the supply curve, the more tax will be paid by occupiers.
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The effective tax incidence will depend on the elasticity of demand (ed) 
relative to the elasticity of supply (ss).
The situation is shown graphically in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2. Because 
there are two prices in the system, the effects of the tax can be shown either 
as a downward shift in the demand curve or as an upward shift in the supply 
curve: the figures follow the convention discussed by Hirshleifer (1997 at p. 
39) of interpreting the tax as an ‘add-on’ amount and depicting only the 
supply curve shifts (against the demand price).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the position when the tax is borne entirely by the 
occupier. Figure 3.1a shows the case of a perfectly elastic supply curve (es= 
oo). The price rises by the full amount of the tax and the tax burden falls on 
the occupier. Figure 3.1b illustrates the case of a perfectly inelastic demand 
curve (ed= 0). The quantity demanded will not alter in response to a change 
in price and again the tax burden falls entirely on the occupier.
Figure 3.2 shows the position when the tax is borne by the landlord (who 
receives P0 - 1). Figure 3.2a shows the case of a perfectly inelastic supply 
curve (es= 0). The same supply curve applies both before and after a 
change in the tax (the supply curve shifts along itself) and price does not rise 
at all: the tax is shifted to the landlord. Figure 3.2b illustrates the case of a 
perfectly elastic demand curve (ed= oo). The demand price falls by the full 
amount of the tax and the landlord will bear the entire tax burden. For 
business rates, this represents a 100% shift from the occupier, who bears 
the legal incidence, and it translates to 100% capitalisation.
The polar demand and supply conditions shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are 
extremes. Increases in the tax will result in a combination of price effects: an 
increased price payable by the occupier and a reduced price receivable by 
the landlord. This will be influenced by the time scale of the analysis 
because the respective elasticities are likely to vary between the short-run 
and the long-run supply and they also will depend on the degree of factor 
substitution that is possible.
The importance of the relative elasticity of both supply and demand is clearly 
shown by the model of tax incidence set out in this section.
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Figure 3.1a: Perfectly Elastic Supply Curve
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Figure 3.1 b: Perfectly Inelastic Demand Curve
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ELASTICITY OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
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Figure 3.2b: Perfectly Elastic Demand Curve
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3.6 TAX CAPITALISATION
The incidence of property tax has always been a controversial topic and 
much of the debate centres around tax capitalisation, which is occasionally 
known as the generational burden of the tax.
Tax capitalisation describes the effect on the market price of an asset 
caused by the impact of the tax on the expected return from that asset. If the 
income from an asset is reduced by the imposition of the tax, this reduction 
will be capitalised (resulting in lower capital values). See James and Nobes 
(2000 at pp. 88-89) for a contemporary discussion of tax capitalisation in the 
UK context. In this thesis, any reduction in rental value caused by the 
imposition of a property tax is treated as causing a corresponding reduction 
in capital value.
The model set out in the previous section explained the way in which tax 
incidence will impact on the owner and occupier of a property. Whether a 
business property is rented or owner occupied, the capital value is a function 
of the expected rental income (see 2.9). If the tax is capitalised, this will be 
reflected by a reduction in the capital value of the property. The UK tax is 
paid by the occupier of the building. If the tax is paid by a tenant who is 
renting the building and the tenant reduces the amount of his rental bid by 
the amount of the tax (as explained in 2.6) the rental income will fall. If the 
tax is paid by a building owner who is in occupation then it will be a direct 
cost or a deduction from the notional rental value. In principle, therefore, 
where there are no offsetting benefits, the tax will be capitalised into the 
value of the building, resulting in a capital loss to the owner.
A theoretical assessment of the way business rates might impact on 
investment property in the UK was made by Fraser (1985), who used the 
popular device of assuming a total abolition of the tax (see for example 
Turvey 1957 at p. 68 or Harvey 1992 at p. 378 who both employ a similar 
assumption). Fraser assumes that the business rates are abolished in toto 
without any replacement tax and without any impact on public expenditures. 
He then examines the effect on property values and rents in such a situation, 
considering each type of property separately. The conclusion is that rent
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(and therefore property values) will rise, the extent of this depending on 
market conditions at the time and the relative supply elasticity of the 
particular property type (see 2.8).
If tax capitalisation takes place, it will introduce a distortion into the property 
market between investors and occupiers, as well as between different types 
of occupiers, such as leasehold occupiers and owner occupiers (Bennett 
and Krebs 1988 at p. 25). Taking the case of owner occupiers and assuming 
the tax is shifted backwards, the tax capitalisation is reflected in lower capital 
values, resulting from lower rental growth and possible distortions to the 
investment yield (see 2.9). Tenants under an occupational lease do not 
suffer in this way.
It has been argued that, if complete capitalisation of the tax (less the value of 
expected benefits) takes place, then the impact of the tax on business is 
zero. This fallacy was long ago identified as being based on a partial and 
inadequate analysis (Adams 1916). Bennett and Krebs (1988 at p. 24) 
observe that the question of business tax impacts will seem to disappear if a 
business can shift the whole of its tax burdens to other entities. This is only 
correct when viewed from the perspective of the taxed entity or the bearer of 
the legal incidence. The tax impact is simply shifted elsewhere and so it 
cannot in any real sense be considered to have disappeared.
The consequences for the entity bearing the economic incidence can vary.
In the case of a backward shift to owners of capital, the returns are reduced. 
In an environment of rapid or uncertain tax changes, the dynamics of 
capitalisation will be affected and there is scope for windfall gains (or losses) 
by the present owners of the asset. This can be controlled to some extent if 
the changes are government inspired, through the use of ‘rate capping’ (see 
5.5) or safety nets where there is a general shift of burdens following 
legislation (Bennett and Krebs 1988). Transitional relief under the uniform 
business rate is one example of such a safety net.
Finally, there is the question of the time frame within which capitalisation 
might take place. Contractual or other rigidities in factor supply and demand 
will influence the extent and speed of capitalisation. The mechanics of the 
UK property markets could result in a significant lag before tax changes can
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be capitalised, causing a different impact between the short-, medium- and 
long-term capitalisation effects of the tax (see 2.6.5 above).
3.7 MODERN NEOCLASSICAL INCIDENCE THEORY
Numerous reviews of the theory have been written over the years. More 
recent examples include a summary by Oates (2001); a British review by 
Mair (1991); and a comprehensive survey by Mieszkowski and Zodrow 
(1989).
As early as 1890, Alfred Marshall (1890 Appendix G) provided a substantial 
discussion of incidence of local rates. He discusses the difference between a 
uniform national property tax and ‘high onerous local rates’ and concludes 
that such rates will be shifted onto owners. Marshall sees ‘onerous rates in 
one district as a bounty to ... landlords in other [districts]’ and similar 
conclusions were reached by Chorlton (1907). In the US, Brown (1924) 
found that the tax would be borne by owners of capital in general (quoted in 
Simon 1943 at p. 399).
Today the literature distinguishes between three separate ‘views’ of the 
property tax, the traditional view, the new view and the benefit view (Zodrow 
2001a), although these names have not always been applied to the three 
schools of argument.
The traditional viewot property tax incidence, which predominated before 
1970, suggests that consumers bear the entire burden of the tax on capital 
and that landowners bear the entire burden of the tax on land. This view 
attempts to separate the land component of a property from the capital 
improvements component. Given the arguments set out in 3.3, and 
depending on the proportions of pure land to capital improvements, the 
suggestion is that property tax is borne largely by the occupier of property. In 
the US, where the tax is assessed on the capital value of a building and is 
paid by the building owner, this represents a shifting of the tax forwards to 
occupiers in the form of increased rents. Proponents of this view considered 
that it may in turn be shifted forwards by occupiers to their customers in the 
form of increased prices.
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Netzer (1966 Chapter III) fully explains the traditional view as it stood before 
it became the subject of an intense debate at the end of the 1960s. It is now 
generally accepted that the traditional view was incorrect and Heilbrun 
(1983) identifies the error of the traditional view as arising from attempts ‘to 
generalise about the effects of the tax from an argument that examined only 
one jurisdiction at a time’.
The new view of property tax incidence reaches a quite different conclusion. 
According to this view much of the burden of the tax is shifted backwards 
onto owners of property in the UK (or remains with owners of property in the 
US). The new view emerged from the seminal work of Mieszkowski (1972), 
which itself is built on Harberger’s model (see 3.4 above). In 1969 
Mieszkowski had been one of the first modern commentators to consider the 
spatial dimension of tax incidence and his views on the incidence were 
developed further by McLure (1971; 1975) and were subsequently extended 
by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1983; 1986). Interestingly, Marshall’s early 
work recognised both the spatial dimension and the impacts that are now 
accepted under the new view.
The new view of the property tax is now widely accepted (Netzer and 
Drennan 1997 at p. 103), but it is not without its detractors (see for example 
Fischel 2001a at p. 170). The main issue with the new view, as expressed by 
Mieszkowski, is that it is built on a general equilibrium analysis, which must 
necessarily be undertaken at national level. This fails to take account of the 
local variations in the tax base and the tax rate, which can vary considerably.
Aaron (1974) christened the Mieszkowski view of property tax incidence the 
‘new view’. In his partly polemical work, Aaron gives a good review of the 
differences between the traditional view and the new view, reiterating the 
chief assertion of the new view, namely that the incidence of the property tax 
is on property owners. Aaron (1975) also identifies a couple of situations 
where the traditional view is likely to be correct, such as periods of rent 
control, when government permits landlords to raise rents in response to a 
rise in tax.
The benefit view integrates local property tax into a Tiebout framework. 
Charles Teibout (1956) developed the work of Musgrave (1939) and
84
Chapter 3
Samuelson (1954), and applied it to a local framework, demonstrating that 
the qualities of pure public goods identified by Samuelson need not apply to 
local expenditures and that, in this context, taxpayers did have choice. 
Tiebout’s framework required a demanding set of assumptions, including 
perfect mobility between communities and Tiebout used a lump sum tax 
rather than a property tax to develop his framework.
The path-breaking work of Wallace Oates (1969), whilst primarily empirical, 
applied Tiebout’s hypothesis to the property tax. Oates’ work has been 
influential and many of the studies of capitalisation that followed adopted 
what has become known as the Tiebout-Oates model (see 4.2.1). Oates 
predicts that ‘for an increase in property taxes, unaccompanied by an 
increase in the output of local public services, the bulk of the rise in taxes will 
be capitalised in the form of reduced property values’. Where property taxes 
rise and there is a corresponding increase in public services, Oates implies 
that the tax will distort user preferences and confirms the Tiebout model of 
efficiency ‘in which rational consumers weigh (to some extent at least) the 
benefits from local public services against the cost of their tax liability’.
Hamilton (1975) took the Tiebout framework and developed it to show how a 
system of local taxes on residential property is equivalent to a non- 
distortionary set of user charges. Fischel (1975) and White (1975) extended 
this further, applying it to industrial property and showing that tax payments 
are equivalent to fees for public services. Each of these studies required a 
Tiebout assumption of high mobility between local jurisdictions but replaced 
lump sum taxes with the property tax and they introduce an assumption of 
strict planning controls (zoning ordinances).
Hamilton’s arguments and his introduction of zoning into the Tiebout model 
have been influential and a number of writers have adopted his position, with 
Fischel in the vanguard of benefit view proponents. He argues (2001b) that 
the tax is effectively a user charge paid in return for local public services, in 
which case it is non-distortionary and has no effect on the distribution of 
income. This is an extreme point of view and it is important to recognise that 
the benefit view is usually applied to residential property in the US where 
Fischel links the tax benefits to homeowners’ voting preferences.
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The benefit view analysis requires strict zoning ordinances and implies a 
market with a homogenous commodity, which is essentially the housing 
services approach suggested by Muth (1968 at pp. 285-333). The zoning 
assumption of the benefit model has been the subject of much debate and 
the benefit view is not without its critics, who unsurprisingly include 
Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989). They stress that the Hamilton version of 
the benefit view only obtains if the zoning requirements are binding, which is 
not a realistic assumption. Another criticism comes from Topham (1981), 
who makes a rare British contribution to the theoretical literature. Topham 
argues that the benefit view is limited to specific institutional circumstances 
and that, as a result of the exacting zoning requirements, the benefit view is 
only applicable in the short run. He concludes that property tax does not 
reduce to a simple user price.
Zodrow (2001 b) provides an up-to-date summary of the benefit view, 
contrasting it with the new view.
3.8 ALTERNATIVE INCIDENCE FRAMEWORKS
Two separate accounting frameworks have been developed by British 
authors for assessing the impact of local business taxes (Bennett and Krebs 
1988; and Tyler et al. 1988). The goal in both cases is the establishment of 
a framework in which to assess geographical variations in tax rates and in 
both cases the authors then apply their accounting framework to their own 
empirical research. Neither can be considered as important contributions to 
the theory, rather they represent theoretical frameworks, designed for a 
particular empirical test.
Mair’s (1984) extension of Kalecki’s insights to property tax incidence 
represents another isolated example of British development of the theory, 
this time within a post-Keynesian framework (as explained by Eichner 1979). 
Post-Keynesian incidence theory is in its infancy, especially for the analysis 
of the property tax and, apart from its use empirically by Damania (1986b) 
and Mair (1987), both working in Scotland, it does not gain acceptance in the 
mainstream literature.
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3.9 CONCLUSIONS
Several different conclusions can be drawn from this review of the literature, 
which gives a clear view of the different issues, theories and the alternative 
possibilities that exist for property tax incidence and capitalisation.
It can be seen that the majority of the theoretical developments in tax 
incidence assessment have come from the US and there has been little 
theoretical work carried out in the UK on the incidence of property tax. After 
Alfred Marshall’s early identification of the problem, there is a noticeable 
absence of British contributions to the theories of tax incidence and tax 
capitalisation.
Modern neoclassical incidence theory is foremost and other theoretical 
frameworks do not succeed, at least when judged by the test of the 
intellectual marketplace.
The most recent literature on the subject identifies two current views (the 
traditional view having been discredited) and there is a considerable and 
ongoing debate in the US about which of the competing views of the tax is 
most appropriate.
Evans (1985), writing from a British viewpoint is equivocal about the validity 
of Tiebout’s hypothesis, on which much of the benefit view literature is 
based, and which itself is focused on the residential sector. He makes the 
important observation that what applies in the US does not necessarily apply 
elsewhere, noting particularly the presence of many more local authorities 
within one US conurbation and also highlighting possible greater mobility in 
the US between local jurisdictions.
Undoubtedly some of the US work can be set aside as being contexted too 
closely within US conditions -  what may be correct for residential property in 
the US is unlikely to apply to business property in the UK.
The Tiebout-inspired benefit view literature is not considered to be highly 
relevant to this thesis, which takes a fundamentally new view approach to 
property tax incidence, based on the theoretical background reviewed in
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Chapters 2 and 3. From this it follows that the tax is expected to be shifted 
from the occupier who pays the tax back to the property owner in the form of 
reduced rent.
The work of Fraser (1985) provides a valid theoretical analysis of tax impacts 
that is both complete and is applied directly to UK business property. 
Although it is not placed in the context of the US literature, the view taken by 
Fraser is essentially the new view of the property tax and Fraser’s work is 
taken as a starting point. Using the model of tax incidence developed in this 
chapter and applying it in conjunction with the Elementary Rent Model 
developed in Chapter 2, it is possible to see how, at a theoretical level, the 
tax impacts can be expected to operate in the UK business property market. 
In Chapter 6 this will be applied to the research design that is used in the 
empirical work in this thesis.
Leaving aside for a moment the question of benefits received in return for 
the tax, it is clear that the most important factor in determining the level of 
tax shifting will be the interaction of demand and supply in the local property 
market and it is expected that supply elasticity will dominate.
Benefits received by the taxpayer, or more precisely, differential benefits 
between taxpayers in different local authority areas will be considered in 
Chapter 5, which examines the UK Property Tax.
Chapter 4 now reviews the empirical evidence as provided by existing 
studies in the UK and the US for both business and residential properties.
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CHAPTER 4
A REVIEW OF THE EXISTING EMPIRICAL STUDIES
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the empirical evidence of property tax capitalisation. 
Just as the theory saw major developments in the late 1960s, there was a 
corresponding increase in studies attempting to identify the capitalisation 
and other impacts of property taxes. In 1966 Netzer (1966 at p. 34) noted 
that ‘the empirical evidence on capitalization is most unsatisfactory’ but since 
that time there has been a steady increase in the quantity and quality of 
research into property tax impacts and, in the United States and Canada, the 
empirical literature is now well developed, especially for residential property 
taxes.
In the United Kingdom on the other hand, until recently, there has been little 
empirical research carried out into the incidence of the UK property tax. In
1975 the Department of Environment considered the evidence (in Layfield
1976 Annex 18) and concluded that ‘a difficult research programme needs to 
be completed before the effective incidence of rates can be established’ and, 
even in 1986, the government stated that ‘hard evidence of the effects of 
rates on business is scarce’ (DOE 1986b, para. 2.9). Since then, a number 
of studies have been made of the UK property tax, with varying degrees of 
success. The most recent UK research undertaken for the DOE was ‘unable 
to reject the hypothesis that changes in non-domestic rates do not have any 
impact on commercial property rents in the long run [for properties in the 
South-East of England]’ (Bond et al. 1996a at p. 29).
Residential studies far outnumber the studies of business property and the 
methodology adopted for residential studies is generally more sophisticated. 
In this chapter the empirical methodology and the issues surrounding it are 
examined, following which the empirical evidence for business property is 
then reviewed. The emphasis is on the UK studies with only a brief 
examination of the most pertinent US studies. A survey of the most important 
residential literature is contained in Appendix 4 to this chapter.
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4.2 DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGIES
In the past 40 years the evidence of tax impacts on property in the US has 
increased to the extent that the conventional wisdom, as represented by the 
traditional view of the property tax (see Chapter 3), has changed completely 
(Ladd 1998 p. 83). Studies on residential property have formed the vast bulk 
of research in the US.
The earliest empirical study was in 1931 by Jensen in the US and by Hicks 
and Hicks (1945) in the UK, but the empirical literature did not grow further 
until the early 1960s with studies by Daicoff (1961) and Woodard and 
Bradley (1965). These early studies were carried out before the major 
methodological advances that took place in the late 1960s, when the 
literature expanded dramatically.
From 1969 onwards there is an important body of research that attempted to 
test Tiebout’s 1956 hypothesis empirically. In the following 15 year period, 
over 35 studies of tax capitalisation were carried out and this was a period of 
focus on the mathematical and modelling techniques that are needed to 
make an analysis.
4.2.1 THE TIEBOUT-OATES MODEL
The first and most influential analysis of Tiebout (1956) and tax capitalisation 
was made by Oates (1969) and has become known as the Tiebout-Oates 
model (see 3.7). Oates made a cross-sectional study of a sample of 
residential communities in New Jersey. He reasoned that, if consumers are 
sensitive both to public service benefits and the property tax costs 
associated with their homes, these factors should be reflected in house 
prices. This work is generally interpreted as confirming the Tiebout 
hypothesis.
Many of the studies of capitalisation that followed have adopted and refined 
the Tiebout-Oates model, which regresses house prices against public 
services (i.e. benefits), housing characteristics and tax levels. There have 
been many studies of residential tax capitalisation (see Appendix 4) and
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capitalisation is found by most studies in this group, ranging from 10% 
(Linneman and Voith 1991) up to full capitalisation (see for example 
Eisenberg 1996) and in some cases over-capitalisation (Church 1974; Noto 
1976).
The majority of the studies carried out, especially in the US, have adopted 
hedonic valuation techniques and almost without exception have relied on 
the assumption of highly competitive property markets.
One axiomatic conclusion arrived at by two studies is that estimates of tax 
capitalisation are sensitive to the specification of the model (see Pollakowski 
1973; Reinhard 1981). The inherent difficulties of model specification are 
considered at length in Yinger et al. (1988), and Eisenberg (1996) makes a 
detailed and meticulous critique of the methodologies of the major US 
studies, including the technical specification of the modelling techniques 
used.
Problems such as the specification of the tax rate variable and simultaneity 
make the analysis difficult, but the most common problem is the bias that 
arises through the omission of important explanatory variables. For hedonic 
techniques, using regression, all major determinants of property value need 
to be included in the regression equation. The most recent studies go some 
way to addressing the problems of omitted variable bias experienced with 
earlier models through the use of more explanatory variables (see for 
example Eisenberg 1996; Palmon and Smith 1998b; Oktem 2001). Whilst an 
increased number of explanatory variables does mitigate the problem of 
omitted variable bias, too many variables may create multicollinearity.
In his 1969 study, Oates adopted a single variable, education expenditure, 
as the sole public service variable in his model, representing a general proxy 
for local public services. Following criticism by Pollakowski (1973), Oates 
added non-school expenditures per capita to the regression equation to 
address the problem of omitted variable bias (Oates 1973). But finding the 
right variables to represent the public sector is a common problem in all 
studies that are based on the Tiebout-Oates model. One of the basic 
difficulties is how to control for any variations in the level of publicly provided 
services that must necessarily be considered. Palmon and Smith (1998a)
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handle this by their choice of an area in Houston that provides identical 
public services but which still has varying tax rates. They find that housing 
market participants rationally discount properties with a higher tax burden, 
showing full capitalisation.
The Tiebout-Oates model assumes that property prices depend on the 
capitalised value of expected future property taxes. The choice of discount 
rate and time horizon is a problem that affects this type of analysis of tax 
capitalisation. The estimate of tax capitalisation is sensitive to these 
variables and there is no consensus about what discount rate should be 
used. Different studies have adopted a variety of discount rates and this is in 
part the explanation of the differences in rates of capitalisation found. The 
lack of agreement about discount rate and time horizon leaves a wide 
dispersion of resulting capitalisation rates.
Only the latest hedonic analyses have begun to take account of underlying 
property market attributes and the structure of the market. Factors such as 
the elasticity of supply will influence the likelihood and extent of any tax 
capitalisation effects but until very recently this has not been taken into 
account in the hedonic analyses. Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) illustrate 
this approach within a hedonic framework.
The assumption of perfect competition and market equilibrium underlies the 
hedonic theory developed by Rosen (1974). This is an assumption of all 
hedonic analysis but, in practice, the market for composite goods may not be 
perfectly competitive and this is particularly true for property markets, which 
are made up of a series of sub-markets (see for example Evans 1995;
Dunse et al. 2001). Recent theoretical work by Anderson et al. (2001) has 
been applied empirically by Oktem (2001) in the only hedonic study of 
property tax capitalisation under conditions of imperfect competition.
A related problem for hedonic regression studies is the correct identification 
of the extent of the market, given the presence of sub-markets in the larger 
property market. All observations that are used to estimate a hedonic price 
equation must come from within a single market (since the hedonic price 
schedule represents the locus of equilibrium points within a market). The 
problems that arise from treating several markets as one are discussed by
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Palmquist (2003), but they are often disregarded in the empirical studies of 
tax capitalisation.
It can be seen that there is a series of complex issues surrounding the 
specification of the model and the underlying assumptions that are implied 
by the hedonic technique. A fundamental issue is the availability of sufficient 
data to enable a hedonic analysis of business rates, which, as will be shown 
in the following sections, is why so many studies rely on aggregate level data 
(see 4.5).
In view of the modelling complexity and likely difficulties in obtaining 
sufficient data, it was decided to develop a simpler model for the purpose of 
this thesis than is necessarily implied by the hedonic method (see Chapter 6 
for a description of the research design adopted).
4.3 CLASSIFICATION OF STUDIES
There are several different ways in which the studies considered here can be 
classified. For each study, the time frame of the research is considered, as 
well as whether it is inter-jurisdictional, intra-jurisdictional or unrelated to any 
jurisdiction.
Inter-jurisdictional studies of tax impacts are concerned with the presence of 
high rate differentials between local authority areas. The possibility of high- 
tax local authority areas existing side by side with low-tax jurisdictions within 
a single urban area has long been recognised (Netzer 1966 Chapter V). The 
significance of this situation is considered in DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996 
at pp. 325-331).
Intra-jurisdictional studies, on the other hand, are based on differential rate 
burdens within the same local authority area. This type of study has the 
special advantage of not needing to pay any heed to tax benefit offsets 
because benefits to taxpayers can be considered the same: the level and 
quality of benefits is constant and the problem of omission or definition of 
public service variables is avoided (Bloom et al. 1983 at p. 154).
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Following Yinger et al. (1988), studies of tax incidence can be broadly 
classified into three types: studies based on aggregate data, studies based 
on micro-level data, and micro-level studies based on tax rate changes, into 
which category this present work would fall.
Aggregate studies are based on national or local statistics, usually collected 
for some purpose other than the research study. In the UK, these studies 
tend to be at a national level whilst, in the US literature, the unit of 
measurement is usually the municipality or local authority area. These 
studies are necessarily reliant on median values derived from the underlying 
statistics on which they are based. Such data limitations give rise to 
difficulties in estimation, but this is still the largest group of tax capitalisation 
studies.
Most micro-level studies use individual properties as the unit of observation 
instead of local authorities and municipalities, but one or two studies use 
micro-data that were not property related. The difficulty with micro-level 
studies is in the collection of data but these studies have several strengths 
when compared to those based on aggregate data. These studies can 
include a large number of explanatory variables, mostly property and 
neighbourhood attributes. The studies can investigate either inter- 
jurisdictional tax capitalisation or intra-jurisdictional tax capitalisation, whilst 
aggregate level studies are either restricted to inter-jurisdictional tax 
capitalisation or they are non-jurisdictional, not being related to any 
administrative area.
Studies based on tax rate changes, are described by Yinger et al. (1988 at 
p. 31) as ‘clever attempts to take advantage of unusual market 
circumstances’, which are then utilised to try to isolate the incidence of the 
tax. The situation that existed in the UK in 1990 is just such a circumstance 
and it is used as the core basis of the empirical work in this thesis, which 
uses micro-level data on individual properties to explore the problem of inter- 
jurisdictional tax impacts.
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4.4 STUDIES OF BUSINESS PROPERTY IMPACTS
Most of the studies of residential tax capitalisation considered in Appendix 4 
have tended to follow a prescriptive format, although there are variations in 
the approach to data and model specification. These studies have generally 
been carried out in a Tiebout-Oates framework and have followed the well- 
established pattern of seeking to test theory through empirical research.
UK studies have taken a more varied approach to the problem, with each 
study defining its own model without particular reference to other work in the 
field. Bennett (1988 at p. 159) observed about British studies:
These studies have taken the pragmatic perspective advocated by 
Meiskowski (1976), Topham (1983) and Bennett and Krebs (1988), 
which have suggested that theoretical views on tax incidence have 
only limited relevance.
It is argued that this pragmatic approach to solving the problem of tax 
capitalisation has little to recommend it. There is a vast body of literature that 
can act as a guide in defining and understanding the problem, even if the 
empirical model eventually selected does not slavishly follow earlier work in 
every particular.
Studies of business tax capitalisation have taken a varied approach to the 
problem, with each study being different. This gives a more diverse group of 
studies for review in the following sections.
Small regard is paid to the tax benefits in UK studies and there is 
consequently little attention paid to the definition of public service variables 
that play such a large part in the residential studies. For studies of business 
property, only one study properly acknowledges the possibility of a benefit 
offset (Bennett and Krebs 1988). There may genuinely be less variation in 
benefits to UK taxpayers, given the smaller size of the country and the 
control imposed by central government, but this does not justify the almost 
complete disregard of the possibility of benefit offsets in the UK work.
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One area of tax incidence that is not considered in this thesis is the tax 
impacts of the UK Enterprise Zones. Property in these limited special areas 
was completely exempt from business rates for ten years (initially until 1992) 
and it received other benefits, including 100% building allowances for 
corporation tax and income tax purposes and greatly simplified local 
planning requirements. There is some evidence to suggest that the business 
rate exemption was quickly capitalised into rents and that ‘rising property 
values in the zones have offset any benefits to firms from the incentives’ 
(Roger Tym & Partners 1984 at p. 79). Overall, it is considered that the 
package of benefits that are comprised in the Enterprise Zone initiative make 
a meaningful analysis of the impact of individual components quite difficult.
4.5 AGGREGATE LEVEL BUSINESS PROPERTY STUDIES
UK aggregate level studies have tended not only to work at a national level, 
but also to use national statistics as the basic data source. This differs from 
the US, where even the aggregate studies are mostly based on local data 
and there is an absence of national level incidence studies.
At aggregate level, UK researchers draw on a number of data sources 
including the Census of Production (Mair 1987), the Department of 
Environment floor-space data, CSO estimates from national and county level 
GPD components (Bennett and Krebs 1988), Inland Revenue Survey of 
Personal Incomes and Return of Rates (Blair 1989; Mair 1990a) and a 
variety of local government financial statistics.
This apparent wealth of alternative data sources illustrates the potential for 
aggregate level estimation and, when viewed in conjunction with the 
difficulties of obtaining micro-level property market data, it probably helps to 
explain why UK research has tended to favour this type of approach. It 
should be recognised that macro-level analyses suffer from the limitations 
that arise from the use of national aggregate level statistics. Unfortunately, 
not all researchers take the same care in validating their data and this also 
may explain the criticism that macro-level research is often the subject of 
‘unduly sweeping statements’ (Brazer et al. 1974).
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4.5.1 EVIDENCE OF SHORT-TERM IMPACTS
An important benchmark is Bennett and Krebs’ (1988) analysis of the 
incidence of local taxes on business and their influence on the relative costs 
of capital in Britain and Germany. This work is the final chapter in a series of 
studies in the field by the same authors (see for example Bennett 1986; 
Bennett and Zimmerman 1986; Bennett and Fearnehough 1987). The study 
uses the local authority as the unit of observation, working at county and 
metropolitan authority level, with district taxes and expenditures aggregated 
to county level. Bennett and Krebs do attempt to test and validate the data 
selected for the study, but they recognise ‘the strong constraints on the 
analysis caused by poor data’ (at p. 231).
Results are presented for a period of two fiscal years, 1979-80 and 1981 — 
82, and the analysis is developed from a partial equilibrium analysis right 
through to a general equilibrium analysis. The latter estimates tax incidence 
with and without benefit offsets. The study concludes that the short-term 
impact of business property taxes on prices charged to customers of the 
taxed entity is low, no more than 18%, and that at a general level the 
influence of the tax is on corporate profits, estimating that 80-90% of the tax 
is borne on profits in the short term.
The incidence of business rates on household incomes is considered by 
Mair (1990a; 1990b) in two studies that examine the impact of UK business 
rates on family incomes. The first is a study of the position using data for 
1979, whilst the second is made following the introduction of Uniform 
Business Rates in 1990.
Both studies are based on Family Expenditure Survey data and national 
average rate burdens. Mair works in a post-Keynesian framework (see 3.8) 
and does not consider the issue of tax incidence: he simply assumes 
business rates to be a tax on production that is passed on in full to 
consumers. This use of a-priori assumptions that are not supported by the 
evidence is unacceptable, but having made the assumption, Mair classifies 
the incidence of business rates by category of expenditure and by household 
type. He concludes that business rates in 1979 are ‘markedly regressive’,
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but following the 1990 changes and largely, he believes, as a result of higher 
rates bills for service industries, the regressiveness is modified and they 
become more progressive. The rationale for this a-priori argument is that 
higher income families spend a greater proportion of their income on 
services. These two studies by Mair are not considered to be a worthwhile 
contribution to the literature and they are also subject to the key criticism 
levelled at much of the work that seeks to aggregate local phenomena to a 
national level, in this case through the use of national average rate burdens.
Earlier work by Damania (1986b) used a general equilibrium framework and 
‘endeavours to infer’ the effective incidence of business rates in the UK. 
Damania develops a model of wage expectations in a single sector, again 
using a post-Keynesian theory that is based on the mark-up approach. The 
analysis is based on the methodological approach pioneered by Musgrave 
and Kryzyaniak (1963). Confirming the Bennett and Krebs results of limited 
price effects (forward shifting), Damania concludes that ‘less than 14% of the 
property tax is shifted forward into prices’ (at p. 309) and, to this extent, he 
considers that the property tax is ‘like an excise tax’. The incidence of the 
remaining 86% is not identified in the results obtained by Damania, but he 
suggests that it will be borne on profits, at least in the short term.
The studies reviewed above illustrate the short-term impact of the UK 
property tax. Whilst the work of Mair can be discounted because of his 
questionable use of a-priori assumptions, the evidence from the other 
studies is that, in the short term, the tax is borne on profits, and in limited 
circumstances it is shifted forward to consumers in the form of increased 
prices. Whilst the aggregate level studies can be criticised from a data 
perspective, this finding is exactly what would be expected in the short run 
from the theoretical analysis made in Chapters 3 and 4. The unanswered 
question is whether the impact of the tax bears on property values in the 
medium to long term.
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4.5.2 EVIDENCE OF IMPACTS ON EMPLOYMENT
A different strand of the literature looks more closely at the impact of rates 
on employment at a regional level. Cuthbertson et al. (1979) and Gripaios 
and Brooks (1982) studied the effect of local authority fiscal policy on 
regional employment, including both tax impacts and the overall budgetary 
consequences of local policies. These related studies identified some 
important adverse effects from local taxation; the second work is a 
development of the first and uses data at 1974. Again the authors comment 
on the inadequacies of the available data. The findings, at county level, 
distinguish between expenditure financed by taxation and other local 
authority expenditures. In the long run, a £1 million increase in local authority 
expenditure, if financed by taxation, is predicted to result in a loss of 1,288 
manufacturing and 818 service jobs. The same increase in expenditure, if 
financed other than by taxation, (the authors do not explain how) is expected 
to have a positive effect on total employment. On the face of it, these results 
do not seem very likely. The actual job loss figures suggest a precision that 
cannot easily be justified by the data and the magnitude of changes 
predicted seems improbable (even at 1974 values). The authors assume an 
‘average’ county and the model used does not measure the regional or other 
policies of central government, the stated assumption being that the impact 
of these policies will be equally spread across the country, both of which 
assumptions are considered incorrect.
Crawford et al. (1985) investigated the effects of business rates on the 
location of employment. The main conclusion of this study was that there is 
little influence of business rates on jobs. The only sector where there was 
evidence of a link was commercial offices and, when central London was 
analysed separately, the evidence produced no statistically significant 
results. There was no evidence of a link in the manufacturing, retailing and 
warehousing sector. This report has been subject to a great deal of criticism 
and is now considered to be ‘thoroughly discredited’ (Mair 1990b).
Mair (1987) again uses a post-Keynesian approach to tax incidence. Taking 
manufacturing data from the Census of Production between 1973 and 1982, 
this study makes a partial equilibrium analysis. Mair finds that business rates
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are not ‘met through wages share of net output’ and the results suggest that 
only a small share of any increases in business rates paid by manufacturers 
will be recovered by higher mark-up prices. This suggests that the burden of 
the tax is borne on capital, either in the form of lower profits, or in the form of 
lower factor payments, in this case rents. Similar results were also found in 
the earlier work by Trussler in 1982 (quoted in Mair 1991).
Crawford et al. and the Cuthbertson/Gripaios studies are strongly criticised 
by Damania (1986a), who finds the Gripaios model weak and the model 
used by Crawford et al. to be statistically flawed (Damania 1986b).
The results of these studies are inconclusive and contradictory, and they 
provide little satisfactory evidence that the property tax has a marked impact 
on employment or wage levels. Doubts about the methodologies employed 
make it difficult to be confident about the results presented. Other studies of 
the impact of rates on jobs by Hughes (1981) and Othick (1983) are found to 
be crude (Bennett 1988) and this area of the literature is not reviewed further 
here.
4.5.3 EVIDENCE FROM OTHER AGGREGATE STUDIES
Another aggregate study in the UK by Blair (1989) failed to reach any 
conclusive results on the tax impacts. Taking an aggregate level approach 
using national statistics, Blair complements his results with micro-level data 
generated from a questionnaire survey.
Tyler et al. (1988) use aggregate data from the Census of Production to 
validate their accounting framework for assessing the effect of local taxes on 
business. They then use the results to assess the impact of a location 
change on the rate bill of a firm. Using the case of the telecommunications 
equipment industry in 1982, the authors demonstrate the presence of a rate 
gradient with decreased tax costs as distance from central London 
increases.
A closely related theme is to look at the impact of tax differentials on 
business location decisions and economic activity. This ties the study of tax 
incidence more closely to the theoretical work of Muth (1969) and Mills
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(1972), which was considered at 2.5. Several US studies carried out in the 
early 1980s concluded that differing levels of local taxes, which include the 
property tax, have a statistically significant effect on the location of business 
activity across local authority areas within the same urban centre 
(Wasylenco 1980; Fox 1981; Charney 1983; McGuire 1985). Each of these 
studies relies on cross-sectional data to estimate the relationship between 
business activity and the tax and, although the robustness of the conclusions 
varies from study to study, all confirm the importance of differential tax rates 
on business location decisions and thus on property values.
A line of related work, also in the US, has sought to show the impact of the 
tax on property value growth rates (McDonald 1993b; Dye et al. 2001). This 
is important because tax capitalisation is likely to manifest itself through 
differing rates of value growth, and this is a prime aspect of the empirical 
study that is carried out for this thesis.
The aggregate level studies above go some way to answering the question 
of how the short-term tax impacts are borne, albeit within the limitations of 
the varying methodologies adopted. Little consideration was given in the 
studies reviewed to long-term tax impacts and no attempts have been made 
to identify whether this impact remains with the firm or is shifted backward to 
property. The UK micro-level studies reviewed below, with one exception 
(Bennett and Fearnehough 1987), use data for individual property and have 
this issue as the chief focus.
4.6 MICRO-LEVEL BUSINESS PROPERTY STUDIES
This thesis makes an inter-jurisdictional micro-level study of business tax 
impacts, using individual properties as the unit of observation and it falls into 
the category of a tax change study (see 4.3). It follows that the micro-level 
studies of business tax impacts reviewed here are more central to the theme 
of this thesis than the aggregate level work.
This part of the review will assist both in terms of the evidence of 
capitalisation presented as well as the development of the most appropriate
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methodology. The work is presented in chronological order of the literature 
development, with US studies first.
4.6.1 US EVIDENCE
The earliest US study of business tax impacts by Clapp (1980) suffers fatally 
from the use of a property tax observation that is based on the tax bill for the 
whole building, which Clapp does not break down into a per square foot (in 
the US) basis to reflect the size of the building. However, there are two US 
micro-level studies that do need to be reviewed here, both of which use 
hedonic pricing functions in their model.
The work of William Wheaton (1984) in the US is thematically congruent with 
this thesis. Even in the US, Wheaton identifies the same lack of empirical 
evidence for property tax incidence on business property, stating that ‘the 
prevailing view ... is largely the result of some educated conjecture and a 
few scattered pieces of research’. Wheaton studies commercial property in 
the Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, and the focus is on rented 
property, following the analytical tradition of Musgrave and Kryzyaniak 
(1963). The results of Wheaton’s research suggest that the burden of inter- 
jurisdictional tax differences is not passed forward to tenants, but remains on 
capital. This is an important result, according precisely with the hypothesis of 
this thesis. In common with many US commentators, Wheaton also explains 
that part of the burden may be shifted backward to land although, in this 
work, urban property is defined to include land and buildings (capital).
Wheaton is careful to point out that the results refer only to a proportion of 
the capital market (commercial buildings) and only to one metropolitan area, 
making it clear that different results may be obtained for other asset types or 
other areas. This is a recurring theme in the empirical studies reviewed in 
this chapter.
Ten years later in Chicago, McDonald (1993a) studied office rents in 1991 in 
a study of intra-jurisdictional differences in property tax rates. This is a partial 
equilibrium analysis, based on cross-sectional data, seeking to show initial 
shifting effects. The findings show that 45% of property tax differences
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across buildings was shifted forward to tenants, implying that 55% of the 
differential falls on capital and is absorbed by the building owner. McDonald 
is very confident about the quality of his data, but he concludes ‘further 
cross-sectional and time-series studies of other commercial real estate 
markets are needed to determine the generality of the results presented 
here’.
4.6.2 UK EVIDENCE
Four UK studies are reviewed in this group of micro-level studies, which are 
listed in Table 4.1 below. The findings of a 1993 study on behalf of the 
Department of Environment (Gerald Eve and City University 1993) were not 
published and are not reviewed here. This study was cited in Bond et al.
(1996a at p. 23) where it was stated that the ‘empirical evidence was 
somewhat mixed and their results failed conventional statistical tests’.
Table 4.1: Micro-Level UK Studies of Tax Incidence
Name Date Context Data Type
Bennett and Fearnehough 1987 Inter-Jurisdictional Questionnaire Survey
Sibley 1989 Inter-Jurisdictional Individual Property
Crosby and Keogh 1990 Intra-Jurisdictional Individual Property
Bond et al./DOE 1995 Non-Jurisdictional Individual Property
The three studies that are based on individual property observations stand 
out for special attention because the researchers have adopted techniques 
that are close either to the methodology or to the theme of this thesis.
The two inter-jurisdictional studies are concerned with the presence of high 
rate differentials between local authority areas.
Crosby and Keogh (1990) undertake an intra-jurisdictional study, based on 
rate burdens within the same local authority area.
The work of Bond et al. is not based on any local authority administrative 
areas and has been classified as non-jurisdictional. Despite being based on
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individual property data, this work attempts a regional level of analysis and 
for this reason it is more like an aggregate study than a micro-level work.
4.6.3 BENNETT AND FEARNEHOUGH
This is the only micro-level study that is not closely focused on identifying the 
extent of property tax capitalisation and which does not use property data. 
Bennett and Fearnehough (1987) adopt a survey methodology to examine 
the impact of differing rate burdens on a single industry. The hand tools 
industry is geographically concentrated in Sheffield, where one third of the 
firms are located, with the remainder being spread evenly across the 
country. Sheffield was at the time of the study a high rate area, which could 
be compared to a wide range of lower rated areas. The survey methodology 
is supplemented by econometric checks for validity and the results show few 
firms believing that business rates are in any way a benefit tax. Firms in the 
high rated area suffer from increased rate burdens, but in a competitive 
industry have few opportunities to pass increased costs on to customers.
The conclusions are that the rate burden is borne on capital in the form of 
reduced profits, in some cases of up to 100% and, where these differences 
are prolonged, the impact on capital formation is high, with possible 
consequences for relocation and fiscal migration.
The authors give no consideration to the possibility of the tax burden being 
shifted backwards in the form of reduced rents, but the reason for this 
omission is not clear.
This micro-level study tends to confirm the findings of the aggregate work 
reviewed at 4.5, that, in the short run, in a competitive market, the impact of 
the tax is on the profits of the business. In other words, it cannot be shifted in 
the short run and remains with the bearer of the legal incidence.
4.6.4 SIBLEY
In 1989, Sibley published research on the effects of business rates on the 
office property market around the Camden/Westminster boundary. This was 
a micro-study taking market data collected from property agents for the
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years 1983,1984 and 1985 and it is especially interesting because it deals 
with the same two boroughs selected for office property for the empirical 
work in this thesis.
This is an inter-jurisdictional study of tax incidence, but no recognition is 
given to the possibility of there being any differential tax benefit to occupiers 
between local authority areas.
Sibley suggests that the rate differentials that emerged between 1979 and 
1982 are the starting point for the emergence of tax impacts, which makes 
this a short- to medium-term study with a time frame of between two and six 
years.
Sibley’s data collection is careful and his data categorisation takes account 
of both building quality, tenant quality and other occupation costs.
The main problem with this work is that the analysis is basic and contains no 
tests for statistical significance or even measures of distribution. This 
seriously undermines the quality of his research and the importance of the 
results.
The results presented by Sibley do indicate a difference in rental values 
between borough boundaries, represented by a difference of £0.90 per 
square foot, yet the average difference in rates would imply a difference of 
£2.14 if the tax is fully capitalised into rents. Sibley concludes that ‘although 
the market has adjusted rents to reflect the rates disparity between boroughs 
... the market has not fully adjusted for rate differences’ (at p. 339). He goes 
on to detail a series of reasons why this may be so, including the impact of 
the institutional lease and the impact of rate capping, which he posits may 
have reduced the risk of rates rising uncontrollably, thereby changing 
tenants’ expectations and rental bids.
Ian Sibley kindly agreed to permit his data to be used in the pilot study that 
was undertaken in this thesis (see 8.3).
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4.6.5 CROSBY AND KEOGH
A meticulous study of shops in central Nottingham was made by Crosby and 
Keogh (1990). This study incorporates both a micro-level analysis and an 
analysis in the tax change category.
This micro-level analysis of tax impacts is unique amongst British empirical 
work, being the only study to adopt the long-term time frame that theory 
indicates is appropriate. The micro-level study covers a period of up to 16 
years between 1973 and 1989.
In 1986-7 a local revaluation of the tax base took place for retail property in 
central Nottingham, referred to by the authors as a ‘mini-revaluation’. This 
circumstance is used as an opportunity to study the effects of changes in 
rate burden on shop rents in the locality.
Market data were collected from the records of local property agents, 
supported by a postal survey of retailers in Nottingham to collect additional 
data and to explore occupiers’ attitudes to rates.
Unlike other UK studies of tax impacts, this is an intra-jurisdictional study of 
tax shifting, with all properties in a single local authority area, so the problem 
of differential benefits does not arise. The survey questionnaire did include a 
question about the ‘extent to which local services represent value for money’ 
but no consideration is given in the data analysis to this issue, nor is it 
necessary.
The data analysis took a two-pronged approach to try to identify the impact 
of the tax on retail property rents. First, rents between 1973 and 1989 were 
analysed using pooled cross-sectional and time series property transaction 
data (the micro-level analysis). A second analysis was made using a subset 
of the transaction data where there were transactions both before and after 
the mini-revaluation in 1986-7 (the tax change analysis).
Surprisingly, the study found little evidence of a relationship between rate 
bills and property rents, stating (at p. 18) ‘in no case was it possible to identify 
a significant negative relationship between real rents and real rate
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poundages’ and the data ‘do not support the hypothesis that rents offset 
rates to keep occupation costs constant’.
Several possible explanations are evaluated by the authors, including the 
possibility ‘that rising rate poundages in the mid to late 1980s were swamped 
by the exceptional growth of retail profits and rents in that period’. This 
conclusion seems to be well founded: the 1973-1989 analysis examined 
serial tax rate differentials (changing rate burdens over time). This makes it 
harder to isolate the tax impacts when compared to an analysis of spatial tax 
rate differentials (differences between properties at one point in time).
The data used are transaction data, and whilst these are prima facie the best 
data to use, it means that measurements cover differing periods, starting in 
1973 but in some cases later. Crosby and Keogh point out that the data may 
be ‘less complete in respect of earlier transactions’ (at p. 12) and this will 
reduce the effective time frame for the analysis. They also recognise (at p.
13) that there are particular problems associated with the analysis of market 
evidence, and this could influence the results, especially in the context of 
retail property (see Appendix 2).
The authors experienced a severe problem of controlling for all the variables 
affecting the rents in order to isolate the specific effect of the property tax. 
The model employed by Crosby and Keogh did identify ‘a number of 
statistically significant retail zones’ (p. 24) within the centre of Nottingham 
and a key finding of the research was that retail property values are 
extremely sensitive to location. Location is confirmed as a key determinant of 
retail property value and many of the problems of data analysis can be put 
down to the difficulty of handling the micro-location of property in the 
analysis. Micro-location was identified as a critical factor in determining retail 
rents in a prime city centre shopping district.
In relation to the analysis across the mini-revaluation, it is possible that the 
time frame was, in this case, too short, such that the rents did not have 
sufficient time to adjust to reflect the changed rate burden following the 
revaluation and this problem would be exacerbated by the rigidities of the 
institutional lease.
108
Chapter 4
The postal survey of retailers asked questions about the mini-revaluation 
(pp. 20-23), which ‘revealed a poor understanding of what had happened ...’ 
and questions about the forthcoming 1990 changes ‘suggested that little 
advance planning was taking place’. Respondents were asked to consider 
their strategy for dealing with a hypothetical increase in rates payable of 15- 
20% per year over the next five years. This is a more interesting question 
from the perspective of the current work and the ‘most likely’ response given 
was that occupiers would expect to negotiate a reduction in rent at the next 
rent review. Having said that, the occupiers did not expect to be able to 
offset the full cost of the rate rise against rent. Fewer than a quarter of 
respondents expected to be able to offset 50% or more of the increased 
rates in this way.
4.6.6 BOND, DENNY, HALL AND MCCLUSKEY
Bond et al. (1996a; 1996b) made a study of tax effects on business property 
rents, following the introduction of the new rating system. This is a national 
study of serial tax rate differentials rather than a study of geographic tax rate 
differentials. The use of micro-level property data puts it into this category of 
analysis (following Yinger et al. 1988) but the methodology employed makes 
it analogous to an aggregate work.
This study was undertaken on behalf of the Department of the Environment 
by the Institute of Fiscal Studies. The results were published in several 
places and the findings are not clearly presented in the published work (DOE 
1995b; Bond et al. 1996a; Bond et al. 1996b; McCluskey 1999a [one paper 
out of 35 submitted for a DPhil by publication]).
This is a short- to medium-term study that uses circumstances of tax change 
to try to elicit evidence of the tax effects on rental values, in this case the 
new rating system that was introduced in 1990. This is exactly the same 
circumstance that is adopted in the empirical work in this thesis, although 
there are some crucial differences between the work of Bond et al. and the 
present work.
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Bond et al. worked with time series data on individual properties from the 
Investment Property Databank (IPD) between 1987 and 1992. This data 
source has the benefit of containing a large number of properties but the 
authors recognise the data used to be panel data, explaining that 
‘unfortunately we have very little information on the attributes of the 
properties within the sample’. The data used for this study are based on 
property level data rather than unit or tenant level data. The latter are 
necessary if the correct rateable unit is to be identified in the analysis (see 
A2.4 for a discussion of rateable hereditaments).
Property information in the IPD is representative of prime investment quality 
property, which is not representative of typical business properties in 
England and Wales. The IPD has a disproportionate number of high value 
lots and is concentrated in London and the South-East and ‘has very few 
small properties of any type’ (DOE 1995b at p. 62). The study utilises the 
IPD property sector definitions of Retail, Industrial and Office, but only limited 
regard is paid to the government regions that are used extensively in the IPD 
data. The only regional results that are reported are for retail property and 
then only between London, the South-East and Elsewhere.
Notwithstanding the short time period covered by the data, the authors 
develop a predictive econometric model and, in their national analysis across 
property types, they predict a long-run decline in rental values of £4.92 for 
each £1 increase in rate burden. Based on the theory reviewed in Chapters 
2 and 3, this is a highly improbable prediction and the authors recognise that 
it ‘seems too large to be plausible’ (Bond et al. 1996a at p. 27).
To ‘allow for some degree of heterogeneity’ between property types, the 
authors go on to make the analysis separately for retail, industrial and office 
properties, but only the results for retail property appear in the published 
work. The model for retail properties continues to predict over-capitalisation 
in the long run, suggesting a £1.79 decrease in rents for every £1 increase in 
rate burden, which again seems to be improbable.
For industrial property, the ‘results were imprecise’ whilst, for office property, 
the results ‘were the least satisfactory’ and ‘there is clear evidence that the
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specification is invalid’ (DOE 1995b at p. 41). No results were presented for 
industrial or office property.
In spite of a pronouncement that ‘property market responses were found to 
operate with considerable delay’ (Bond et al. 1996a at p. 29), the model is 
also applied in a short-run analysis and the authors believe that ‘estimates of 
the impacts ... after one or two years are likely to be more reliable’ (Bond et 
al. 1996b at p. 32).
The short-run findings for retail properties show that above average 
increases in business rates were associated with below average increases in 
commercial property rents, suggesting that at least part of the rate burden is 
capitalised. For retail properties, ‘one can reject the hypothesis that there is 
no effect on rent but not the hypothesis that the entire burden is passed on 
to the landlord’. The short-run results are ambiguously presented and 
continue to infer long-run impacts, stating for example, that ‘eventually, the 
impact of a £1 increase in non-domestic rate bills has roughly twice as large 
an impact in London and the south-east of England as elsewhere’ (Bond et 
al. 1996a at p. 29). They then go on to explain that ‘these estimates are 
particularly imprecise in the South-East where we were also unable to reject 
the hypothesis that changes in non-domestic rates do not have any impact 
on commercial property in the long run’. Elsewhere it is stated that ‘rent 
levels appear to adjust slowly to changes in tax bills, particularly outside the 
South-East’ (Bond et al. 1996a at p. 18).
The final conclusions (Bond et al. 1996b at pp. 31-32) are that:
Whilst we cannot reject the hypothesis that rents fall pound for 
pound with rates in the long run, leaving total occupancy costs 
constant and shifting all the burden of rates onto landlords, nor 
can we reject the hypothesis that that rents fall by only 80p; and 
indeed ... we cannot reject the hypothesis that the long-run fall in 
rents is only 50p.
This is an inconclusive summary and the authors go on to comment that 
‘uncertainty about the long-run effects of rates increases is not surprising 
given that we have only six years of data in total, and only two years and
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eight months of data after reform of non-domestic rates in 1990’. The DOE 
report observes that ‘one limitation that could be resolved in future work is 
the short time period covered by this data-set’ (1995b at p. 2).
There could be a number of different explanations for the results found in 
this study, but the time frame of the study, poor model specification and 
issues with the underlying data are likely to be the chief explanation of the 
unconvincing results.
The data in the IPD are based on both open market lettings and estimated 
rental values (see 2.6.5 and Appendix 2). Crosby and Murdoch (2001) draw 
some important conclusions about the valuation inputs that underlie the IPD 
data-set and make suggestions for ‘eliminating inconsistencies in the data 
provided’ but problems arising from the underlying nature of the IPD data 
were not recognised by the authors.
The possibility of benefit offsets and variations in the scope and quality of 
local public services is mentioned by the authors but dismissed (in Bond et 
al. 1996b at p. 24) and no consideration at all is given to the benefit effects 
in the other published work. No attempt is made to take account of tax 
benefits in the analysis.
Perhaps the most important shortcoming of the study is that it does not pay 
any real regard to local differences in the property markets. To reflect 
differences in property market conditions, the authors use a proxy based on 
labour market conditions, recorded at county and regional level, with no 
attempt to justify or explain the choice. Property markets do not operate at 
county level, still less at regional level and it is thought unlikely that labour 
markets could be relied upon as an accurate indicator of property market 
conditions.
Two additional difficulties arise from the choice of a time frame that brings its 
own set of analytical problems. First is the tax base revaluation that came 
into effect in 1990. The change in the tax base introduced a new set of inter­
regional adjustments and distortions, which are neither recognised nor 
addressed in this work. The second problem comes from the 1989-1993 
recession in the UK, which itself could explain the downward changes in
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property values during the period and this is not handled in the analysis in 
any meaningful way.
A number of minor issues arise from the use of time series data. One 
example relates to the fact that 20% of the properties in the sample had 
changes in floor-space during the period of the study (DOE 1995b at p. 50), 
but the rateable value in each year is not available. This means that physical 
changes to the property cannot be reflected in the rate burden, but they are 
reflected in the rent.
Despite the use of individual property data, this study can be regarded as an 
aggregate level work. This was recognised by McCluskey (1999a) who 
observes that ‘the research was able to draw important conclusions as to the 
regional effect of rates on open market rents’ (at p. 67) although in reality the 
analysis was not made at the level of the standard UK economic regions. As 
an aggregate study it is subject to the same concerns and criticisms of 
aggregate level research that were considered at 4.5 and the conclusions 
must be treated with caution. The authors themselves counsel (Bond et al.
1996a at p. 24) that ‘one should be extremely cautious about extrapolating 
the results to the property market as a whole’. This would seem to be sound 
advice, given the lack of attention to heterogeneous property characteristics, 
the absence of unit level data, the failure to take account of regional or local 
market factors and the gross overestimate of capitalisation predicated by 
their model.
4.7 CONCLUSIONS
There are a number of different approaches to the problem of tax 
capitalisation: in the US the inclination is to let the theory guide the model 
specification. British studies have not seen the need to define themselves in 
the precise terms of the theoretical literature and part of the explanation for 
this could be that the theory is very much a product of the US context and 
thus is less applicable in the UK.
It is a familiar theme in the empirical literature that data are difficult to obtain 
and to analyse and this problem seems worse in the UK than in the US. The
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difficulties of getting adequate data are compounded by the inherent 
methodological difficulty of estimating tax capitalisation.
The various empirical studies reviewed here have strengths and 
weaknesses: aggregate level studies may provide general insights, but are 
often unable to answer the incidence question; many of the other studies 
were poorly executed, or utilised a flawed model or were hampered by data 
constraints.
Differences in results between studies will inevitably reflect the experimental 
methodology and are in part explained by the different time horizons 
adopted. One of the most important conclusions to be drawn from the 
literature is that a long-term time scale is needed for the analysis of tax 
impacts on property values. It is also concluded that the analysis should be 
at a local level using individual property data. Most studies adopt a short 
time horizon, which is unlikely to give the capitalisation effect time to 
manifest itself fully: only one UK study adopts an appropriately long-term 
time scale. These conclusions, which follow from the examination of theory 
made in Chapters 3 and 4, will be applied in the following chapters when 
designing the empirical study.
For business property many aggregate studies find evidence of tax 
capitalisation, but the multiplicity of alternative approaches adopted in the 
British studies makes it difficult to draw conclusions. Bennett (1988) 
observes that ‘a major problem with all of these [UK] studies is that they are 
aggregate generalisations’. It might also be added that many of these 
studies also lack proper theoretical foundations.
The aggregate level work reviewed here suggests that only limited forward 
shifting of the tax takes place and that backward shifting to wages is even 
less in evidence. This body of work makes it clear that the major impact of 
business rates is borne on capital. In the short term, this must mean reduced 
profits, but the analysis does not go on to consider whether this burden 
remains with the firm in the medium to long term or is shifted back to other 
factors, specifically property.
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Turning to the micro-level studies that considered property tax impacts, it 
was a common theme amongst the UK studies that the results, where they 
were obtained at all, were not as strong as expected.
The findings of this review suggest that the analysis must be at local level 
and be property unit specific if the results are to be meaningful. Only the 
studies by Sibley, and Crosby and Keogh fall into this category but neither 
managed to obtain significant results. Sibley’s absence of statistical analysis 
makes his results of questionable value; while for Crosby and Keogh it is 
likely that the complex influence of retail location frustrated their attempts to 
identify the tax impacts. It is also probable that too short a time period 
elapsed following the mini-valuation in 1986-7 for results from this part of 
their study to become manifest.
The work of Bond et al. did find statistically significant results for tax impacts 
on retail property in the short term. The analysis is carried out at a highly 
aggregated regional level with only three regions for the whole of England 
and Wales and this study is in many ways akin to the ‘aggregate 
generalisations’ referred to above. The authors ask much from their data and 
the overall conclusions are unconvincing: the findings of their study should 
be viewed with caution.
The identification of tax impacts on business property has eluded previous 
researchers; there are no published results for industrial property, no 
statistically significant results for offices and the results for retail property 
(Bond et al.) are of questionable value. The identification of such results is 
the subject of the empirical work set out in the following chapters.
Chapter 5 now looks at the background to the UK business rate system and 
considers the six London local authorities that are the subject of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 5 
BUSINESS RATES: THE UK PROPERTY TAX
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews local government finance in the UK with the emphasis 
on business rates. Appendix 1 sets out the legal framework for the operation 
of business rates. A review of the organisation of local government is given, 
followed by consideration of the circumstances and arguments that led to the 
major reforms of 1990.
The political background to the tax is then examined, with the emphasis on 
the state of affairs that led to the emergence of marked tax rate differentials. 
This wide ranging discussion is based around the work of Bennett and Krebs 
(1988).
A short consideration of the six London boroughs used for the empirical 
research concludes the chapter, including a look at the tax rates that applied 
in these boroughs at the time of the main study.
Rates are unusual amongst taxes because the amount of revenue to be 
raised is decided in advance and this total liability is then levied on the 
taxpayers according to the values of their properties (see A1.3.2). The 
precise yield from other forms of taxation is not known in advance and, in the 
past, with less sophisticated economic forecasting, this element of certainty 
in the property tax was a central feature, especially when the expenditure 
levels were set locally. Today, the level of the business rates is set by central 
government, so the ability of local authorities to make their own budget is 
curtailed. Nevertheless, it is still possible for local government to set its own 
level of Council Tax charges on residential property.
Business or General Rates have not been the only rates charged in England 
and Wales. There have been other rates, such as the Water Rate and Land 
Drainage Rates. These two levies differ from the rates tax in that they more 
closely follow the benefit principle of taxation, while, in a loose way, the 
General Rate follows the ability to pay principle (see 3.3.5).
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The only rates with which this thesis is concerned are business rates, which 
is the UK property tax that is levied on business occupiers.
5.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION
5.2.1 A HISTORY OF REORGANISATION
Local authorities are statutory bodies created by Act of Parliament. In 1960 
there were over 1,600 local authorities in England. The reorganisation of 
local government in the UK between 1965 and 1974 reduced the number of 
local authorities by two thirds to about 450 (OECD 1997a), and a further 
review was completed between 1995 and 1998, with the creation of 46 new 
unitary authorities.
In London the main reorganisation of local authorities was carried out 
between 1963 and 1965 under the provisions of the Local Government Act 
1963, which adopted many of the recommendations of the Herbert Report 
(1960). Under the reforms covered by the Act, the number of councils in 
London was reduced from 96 to 33 (including the City of London) and the 
process involved an extensive merging of the existing local authorities’ 
boundaries to create larger organisational units. Policy makers envisaged 
that the larger administrative units would improve the efficiency and 
coordination of services in London (Byrne 2000).
The Greater London Council (GLC) was created at that time to provide a 
new regional tier of local government for London. It replaced the smaller 
London County Council. Figure 5.1 shows a map of the Greater London area 
and the 33 borough boundaries. The GLC was abolished by the Local 
Government Act 1985 to be replaced by an unelected London Regional 
Authority, which was in turn replaced by the elected Greater London 
Authority in July 2000.
Today, local government in Britain is structured in two contrasting ways. In 
Scotland, Wales and some parts of England there are single-tier authorities 
responsible for all local authority functions. The 33 London boroughs are 
single-tier authorities with responsibility for all functions except a few that are
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Chapter 5
coordinated on a London-wide basis. In this thesis, the City of London will be 
included in the group of 33 London boroughs, although strictly speaking it is 
a separate Corporation.
The remainder of England had a two-tier system with responsibility divided 
between district and county council.
5.2.2 REVENUE AND SOURCES OF FINANCE
Local authorities raise their income in a number of different ways. Figure 5.2 
shows the sources of local government revenue. Figure 5.2a shows the 
breakdown for 1989-90 and Figure 5.2b for 1999-2000.
In 1999-2000 business rates accounted for about 17.5% of revenues and 
council tax a further 14.5%. Central government grants at around 52% form 
the major source of local government revenue, with the remaining amounts 
being made up of fees and charges, interest and reserves.
Until 1990, local authorities were responsible for setting their own rate of 
business property tax but today the level of business rates is set centrally by 
national government. The locally collected tax is paid to a central pool from 
which it is redistributed to local authorities on a simple per capita basis, 
creating what is ‘effectively a hypothecated national tax’ (Ridge and Smith 
1991 at p. 27). Local government still sets its own level of Council Tax on 
residential property, which leaves some budget setting discretion with the 
local authority.
Single-tier authorities are responsible for all local government functions 
within their jurisdiction and this includes collecting the rates and, before 
1990, it included setting or levying the rates. In two-tier jurisdictions this 
responsibility fell on the district council. The local authorities that were 
responsible for levying and collecting the local tax were known as rating 
authorities. Those authorities that were not empowered to levy a rate could 
still impose a ‘precept’ on the rating authority and the rating authority must 
take this into account when levying its rate. The most obvious example of a
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Figure 5.2
SOURCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE
43.12% Rates’
39.87% Grants
3.40% Interest 
8.99% Fees and Charges 
4.62% Other
‘ Includes business rates and domestic rates.
Source: Local Government Financial Statistics, DOE (1991).
Figure 5.2a: Revenue Sources 1989-90
52.35% Grants
17.40% Council Tax
14.49% Business Rates
1.01% Interest 
8.25% Fees and Charges 
6.50% Other
Source: Local Government Statistics, DTLR (2001).
Figure 5.2b: Revenue Sources 1999-2000
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precepting authority is the county council in any area with a two-tier 
administration and, in this case, the precept is known as the county precept 
(see A1.3.4). Since 1990 the local authority that collects business rates on 
behalf of central government has been known as a billing authority.
Recent proposals suggest a move away from central control of the business 
rates to a system that would allow some local setting of the tax rate. A full 
discussion of these options can be found in Denny et al. (1995) or Denny 
and Ridge (1992). The most recent developments in central government 
policy are for Business Improvements Districts (BID) which are to be 
financed in whole or in part by a BID levy imposed on business ratepayers in 
the district (DETR 2000b; Local Government Bill 2002/03, Part 4). These 
proposals are not considered in this thesis.
5.3 BACKGROUND TO THE 1990 CHANGES
Prior to 1990, revaluations of the tax base did not take place regularly in 
England and Wales. A new valuation list was supposed to be prepared every 
five years, but the previous list was introduced in 1973. Appendix 1 sets out 
the purpose and background to the process of revaluation. A great deal of 
concern was expressed about the inequities that would arise following the 
1990 Revaluation (see for example Cunnane and Walker 1989; Goodchild 
1989). This was not a new problem: after the criticisms that followed the 
rating revaluation of 1973, the Government appointed a Committee of 
Enquiry into Local Government Finance under Sir Frank Layfield (1976). The 
revaluation of 1963 had been met with a similar response in the form of the 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Impact of Rates on Households 
(Allen Committee 1965).
Each revaluation resulted in a redistribution of rate burdens and increased 
popular dissatisfaction with the rating system, especially as it still applied to 
domestic property at that time. No other major tax is paid directly by 
individuals and the high visibility of the tax increased its unpopularity.
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The main weakness of rates, in fact, was the lack of buoyancy, namely the 
inability of the rates to finance expanding local authority expenditures. 
Layfield identified this problem as ‘fiscal imbalance’, the problem that local 
authorities’ responsibility for expenditure was more extensive than their 
capacity to raise revenue. As early as 1901, The Royal Commission on 
Local Taxation (Balfour 1901) advocated a system of central government 
grants to redress the imbalance and, by 1975, a large proportion of local 
government spending was financed by central government grants.
When the Layfield Committee reported in 1976, the UK rating system applied 
equally to residential and business property. In Layfield's view, if local 
autonomy was to be pursued, local authorities needed new sources of 
revenues, which Layfield saw as a local income tax (pp. 196-208). This was 
discussed in a Green Paper (DOE 1981) but has never been seriously 
considered (Kay and King 1990 at p. 136). Ridge and Smith (1991) provide a 
critique of the arguments for and against a local income tax in Britain.
The arguments in support of the UK rating system before the 1990 reforms 
were clearly set out in the Layfield report, and the property tax, according to 
Layfield, had many benefits. It could easily meet Smith’s Canons of Taxation 
(see 3.3) in respect of efficiency, certainty and convenience. Notably absent 
from the list is the question of equity, which Layfield linked closely to 
accountability. In 1969, the Representation of the People Act had abolished 
the rights for non-resident property owners to stand in local elections and to 
vote in local elections. When the level of business rates was set by the local 
authority, there was no accountability to the businesses paying the tax (until 
the 1984 Rates Act introduced a new statutory duty on the rating authority to 
consult with representatives of business before setting the rates or a 
precept).
5.4 THE GREAT RATE DEBATE
Immediately after Layfield there was a Green Paper (DOE 1977), followed in 
1981 by Alternatives to Domestic Rates (DOE 1981). For a discussion of the 
post-Layfield government attitude see Prest (1982), Crawford and Dawson 
(1982) or Travers (1986).
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For business rates there followed a period of inactivity on the part of the 
government, with no substantive action until 1986, when an important Green 
Paper, Paying for Local Government was published (DOE 1986b). The 
publication of this Green Paper heralded a new and important chapter in the 
controversy about rates, culminating in the 1990-93 reforms of the local 
government taxation.
The main proposal in the Green Paper for businesses was the replacement 
of locally set rates on business property with a centrally set Uniform 
Business Rate. In response to this proposal a flood of academic papers, as 
well as less objective commentary, was published: nearly every major firm of 
surveyors and special interest group had something to say on the subject.
The CBI passed a resolution at their annual conference hostile to the 
government plans for a nationally set business rate (Independent 1987). 
They proposed that business should contribute only towards the local cost of 
those services that benefit them directly (CBI 1987). In other words, the CBI 
wanted the UK business property tax to be changed to a specific benefit tax 
(see 3.3.4).
Examples of the typical responses to the Green Paper and the subsequent 
legislation can be found in RICS (1989), Institute of Directors (IOD 1986), 
Edward Erdman (1987) and Fuller Peiser (1987). Blair (1989) summarises 
contemporary debate, taking account of arguments on both sides of 
government and the business lobby. A critical evaluation of the arguments 
for and against the proposed reform is given by Midwinter and Mair (1987).
The most significant criticism of the new system was that it ‘totally 
undermines any link of local authority and local business’ (Bennett 1988 at p. 
152). This criticism came from across the political spectrum. The Institute of 
Directors (IOD 1986) despaired ‘at the possibility of ever achieving any 
effective relationship between the local business community and local 
government’, whilst Westminster City Council (1986) concluded that ‘the link 
between local business and local government would be effectively broken’.
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5.5 RATE DIVERGENCE AND CENTRAL CONTROL
The economic crisis of the mid 1970s brought to an end a long period of 
expansion of public services in Britain (Travers 1987), especially in the local 
government sector. In the period between 1961 and 1975 there was a rise of 
69% in local government employment. This compared to an increase in 
central government employment of only 9.4% in the period 1965 to 1974 
(Midwinter and Mair 1987 at p. 63).
From 1979, the government was determined to exercise tight control over 
public expenditure. During this period there was a change of emphasis away 
from the development of local services towards control of grants, 
expenditures and individual rate levels. Between 1975-6 and 1981-2, local 
authority spending fell by 4% per annum in real terms and, between 1980 
and 1995, employment levels in local government fell by 15% (OECD 
1997a).
That rates were unpopular with business is well documented (Birdseye and 
Webb 1984; DOE 1986b) and the government used this unpopularity to 
bolster its arguments for controlling local expenditures. The following 
controls were introduced by central government between 1980 and 1985:
1. the use of grant penalties based on the extent to which local 
authorities overspend their targets or central government 
guidelines;
2. the acquisition of rate capping powers against individual local 
authorities in cases of ‘excessive or unreasonable’ expenditure;
3. the acquisition of general powers of rate limitation that were applicable 
to all local authorities;
4. the abolition of supplementary rates (explained in A1.3.4).
These measures were viewed by some as draconian (Charman 1989) and 
by others as an attack on local democracy (Midwinter 1984), but they failed 
to achieve the reductions in local authority expenditure that were sought.
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What they did was to raise the importance of the rating system on the 
political agenda and strengthen government resolve to introduce reform.
5.5.1 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS
Earlier in this chapter Figure 5.2 illustrated the growing importance of central 
grants as a component of local finance. In 1999-2000, they accounted for 
over 50% of local revenue. The grant system and how the level of grants is 
set using the Grant Related Expenditure Assessment, are explained in 
Bennett (1982) for the system as it existed before the reforms of the 1980s, 
and for the revised system in Ridge and Smith (1991).
Jackson and Meadows (1985) summarised the objectives of the grant 
system:
1. to compensate authorities for differences in their spending needs;
2. to compensate authorities for differences in their local taxable needs;
3. to reduce the burden which would otherwise fall on local taxpayers;
4. to influence the total composition and distribution of local authority 
spending.
Figure 5.3 shows the way local authority income sources changed between 
1940 and 1990. Although central grants are a growing component of local 
revenues, grants fell in real terms by 6% per annum between 1979 and 1986 
and many increases in the rate burden came about precisely because of 
cuts to central government grants and the Rate Support Grant in particular.
5.5.2 CHANGING RATE BURDENS 1973-1988
Changes in central grants resulted in an equivalent change in the local tax 
rate. On a national basis, reductions in central grants in the period 1979 to 
1985 resulted in a net increase in rate poundages of 11.8p (Bennett and 
Krebs 1988 at p. 99).
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Over the three years 1978-81, domestic rates rose by 91 % (Brown and 
Jackson 1990 at p. 288), and between 1978 and 1982 business rates rose 
from 21% to 42% of corporate profits (Bennett 1986 at p. 35).
In the same study, Bennett reports that rate payments by businesses in the 
period following 1979 increased 15% to 20% faster than other costs and he 
observes a steady increase in the variability between local authority areas, 
resulting in wide disparities between locations (at p. 36). Despite the 
evidence of rising burdens, some commentators at that time, especially the 
local authority associations, were claiming that business rates did not 
represent a significant problem for business (see for example Hughs 1981, 
1983; AMA 1983; Othick 1983; Crawford et al. 1985). A close look at the 
arguments reveals that, for the most part, they are based on the premise 
that rates represent only a small proportion of total business costs. Whilst it 
may be correct that rates are a small proportion of total costs, if they are 
increasing fast, they can still have a major impact on profitability due to the 
gearing effect (see Appendix 3).
The impact is likely to be different for different sizes and types of business. It 
may be possible to minimise the impact of differing burdens for nationally 
based or multi-branch businesses, but for small businesses the problem is 
more serious. Small businesses paid £5.4 billion in business rates in 1994-5 
and this represented 22.9% of the total burden of taxation on the small 
business sector (Chittenden et al. 1999). This suggests that rates make up a 
bigger proportion of total costs for small businesses.
A further problem is the extent to which a higher level of services is enjoyed 
by the taxpayers in return for a high rate burden. This is a central issue in 
assessing the impact of a tax (see 3.4.2), since a tax that benefits the 
taxpayer by the amount of the tax itself is no longer onerous. For business 
rates, it seems certain that rises in rate burden did not translate to equal 
rises in benefits. The increases came about from a need to replace other 
forms of revenue, such as falling grants. Nor can it be assumed that differing 
tax rates between jurisdictions gave better benefits to business taxpayers in 
the high rate area. In this case it is suggested that the higher level of
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benefits in high rate areas flows to the residential sector and gives few, if 
any, benefits for businesses. This important question of benefits received by 
business rate payers is discussed further in 6.4.
The conflict between central and local government that is illustrated by the 
rate discrepancies can also be viewed as a consequence of a redistributive 
desire on the part of local government. It is not desirable to have more than 
one level of government engaged in redistribution of income and wealth and 
this role is usually reserved for central government, in order to avoid 
conflicting goals in this area of normative judgments. In some cases, local 
authorities used high levels of expenditure as a means of offsetting the 
distributional effects of central government policies. This in turn led central 
government to implement more extreme policies than would be in place if the 
two were working cooperatively (Kay and King 1990 at p. 141).
5.6 POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
An internally consistent set of principles for efficiency in the public sector can 
be elaborated without the need to consider the political process (Buchanan 
1975). In this thesis, little attention is paid to the politics of either central or 
local government, but it is useful to differentiate the political composition of 
local authorities if only to explain the increasing disparity of business rate 
burdens that emerged during the period 1979-1988.
Local Government was ‘... the bete noire of the Thatcher administrations 
during the 1980s’ (Johnson and Pattie 1996) and the main source of conflict 
was between Conservative central government and Labour controlled local 
councils, especially the so-called ‘new left’ authorities. Boddy and Fudge 
(1984) and Gyford (1985) both give a very complete analysis of the issues 
and, for a summary of the political arguments on both sides, see Newton and 
Karran (1985).
Bennett and Krebs (1988 in Appendix 3) make an analysis that ‘seeks to 
differentiate by objective criteria the political character of the main groups of 
local authorities which have steadily deviated from the modal distribution of
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tax rates’. Whilst recognising the problems of defining political 
characterisations with accuracy, the authors do identify a subgroup of 
Labour areas that can be classified as ‘new left’, which defines the distinctive 
behaviour of the high tax local authority areas in the 1980s. They are 
concentrated in city centres and other highly urbanised areas and all except 
one were rate capped. Bennett and Krebs conclude that ‘there can be no 
doubt that the “new left” phenomenon as a whole is a major factor in the dev­
elopment of the extreme range of rate poundages since 1979’ (at p. 106).
There were nine ‘new left’ authorities identified in London, including 
Haringey, Brent and Camden, which are the three high rate London 
boroughs that are used for the empirical work in this thesis. The important 
point about these three ‘new left’ boroughs is not just that they imposed high 
rates, but they are located adjacent to boroughs with Conservative councils 
who were setting below average tax rates.
The London Borough of Camden has been the subject of two historically 
based case studies that give a careful analysis of the political tone (Vielba 
1992; Marinetto 1997). These authors make clear the process of 
politicisation that led to the ‘new left’ administrations and give an insight into 
the tension between central and local government, which existed long before 
the emergence of Thatcherism in central government politics.
5.7 SIX LONDON BOROUGHS
The London boroughs were constituted under the Local Government Act, 
1963 and came into operation in 1965, (see 5.2.1). Six London boroughs 
have been selected for the empirical research.
The selected local authorities are the London boroughs of Barnet, Brent, 
Camden, Enfield, Haringey and the City of Westminster. Of these six, Brent, 
Camden and Haringey are high rate boroughs and Barnet, Enfield and 
Westminster are low rate boroughs.
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Figure 5.4
MAP OF SIX LONDON BOROUGHS USED IN THE STUDY
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Figure 5.4: Map of Six London Boroughs Used In The Study
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Figure 5.4 is a map showing the six boroughs and their relationship to each 
other. The boroughs are paired together, so that there is a match between a 
high rate borough and a low rate borough; a study of a single property type 
is then made for each pair of boroughs.
Enfield and Haringey are paired for a study of industrial property. 
Barnet and Brent are selected for the study of retail property. 
Westminster and Camden are used for the study of office property.
Further information on the design of the empirical research is given in 
Chapter 6 and the data collection for the districts selected is explained 
in 7.6.
Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 show the way rate burdens between the selected 
pairs of boroughs diverged between 1973 and 1988.
In 1974, rate poundages in London were within 8% of each other, except for 
inner London, which had a rate poundage 20% below the average. This is 
because of the dominance of the City of London, Westminster and some 
other inner London areas that have a much higher tax base (based on 
property values), and this allowed these local authorities to set low rate 
poundages.
For all three pairs of boroughs there is a progressive divergence of rate 
poundages, which becomes more marked after 1979. The divergence is 
clear in Westminster/Camden from 1976-7 onwards and in Enfield/Haringey 
from 1978-9 onwards. In 1978-9, rate poundages in Barnet/Brent were still 
in line with each other, but by 1988 the uniform pattern has been replaced in 
all three areas by the widely differing rate poundages that are illustrated by 
the figures.
The impact of rate capping on high rate boroughs stands out, in Brent from 
1983-4 (Figure 5.6) and in Haringey from 1985-6 onwards (Figure 5.5).
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5.7.1 LONDON BOROUGH OF ENFIELD
The borough was formed from the district councils of Enfield, Edmonton and 
Southgate and part of the county of Middlesex, which, being fully urban, was 
abolished as part of the 1963 reforms.
Enfield is an outer borough, forming part of the northern edge of London and 
contains large tracts of industrial property in the Lea Valley. The borough 
had a stock of 1,174,000 m2 of industrial floor-space in 1994, representing 
65% of its total business property. Shops and offices made up 25% and 10% 
respectively (ONS 2001).
Between 1968 and 1994 there was an unbroken period of Conservative 
control and until recently the political character of the borough had been 
predominantly Conservative. There have been two periods of Labour control: 
one took place during the first administration at the time the council was 
formed, and between 1994 and 2002 the council was Labour controlled (see 
Table A5.1).
5.7.2 LONDON BOROUGH OF HARINGEY
Haringey was formed from the old boroughs of Hornsey, Tottenham and 
Wood Green. It is classified as an inner London borough, with part of the 
Lea Valley industrial area to the north-east of the borough.
In 1994 the borough had a stock of 815,000 m2 of industrial floor-space. This 
was 60% of the total business floor-space in the borough with the balance 
being made up of 30% shops and 10% offices (ONS 2001).
The only period of Conservative administration in the history of the borough 
took place during the first two terms between 1965 and 1971, immediately 
after the borough was created. Since 1971 control has been with Labour, 
who have enjoyed a large majority, winning 42 out of 57 seats in the 2002 
local council elections, with no Conservative seats (see Table A5.2).
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5.7.3 LONDON BOROUGH OF BARNET
Four boroughs were merged to create Barnet: East Finchley, Hendon, East 
Barnet and Friern Barnet. The borough is an outer borough, to the north of 
London. Minor boundary changes in 1996 to the northern boundaries of the 
borough do not have any effect on this study.
Shops made up 40% of the total business floor-space with 538,000 m2 of 
space in 1994. Offices represented 25% and industrial 35% (ONS 2001).
Barnet was Conservative controlled from the formation of the borough until 
1994, since when it has had a Labour administration with Liberal Democrat 
support. In the 2002 elections the Conservatives again won a majority. The 
largest Conservative majority was 53 in the 1968 elections and throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s the Conservatives held majorities of between 21 and 
39 seats (see Table A5.3).
5.7.4 LONDON BOROUGH OF BRENT
Formed from the boroughs of Willesden and Wembley, Brent is classified as 
an outer London borough, although all of its boundaries are with other 
London boroughs.
Shops had a total floor-space of 426,000 m2 which was 20% of the total 
business property in the borough in 1994. This figure includes the Brent 
Cross shopping centre, which, at that time, was 24,320 m2 representing 
nearly 6% of total retail space in Brent. Industrial property made up 66% of 
the remaining total and offices 14% (ONS 2001; Standard Life 2002).
Conservative controlled until 1971, Brent has been under Labour control 
ever since. The Labour administration has been supported by Liberal 
Democrats for two periods, the first between 1982 and 1986 and again 
between 1990 and 1998. The largest Labour majority of 20 was gained in 
the 1986 elections (see Table A5.4).
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5.7.5 WESTMINSTER CITY COUNCIL
Westminster became a City in 1902 but, unlike the neighbouring City of 
London, it has the administrative status of a London borough. Formed from 
three local authority areas, Westminster, Marylebone and Paddington, the 
borough is a city centre authority with a high value property base.
Over 65% of the business property (by floor-space) was made up of office 
accommodation, represented by 4,241,000 m2 in 1994. The remainder was 
mostly made up of retail property, with only 4% of the total being industrial 
property (ONS 2001).
Westminster has been under Conservative administration since it was 
formed. The Conservative council had its largest majority of 50 seats in the 
1968 elections, which was reduced to its lowest level of 2 seats in 1990. The 
Conservative majority currently stands at 36 (see Table A5.5).
5.7.6 LONDON BOROUGH OF CAMDEN
Formed from the prosperous boroughs of Holborn and Hampstead and the 
relatively deprived St Pancras, Camden is an inner London borough, which 
includes large parts of central London to the south, including Bloomsbury, 
Holborn and the Kings Cross and Euston area.
There was 2,908,000 m2 of office property making up 60% of the total 
business property floor-space in 1994. This is concentrated in the southern 
part of the borough. The remaining floor-space was split evenly between 
shops and industrial (ONS 2001).
Camden was controlled by Labour from 1971 onwards, with only a single 
term of Conservative administration in the borough following the 1968 local 
elections. Majorities have varied over the years of Labour control with the 
lowest being 7 seats and the highest 35 following the 1994 elections (see 
Table A5.6).
138
Chapter 5
5.8 CONCLUSIONS
The rating system is just one part of the of local government finance system 
and, throughout the 1980s, it was the subject of vociferous debate, political 
wrangling and much legislation. The central problem was that continual 
increases in demands for local services had to be matched against the 
limited sources of local government revenue. This culminated in the 
introduction of the Uniform Business Rate in 1990, the most far-reaching 
change to the rating system for over 70 years.
The exceptional circumstances that led to the 1990 reforms provide a unique 
opportunity to study differing tax burdens between local authority areas and 
this opportunity has effectively been removed by the reforms themselves, 
which introduced a unified national rate of tax.
The differing rate burdens that were in effect for several years prior to 1990 
provide an ideal set of conditions to identify the impact of business rates on 
rental values. This is expected to manifest itself through different rates of 
rental value growth between the paired London boroughs selected for this 
study.
In the next chapter the research framework is developed. It is based on the 
theoretical background, which was explained in Chapters 2 and 3, and it 
draws on the previous empirical work discussed in Chapter 4.
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6.1 INTRODUCTION
The empirical study that is carried out for this thesis examines the effect of 
business rates on business tenants and property owners. Chapters 2 and 3 
set out the theoretical background to the thesis, while Chapter 4 examined 
the existing empirical literature. Chapter 5 explained the political background 
to the rating system in the UK and identified the six local authorities in 
London that were selected as the subjects for the empirical research.
This chapter explains the research design, the methodology adopted and the 
data collection approach that is employed to answer the chief question posed 
by this thesis: to what extent is the UK property tax shifted backwards into 
rents and thereby capitalised? The basic approach to the empirical work is 
an inter-jurisdictional micro-level study of property tax incidence using the 
circumstances of tax change. Figure 1.1 showed the time frame of the 
empirical research.
6.2 DEFINING THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The essential problem is whether or not differences in property tax rates are 
reflected in the values of the properties to which they apply. Underlying this 
research is the hypothesis that property values over time will be lower in 
areas where there is a higher tax burden, subject to any differences in the 
benefits received in payment for the tax.
In defining the research hypothesis, careful account is taken of the theoretical 
factors that were considered in Chapters 2 and 3. The research design and 
methodology selected make reference both to the determination of property 
values and the analysis of tax incidence.
The central research problem has been set out in the literature on many 
occasions and several precise formulations have been made in studies of 
property tax incidence. In a UK context, the research problem was clearly 
explained in theoretical terms by Bennett and Krebs (1988), and it was
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developed empirically, in the framework of a property based micro-level 
study, by Sibley (1989). The statement below expands on that formulation.
Consider two identical properties, situated in close proximity to one 
another and having the same access to transport links and other 
relevant amenities. Each property will represent a close substitute for 
the other. They will be equally attractive to prospective occupiers and 
rental value will tend to be the same for both buildings. It follows that 
rateable values will also tend to be the same because they are 
assessed according to the rental value of the property.
Now assume that these properties are located on either side of the 
boundary between local authority areas and the respective local 
authorities have widely differing rate poundages. The business rates 
payable by the occupiers will be different and the property in the high 
rate area will suffer from higher occupation costs.
The two properties, although otherwise identical, are no longer equally 
attractive to occupiers and, assuming an efficient property market, 
rental values in the high rate area can be expected to fall to a level 
where total occupation costs are equalised, subject to any differences 
in benefits received by the taxpayer.
In order to test the hypothesis that total occupation costs are equalised, it is 
necessary to identify properties that closely match the above scenario.
Figure 6.1 provides an illustration of these circumstances for retail property 
in the London Boroughs of Barnet and Brent.
It is assumed that the circumstances above exist under the pre-1990 rating 
system. It has already been seen that property markets offer ‘efficiency over 
time’ rather than immediate adjustment to changing market circumstances 
(see 2.6.3). In previous studies ‘property market responses have been found 
to operate with a considerable delay’ (Bond et al. 1996a at p. 29). This is a 
function of the institutional arrangements that are found in the UK and the 
structure of the business lease is part of the explanation for this phenomenon 
(see 2.6.5). The general level of rental values in the high rate area cannot 
readily adjust to compensate for higher total occupation costs, so that
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changes in the levels of value between areas (under conditions of rental 
value growth) will tend to come about through differing annual rates of rental 
value growth. Even when dealing with new lettings and renewals, this 
process is not instantaneous and it can be described as a ‘slowly changing 
spatial relationship’ (Bennett 1980 at p. 97). Such relationships can only be 
observed after a sufficient length of time has elapsed.
The central problem can be stated in the form of a research hypothesis 
as follows:
Following a period of years during which differing property tax 
burdens are applied to otherwise comparable properties, the 
rental values of those properties will adjust to a level whereby 
total occupation costs are equalised.
This hypothesis disregards the question of tax benefits, which is considered 
at 6.4 below, but first it is useful to recap on how the expected equalisation 
can occur. The theory of rental value determination was considered in 
Chapter 2, together with the residual nature of rent and an analysis of 
demand and supply differences between property types.
Occupation demand for property is determined by the expected profitability of 
running a business in a particular property. Increased costs in the high rate 
area will reduce the level of occupation demand and this will manifest itself in 
two ways: existing tenants can vacate their premises when their leases 
expire and prospective tenants will look for lower rents in such areas when 
seeking premises. This reduction in demand will in turn result in an increase 
in supply which will bring about a corresponding fall in rental values.
The extent to which equalisation will take place will be strongly influenced by 
the property type. The degree of equalisation will in part be determined by 
the price elasticity of occupation demand and the elasticity of demand is 
affected by the availability of substitutes, which will vary for different property 
types. A manufacturing firm could, perhaps, locate anywhere in the South- 
East, and could certainly locate anywhere in the same industrial estate but 
the same could not be said for retail occupiers.
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The supply elasticity of the particular property type will also have an influence 
on the extent to which the expected results are likely to be observed. Supply 
for all three property types can be regarded as inelastic within the selected 
London boroughs at the time of the chief empirical analysis in this thesis.
This is a function of the urban location and local planning policies (see 2.8).
The residual nature of rent is also affected by property type. The relationship 
of profitability to occupation demand is strongest for retail premises and is 
likely to be weakest for office properties. This would suggest that the 
strongest results will be found for retail property, but in practice the 
institutional lease isolates the rent from price shocks, such as changes in 
other occupation costs. This will lengthen the time frame required for the 
observation of any change.
Finally, the proportion of rates as part of the occupier’s total costs can also 
be expected to influence the extent of equalisation. If the rate burden is a 
small proportion of costs, then the impact on rent (or other shifting effects) 
will be less.
6.3 TELEPHONE SURVEY OF PROSPECTIVE OCCUPIERS
In order to explore the proposition that a higher tax burden will result in lower 
demand for properties in that area, a small-scale telephone survey was 
carried out on prospective occupiers in Enfield and Haringey.
The survey was focused on identifying the importance to occupiers of rates 
as a business cost. It also sought to identify whether occupiers perceived 
any differential benefits arising from being in one local authority area over 
another. Another area that was investigated in the survey was the extent of 
occupiers’ knowledge of the (then) forthcoming system of Uniform Business 
Rates. A full analysis of the survey results is set out in Appendix 6.
The telephone survey confirmed that business occupiers are likely to take 
account of rate burden in making their location decisions. Prospective 
occupiers showed a strong aversion to high rate areas, which supports the 
validity of the central hypothesis of this thesis.
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No occupiers identified any tax benefits that were received in exchange for 
the tax payment beyond those that were common to all local authorities.
There were other non-tax preferences that affected the choice of location, 
such as political inclination and perceived disadvantages in the 
implementation of planning policies in some local authority areas.
The questions about knowledge of the new rating system were intended to 
see if there was any need to account for the rational occupier with perfect 
knowledge, who would already have adjusted their rental bids to take 
account of the expected future changes to rate burden. The survey 
suggested that knowledge of the new system of Uniform Business Rates was 
quite limited in November 1989.
This was consistent with the survey of retailers by Crosby and Keogh (1990) 
in Nottingham who found that ‘very few firms claimed to have taken any 
action in anticipation of the change’ (at p. 22).
A more recent survey (DOE 1995a) of 1,500 occupiers, carried out in 1993, 
found that ‘almost three quarters of firms (72%) claimed to be aware of the 
Uniform Business Rate’ (at p. 55). The corollary of this finding is that, even 
three years after the new system was introduced, 28% of business occupiers 
still did not have any knowledge of the new system.
6.4. BENEFITS TO THE TAXPAYER
Business rates are paid by occupiers to finance local services, but the 
relationship between the payment and the benefits received is a tenuous 
one. The services received by taxpayers have included refuse collection, 
local road maintenance, police and fire services, local education services, 
some transport services, social services, libraries, leisure and recreational 
facilities.
For the purpose of this research, the important question is whether there 
were differential benefits between high and low rate boroughs, which 
reflected the differences in property taxes on businesses. The key services
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of interest to business occupiers are refuse collection and security (fire and 
police). For the most part, the other local services are of the greatest benefit 
to the residential sector of the local population. This issue was also 
discussed in 5.5.2, where the conclusion was that the improved services in 
the high rate boroughs tended to benefit the local residential sector. If the 
employees of a business reside in the same local authority area as the firm, it 
could perhaps be argued that the business gains benefit to its workforce from 
higher business rates, but high employee mobility between local authority 
areas in London weakens this link considerably.
By the late 1970s, most London boroughs had removed trade refuse 
collection from business rates and made it a chargeable service. All six 
boroughs used in this empirical research made a separate charge for refuse 
collection in addition to the business rates. Occupiers in these boroughs 
were also free to arrange for refuse collection from one of a number of 
private sector suppliers as an alternative to the local authority service. This 
meant that there was little incentive for occupiers to locate in one borough 
over another due to either free or better refuse collection services.
In London, the Fire Service has been provided by the London Fire Brigade 
(LFB) across the whole metropolitan area since 1948 and this was financed 
by the rate precept, charged first by the LCC and, until 1986, by the GLC. 
After 1986, responsibility for the LFB passed to the London Fire and Civil 
Defence Authority and financing was still through a rate precept. Again, there 
is no differential benefit attributable to any individual local authority area.
Similar arrangements apply to the Metropolitan Police Authority, which is 
financed and managed on a London-wide basis through a rate precept, 
although in this case with local level management via Borough Operation 
Command Units. The City of London Police is a separate force and not part 
of the Metropolitan Police Authority.
The London Ambulance Service has been the responsibility of the National 
Health Service (NHS) since 1974. This service, and other local health 
services that are part of the NHS, are not financed by local taxes.
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The telephone survey carried out as part of this research did not find that 
prospective occupiers considered any borough to provide better services 
than any other (see 6.3 and Appendix 6). The overwhelming concern of 
occupiers was the size of the rate bill and it is suggested that any marginal 
differences in the quality of services in the high rate boroughs that might 
benefit businesses (such as better libraries) are outweighed by the 
substantially higher rate burden.
It is reasonable to assume that, for London boroughs, the important 
business-focused services are homogenous between boroughs, regardless 
of rate burden (and political persuasion of the local authority). There has 
been a progressive tendency to centralise government services and this has 
reduced the scope for local differentiation. In fact, for England as a whole, 
‘local authorities have much less freedom to vary the level of services they 
provide’ (Evans 1985 at p. 169), when compared to other countries, such as 
the US, and compared to freedoms enjoyed in the past.
It is concluded that any differential benefits between local authorities used in 
this empirical work can be safely ignored. The benefit effect is considered to 
be fiscally neutral between boroughs and therefore no explicit public sector 
variables will be used in this work.
6.5 RESEARCH DESIGN
Many factors were taken into account when designing the research 
methodology. In choosing a design for this research, two main principles 
were kept in mind:
that the design must be structurally congruent with the research 
question;
that it must be compatible with the available resources, especially the 
availability of data to complete the study.
Spector (1981 at p. 32) commends a cross-sectional design for field studies 
where the data are difficult to acquire or control and this is the underlying 
approach to the data in this work.
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The primary analysis undertaken for this research uses cross-sectional data 
at 1st April 1988 and analyses the information to see if any statistically 
significant causal relationship exists between rate burden and rental value.
In the standard cross-sectional design, data are collected at one point in time 
and this can give rise to problems in establishing cause without a time 
dimension (de Vaus 2001 at p. 177). The adoption in this thesis of a 
Pre-test/Post-test design (Graziano and Raulin 1997 at p. 221), addresses 
this flaw, strengthening the standard approach, to allow comparison between 
two points in time (Ti and T2), even though the underlying approach is cross- 
sectional.
The cross-sectional data at April 1988 (T2) represent the Post-test data but, 
for the Pre-test/Post-test design to work, data must also be collected at an 
additional point in time, before significant tax rate differentials were present. 
The date selected for the Pre-test data collection (T^ is 1st April 1973. This 
makes it possible to test whether the properties in each area were drawn 
from the same population before the emergence of high tax differentials, an 
assumption that underlies the research design.
The logic of the experimental design is based on the following two 
conditions:
the areas under study are the same in all relevant respects at 
Tt before the emergence of rate differentials;
the areas under study experience the same conditions between 
Tt and T2 except for the emergence of rate differentials.
The research hypothesis to be tested was set out in 6.2 above. If either of 
these two conditions is not met, then there are alternative plausible 
hypotheses that could account for the differences between the areas under 
study (de Vaus 2001 at p. 56).
The long time period is expected to allow the impacts of the differing tax 
rates to work through to differences in rents. It is a basic prediction of this 
thesis that rental values will adjust to reflect differing rate burdens. The 
assumption underlying the Pre-test design is that, in 1973, for any pair of
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boroughs, the two sets of observations represent different data drawn from 
the same population. The Post-test analysis for tax capitalisation is based on 
the corresponding set of measurements for the outcome variable of rent in 
1988. If these observations can be shown to have been drawn from different 
populations after the rate burden has diverged, then the tax can be shown to 
have been capitalised (as long as the direction of change is consistent with 
the predicted outcome).
Whilst the additional 1973 data do not allow for a time series analysis to be 
carried out, they do give a longitudinal dimension to this study. A secondary 
analysis was made to introduce an additional longitudinal dimension to the 
study and to extend the time horizon beyond the 1973-1988 period. This 
secondary analysis is a test of rental growth in the period 1988-1998, 
following the introduction of Uniform Business Rates: it is not as rigorously 
specified as the primary analysis and is explained in 8.8.
The Pre-test/Post-test design is an adaptation of the experimental method. 
Fisher (1966) is still the classic description of the modern approach to the 
experimental design, but the techniques of statistical inference evolved for 
controlled experiments are inappropriate for social sciences (Bennett and 
Wrigley 1981 p. 8). The data available for this study will be field data rather 
than laboratory data (Friedman and Sunder 1994 at p. 7), which necessitates 
relaxations to Fisher’s method and the design adopted might be more 
accurately described as a ‘quasi-experimental design’ (see Cook and 
Campbell 1979 or Shadish et al. 2002).
The experimental methodology involves the application of treatments to the 
independent variables identified as causes, to determine their effect on the 
dependent variable (the outcome variable). Within this research, the 
treatments are the differential tax rates and the independent variable is the 
rate burden payable by a particular property. The dependent variable is the 
rental value, which is predicted to be affected by the differential rate burden.
The approach to the analysis is based on well established null hypothesis 
significance testing procedures. For the primary analysis this involves 
standard tests of statistical significance, first to test the data in 1973 before
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the divergent rate burdens emerged (the Pre-test) and then in 1988 after the 
divergent rate burdens had been present for a number of years (the Post­
test). The statistical analysis procedures are explained in Chapter 8.
The ideal approach controls extraneous sources by randomisation rather 
than by attempting to hold everything constant except for the one variable 
under consideration (Brown and Melamed 1990). The empirical research in 
this thesis does not involve the completely randomised design that is only 
possible with the true experiment. In true experimental research, subjects are 
allocated to treatment groups before the treatment is applied to the 
independent variable and the outcome of the treatment on the dependent 
variable is measured and later tested. The subjects to be considered in this 
experiment are individual properties that cannot be chosen or allocated to 
treatment groups at random. The treatment in this research is the application 
of different tax burdens to otherwise identical contiguous local authority 
areas. Like so much social science research, the treatment of interest cannot 
be applied by the researcher, it can only be observed.
The lack of randomisation in the selection of subjects in geographical 
research is closely related to what Openshaw and Taylor (1981) call the 
‘modifiable areal unit problem’. This describes the choice of an arbitrary or 
convenient zone as a basis for spatial aggregation and analysis, which can 
invalidate much research in the field. This may be true for spatial units that 
are chosen arbitrarily on an a posteriori basis but, in this thesis, the zones 
chosen are based on local authority administrative boundaries that are 
directly linked to the solution of the research question. The zones are not 
modifiable or arbitrary. They are truly given, a priori and so the areal unit 
problem does not arise. This prior assignment by virtue of the property 
location removes the possibility identified by Spector of ‘bias in the 
assignment of subjects to treatments’ (1981 at p. 27). It is an underlying 
assumption that the two groups of properties under consideration in each 
borough were equivalent at the beginning of the study (T^ and this is tested 
in the Pre-test data analysis.
Changing local authority boundaries was another factor that is related to the 
modifiable areal unit problem and this was taken into account in selecting the
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local authority areas used for the study. During the time period under 
consideration there were no relevant boundary changes instigated by the 
Boundary Commission.
6.6 MATCHED PAIRS
In this design, matched pairs of properties are identified on either side of the 
local authority boundary. The use of matched pairs is fully congruent with the 
research statement set out in 6.2.
Matching is an important part of the methodology adopted and, by using this 
approach, it was possible to control and resolve data issues that have 
confounded earlier studies. Shadish (2002 pp. 118-122) provides a 
discussion of the way in which matching can strengthen the Pre-test/Post- 
test design. The identification of pairs of properties with closely similar 
characteristics is a major control on the data but matching suffers from the 
problem that it needs a large pool of ‘subjects from which to draw those with 
appropriate characteristics’ (Lindsey 1999 at p. 112). This has been aptly 
described by Smith (1997 at p. 326) as ‘statistical inefficiency -  creating 
matches ... requires “throwing away” a lot of data’ (see 7.6).
Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) comment on the use of matched pairs in the 
following terms (at p. 4):
This ‘matched pair’ method is really a type of hedonic analysis. It is 
implicitly admitted that many variables or attributes determine the price 
paid for the complex good and the researcher is simply trying to set up 
a situation in which the influence of all but one is eliminated.
Hedonic techniques are more commonly applied to residential property and 
the difficulties associated with the traditional hedonic approach were set out 
in 4.2.1. Black (1999) recently used matched pairs to good effect in a study 
of how school quality influences house prices. In an attempt to avoid the 
problems of omitted variable bias that affect the more usual hedonic 
regression approach, Black adopts a matched pairs technique, comparing 
houses on opposite sides of attendance district boundaries.
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In the UK there have been few hedonic analyses of business property and 
this study does not attempt to use hedonic analysis. The decisive problem for 
hedonic analysis of business property is the availability of data, although 
some of the assumptions required for a hedonic analysis also do not hold 
true for business property markets, especially the requirement for perfectly 
competitive property markets and perfect mobility between locations.
A single market is a prerequisite of hedonic analysis and, for business 
property, there are difficulties defining the market itself. Dunse and Jones 
(1998) make the first major hedonic analysis of UK office property, finding 
that the hedonic model could not be successfully applied, explaining only 
60% of the variation in rental price. The methodology adopted in the study 
(stepwise regression) is open to strong criticism, but the problem of market 
definition and the presence of sub-markets was a confounding factor. The 
latest extension to this work resolved some of the difficulties (Dunse and 
Jones 2002), finding results for one out of four market segments but the 
author’s conclusion is that ‘the hedonic regressions for other clustered 
segments are less convincing’.
There have been notably few studies that use matched pairs in recent years 
and this is partly because of the popularity of regression models. Smith 
(1997) evaluates the two approaches, showing that ‘when controls are many 
and treatments are few, matching compares to multi-variate regression 
analysis in the estimation of treatment effects’ (at p. 327).
Designs of the type adopted in this thesis are, in fact, a specialised form of 
the general linear model but, unlike regression models, classical models of 
the type employed here are focused on a select few important variables and 
‘parsimony is built into the model by the nature of its design’ (McKee 2002). 
On the other hand, the statistical model adopted does not allow for 
standardisation within the model itself and the matched pairs methodology 
relies on pre-selection. As pointed out by Cheshire and Sheppard (2002 at p. 
4), ‘the difficulty with the matched pairs approach is that there are no obvious 
tests to apply to see how well the research design has succeeded’. This 
limitation is partly addressed through the Pre-test/Post-test methodology 
used for the primary analysis and this is supported by a secondary analysis 
designed to help confirm the central research hypothesis. When fortified with
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triangulation of the results against market data, it is considered that the 
limitation is fully addressed.
It was thus decided to use matched pairs and to implement the selection of 
pairs within a rigorous selection framework. In principle, as was argued 
above, such a methodology is comparable to the approach used in the best 
hedonic analyses, but it is far less data intensive. The process of matching 
the pairs together is fully described in 7.5.
A regression model was used in the pilot study to handle data that were not 
cross-sectional in their nature (see 8.3).
6.7 DATA REQUIREMENTS
Before considering in detail the analytical techniques that are envisaged to 
test the hypothesis, it is necessary to discuss the data requirements that 
underpin this empirical research. One of the main factors in the design of this 
research was to ensure that sufficient data could be collected to ensure that 
a satisfactory analysis could be carried out.
A primary limitation for much research in the field of real property is the 
availability of data: there is a dearth of published information and this acts as 
a bar to research in the discipline. Crosby (1985a at p. 547) notes that, in the 
analysis of the property market, data are ‘limited by lack of centralised 
sources’ and the discussion of existing research in Chapter 4 found that 
other empirical studies in the UK were hampered by poor or inadequate data. 
Behind the apparent objectivity of statistical analysis lies a great deal of 
subjective judgement. In this thesis, particular emphasis has been given to 
detailed data collection, which has been carried out in the field at the level of 
the individual property unit. The use of matched pairs was described in 6.6 
and is examined in more depth in 7.5. Considerable care has been given to 
the data collection and verification process and, where assumptions are 
made about data, these assumptions are subjected to verification 
themselves, wherever possible.
The data requirements for this study are purely observational, the treatment 
being the existence of high tax differentials between the local areas under 
study. These observations could be taken over a period of time (time series 
data) or at a single point in time (cross-sectional data).
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Time series data would allow any differences in the annual rates of rental 
value growth to be identified, but a time series is significantly more difficult to 
assemble. The only way to achieve time series data would be to make 
estimates each year of rental value. Market rental values are only 
established at the point that a property is let or re-let. Lettings or other 
reviews of rent take place infrequently, typically at five-yearly intervals, so the 
series of data needed for a time series analysis will not be available unless 
estimates of rental value are used. This is the normal procedure for portfolio 
valuations that are carried out annually or, in some cases, quarterly, but the 
frequency of revaluation can lead to a mechanical exercise based on the 
updating of previous figures, rather than an ab initio valuation. This problem, 
known as serial correlation, is discussed by Dunse et al. (1998) and it is an 
important criticism of the IPD data that were used by Bond et al. (1996a).
After careful consideration of both data sources and existing studies, it was 
judged that sufficient data would not be available for a time-series study and 
the cross-sectional research design explained in 6.5 was adopted 
accordingly. This cross-sectional design was specified for the primary 
analysis and it is supplemented by a secondary analysis that introduces a 
further longitudinal dimension to the study.
The date chosen for the primary cross-sectional analysis (April 1988) follows 
several years of differing rate burdens and it is reasonable to predict that any 
differences in rental growth over the preceding 10 years will have been 
transmitted to actual rental values. One of the chief problems with the studies 
considered in Chapter 4 is the short time horizons that were adopted: only 
the study by Crosby and Keogh (1990) makes the analysis over a long-term 
time horizon.
The secondary analysis uses a different data-set to the primary analysis: it 
was not considered practical in a small scale study of this type to try and 
maintain the data-set over a long time period, partly for the reasons outlined 
above, but especially given the property market recession that occurred 
immediately after the period covered by the primary analysis. The introduction 
of Transitional Relief which is designed to smooth out differences between 
occupiers under the Uniform Business Rate was another factor in the decision 
to make the secondary analysis subsidiary to the main analytical approach.
In this thesis it is proposed to use rateable value as a uniform proxy for rental 
value. Whereas data from several different portfolio valuers might be subject
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to errors and differences in method and opinion, the estimated rental values 
in the rating list are all arrived at in the same consistent manner, and they are 
all determined at the same date. Appendix 2 contains a discussion of the 
differences between market rental value and estimated rental value and 
examines the hypothetical tenancy that is used for the purposes of the 
chosen rental value proxy.
The Post-test data will be based on 1990 Rateable Values acting as a proxy 
for rental value at April 1988 and the Pre-test data will be based on 1973 
Rateable Values, which will be treated as a proxy for rental value in April 
1973. Details of this approach and its validity are discussed in Chapter 7.
The secondary analysis of rental growth in the period 1988-1998 also uses 
rateable value as a proxy for rental value but is not based on fully matched 
pairs and, for the reasons explained earlier, it used a different data-set to the 
primary analysis. The secondary analysis is explained in 8.8.
6.8 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter the research problem has been defined and the research 
design has been explained. The research design uses matched pairs of 
properties to try to identify the extent of any tax capitalisation. Taking cross- 
sectional data for matched pairs on either side of the local authority 
boundary, the analysis investigates whether total occupation costs between 
the high and low rated areas are equalised.
Unlike most other UK studies of tax incidence, the value of tax benefits has 
been explored and, in the context of the London boroughs covered by this 
study, the evidence suggests that they can be safely ignored. It has been 
concluded that the tax benefits for businesses are unlikely to vary between 
local jurisdictions.
Finally, the data required have been identified and the use of rateable value 
as a proxy for rental value has been introduced. In Chapter 7 the data 
requirements are examined in more detail and the proposed data are 
checked by several methods to make sure that they are valid. An explanation 
of the pair matching process and the variables that are taken into account in 
making matches is also set out and the data collection process is discussed.
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CHAPTER 7
DATA: VALIDATION, MATCHING AND COLLECTION
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 6 defined the research question and examined the data 
requirements. This chapter takes a more detailed look at the data collection 
and, through a series of control exercises, it seeks to resolve and address 
any issues relating to the data and the appropriateness of the data for the 
purposes of this research.
7.2 VALIDATING THE DATA ASSUMPTIONS
Information relating to a property may be seen as falling into two categories: 
objective data, which is known to a high degree of certainty, and subjective 
data, of which there is generally no precise knowledge, only estimates.
7.2.1 RATE BURDEN AND RENTAL VALUE -  THE PRINCIPAL
VARIABLES
For each property it is essential to know two principal variables:
rate burden per m2; 
rental value per m2.
Rate burden is objective data that can be readily established. The total rate 
liability for any particular property is a matter of public information that can be 
identified and calculated precisely. If the area of the property is known, the 
liability per m2 can be calculated with ease.
Unlike rate burden, the rental value of a property at a given point in time is 
unknown and is represented by an estimated rental value unless a property 
has just been let in the open market and the market rental value is known.
Rateable values in the 1990 Rating List are a particular type of estimated 
rental value, corresponding to the rental value of a property on 1 st April 
1988. The rateable value is estimated on the assumption of a hypothetical 
rating tenancy. The differences between estimated rental value and market
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rental value, together with the terms of the hypothetical tenancy are 
discussed in Appendix 2.
The essential question is whether the proxy represents a good proxy for 
rental value and this basic assumption needs to be considered further. There 
are a number of potential advantages in adopting 1990 rateable values as a 
surrogate for rental values:
First and foremost is the availability of the information. Rateable value 
observations are available for every property, regardless of whether it 
is vacant, let or owner occupied. Information on market rental values is 
commercially sensitive and may not be disclosed for research 
purposes.
The statutory assumptions of a hypothetical tenancy and the rules for 
valuation hold true for all properties in the rating list, unlike other 
estimated rental values, which are established by reference to widely 
different lease terms. The same problem applies if market rental value 
is used. Either of these must be adjusted to reflect differences in the 
agreed lease terms (see A2.3 for a discussion of this topic).
All valuations are at one date. The chance of getting sufficient 
evidence of market rental values at one date is slim. Sibley (1989) was 
obliged to take information on lettings over a three-year period, but in 
each year he used different properties, based on lettings that had 
taken place (at different dates) in that year (see 4.6.4).
So much for the advantages of using rateable value as a proxy for rental 
value. What about the disadvantages? There are several difficulties and 
possible problems that arise from the use of rateable value as a surrogate for 
rental value and these must be carefully addressed before use in this way 
can be validated:
If rental levels had already begun to adjust to take account of the 
expected changes in rate burden when Uniform Business Rates were 
introduced in 1990, this would complicate the analysis. The result from 
the survey of occupiers (see 6.3) suggests a low knowledge of the
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new system in 1989, just before it was introduced, so it is unlikely that 
any significant adjustment had taken place by April 1988, when the 
detail of the legislation was unknown. The antecedent valuation date 
(see A2.5) was introduced for reasons of administrative convenience 
but, in this study, it reduces the likelihood that occupiers in 1988 
adjusted their rental bids to take account of the new rating system. 
Even if general expectations were taken into account, the time lag 
before they are transmitted to rental values further reduces the 
consequences of this problem.
The nature of the rateable value as a proxy for rental value makes 
these observations secondary data, dependent on the accuracy of the 
District Valuer (see A1.3.1 for a description of the functions of the 
District Valuer, the Chief Valuer and the Inland Revenue Valuation 
Office). Only market rental value would represent primary data: and 
any form of estimated rental value would make this observation 
secondary data, dependent on the accuracy of the valuer(s) 
responsible for producing the estimate(s).
Special care is needed in the use of secondary data and validity tests have 
been carried out to establish whether or not rateable values are a good proxy 
for rental values. As part of this testing and before the new rating lists were 
published, a series of controls was established to verify the correctness of 
the District Valuer’s judgements. Four separate principles were adopted.
7.2.2 CHECKING THE UNDERLYING ACCURACY OF 
RATEABLE VALUES
The essential first step was to establish whether or not rateable values were 
in fact a good proxy for rental values.
This was achieved by making a check of rateable values published in the 
1990 Rating List against a control group of properties whose rents were set 
in March and April 1988. Table 7.1 shows the properties that were used in 
this control group. This comparison was made as a way of confirming the 
basic validity of using rateable values as a surrogate for rental values.
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Table 7.1: Rental Proxy Compared to Market Rental Values in April 1988
Type Location Rating Market Difference
List Value
Industrial London N18 £12,100 £11,000 -10.0%
Industrial London N18 £13,000 £13,500 +3.7%
Industrial London N11 £7,250 £7,000 -3.6%
Shop London N13 £23,000 £21,000 -9.5%
Shop London N13 £12,500 £13,200 -5.3%
Shop London N13 £3,700 £3,400 -8.8%
Shop London N13 £18,000 £19,000 -5.3%
Office London N13 £6,400 £6,700 +4.5%
Office London N22 £16,600 £17,500 +5.1%
Average Difference: 0.89%
The control properties shown in Table 7.1 were all drawn from the London 
Boroughs of Enfield and Haringey, and were selected in November 1989, 
before the 1990 Rating List was published. The selection criteria were based 
simply on the availability of letting evidence in April 1988.
Given the small differences and very small mean difference between market 
values and the rateable values, this initial comparison supports the idea of 
using rateable values as a proxy for rental value.
One concern with the information in Table 7.1 is that the market values 
shown might also have been used by the District Valuer in setting the 1990 
rateable values. In fact this does not undermine the use of rateable value as 
a rental proxy, but it would weaken Table 7.1 as a ‘proof of concept’. If the 
rateable values in the table are based on the letting evidence, it must be 
assumed that this evidence was available to the District Valuer through the 
completion of a Rent Return Form (see Appendix 1) which was frequently not 
the case.
Other reports suggest that, overall, the 1990 Rating List was generally 
considered accurate (see for example Evans and Cheeseright 1990) and this 
supports the selection of rateable value as a rental proxy.
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7.2.3 MONITORING THE GENERAL LEVEL OF VALUES IN THE 
RATING LIST
A study of the level of appeals made against the new rateable values 
provided another insight into the validity of the rental surrogate. In this case, 
the comparison was again restricted to Enfield and Haringey.
Table 7.2 is based on an analysis of the rating instructions received by one 
firm of chartered surveyors between 1st January and 30th September 1990.
Table 7.2: Rating Instructions against Appeals Recommended
Month Shops Offices Industrial Total
Instruct Appeal Instruct Appeal Instruct Appeal Instruct Appeal
Jan 8 5 3 1 16 7 27 13
Feb 21 12 16 5 26 2 63 19
Mar 14 4 8 1 26 3 48 8
Apr 12 6 5 2 19 4 36 12
May 15 10 2 - 14 5 31 15
Jun 11 5 4 - 21 6 36 11
Jul 9 6 2 2 17 4 28 12
Aug 7 2 - - 15 2 22 4
Sep 23 17 6 1 29 7 58 25
Totals 120 67 46 12 183 38 349 117
Appeal % 56% 26% 22% 34%
Out of 349 instructions received to deal with rating appeals, there was a 
recommendation that an appeal be lodged for 34%. This decision was based 
on a comparison between the estimated rental value of the property in April 
1988 and the entry in the 1990 Rating List.
These data appear to confirm the information provided by the local District 
Valuers’ offices. In discussion with the Chief Valuer’s office, the predicted 
rate of appeals against the new assessments was established. On a national 
basis this was expected to be 50% and, in the South-East, it was generally 
expected to be 60% (Morgan 1990).
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The actual rating appeals in Enfield and Haringey were lower than predicted 
by the Chief Valuer’s office. From local District Valuers the following appeal 
levels were identified:
London Borough of Enfield 30%
London Borough of Haringey 36%
This suggests that occupiers were more satisfied with their assessments 
than was expected. The implications of the lower than expected rate of 
appeals is discussed in more detail below.
The 34% overall appeals rate shown in Table 7.2 obscures some more 
interesting information when the appeals by property type are considered. 
Both offices and industrial properties have an appeal rate of less than 26%, 
whilst over 55% of the shops were recommended for appeal. It can be 
concluded that errors in rating assessments are probably to be found in all 
categories, but predominantly for shops. This data validity check could 
indicate that use of rateable value as a proxy for 1988 rental value may be 
less satisfactory for shops than for industrial and office property. It also tends 
to confirm the analysis made in Chapter 2 that shops will prove to be the 
more difficult category to investigate successfully and this was the 
experience of Crosby and Keogh (1990) in their examination of rate burden 
on retail property in Nottingham (see 4.6.5).
It should be kept in mind that the appeals data presented here were not for 
the Barnet/Brent Local Authority areas, which are being used for shop 
property, and they may have had a different appeals experience. No data 
were available to carry out a similar exercise for the other areas under study.
The deadline for making appeals was six months from the date of the new 
rating list. At the time the list was published, the business community, as well 
as professional advisers, believed that the statutory deadline would be strictly 
enforced (Cobb 1990). The expectation of a limited time to appeal explains 
both the high number of overall instructions received, as well as the increase 
at the end of the period, caused by a last minute rush. This expectation
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makes these figures fairly complete -  although it turned out afterwards that it 
was possible to make an appeal after the deadline had expired.
The appeal rate shown is considered to be low, but does not prove the 
correctness of the rating list, which could have a downward bias, resulting 
from under-valuation and a consequently low number of appeals by 
ratepayers. On the other hand, the low rate of appeals could be because the 
tax burden itself was lower than expected (especially when the transitional 
arrangements were taken into account). It could equally be a result of inertia 
on the part of business occupiers.
7.2.4 SELECTION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES WITH SEPARATE 
VALUATION OFFICES
Even though the first two checks suggest that the use of rateable value as a 
rental value proxy seems to be acceptable, there was a potential additional 
problem present, namely the risk of spatial interdependence, where values in 
one local authority area have a biasing effect on values in the other. Primary 
rental evidence would undoubtedly suffer from this problem, which is 
described in statistical terms as auto-correlation. Spatial auto-correlation is a 
particular problem in geographical research (see for example Haining 1990; 
or Wiltshaw 1996).
If the District Valuers, when making their estimates of rental value for the 
rating list, consistently utilised rental evidence from the adjacent area, this 
would produce a problem of spatial dependence in the data. If the same 
figures per square metre were applied across borough boundaries, for 
example, this would have undermined the integrity of the data and its use as 
a proxy for rental values would not be acceptable.
For each local authority area that was chosen, the corresponding District 
Valuer’s office was separate from the District Valuer’s office in the adjoining 
area (at the time that the 1990 Rating List was prepared). This was a 
requirement in selecting the local authorities that formed the subject of the 
empirical case studies.
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Discussion with the Chief Valuer’s Office (Morgan 1989) confirmed that, if 
differences existed in values across local authority boundaries, these should 
be properly reflected in the rating list. Any co-ordination between local offices 
was limited to the maintenance of common valuation approaches, to ensure 
a uniform method of assessment, with no attempt to even out local 
differences in the level of values. This co-ordination between local offices 
took place mainly through the Chief Valuer’s Office, typically through the use 
of internal memos and written procedures.
It is a paradox that the proxy rental value, which is secondary data, may 
suffer less from spatial interdependence when compared to the primary data. 
This is a quirk of the administrative organisation of the Valuation Office.
It should be noted that the separation of local Valuation Offices does not 
eliminate the problem of spatial auto-correlation within the underlying 
comparable evidence used by the District Valuer.
7.2.5 VERIFICATION THAT THE VALUATION METHODS 
ADOPTED WERE ACCEPTABLE
A perennial debate in the valuation profession concerns the valuation methods 
to be used for the ‘next’ rating revaluation. A number of alternative approaches 
have been proposed, including:
the use of statistical approaches to the revaluation (Fraser and 
Blackwell 1988; RICS 1998);
the use of computers and even expert systems to calculate the values 
(Scott 1988; McCluskey and Adair 1997);
the use of value maps and the application of rent contours to the task 
(Howes 1980; Hillier Parker 1987);
the application of index figures to the entries in the previous valuation 
list in order to arrive at the figures for the new rating list (Morgan 
1990).
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This topic was a fertile area of speculation in the years between the 1973 
Revaluation and the eventual announcement of the 1990 Revaluation. The 
central office of the Inland Revenue had a research unit dedicated to the 
evaluation of the alternative approaches (Morgan 1989). For the proposed 
research design to be valid, it was important that the novel valuation 
approaches listed above were not employed by the Valuation Office in the 
1990 Revaluation.
One of the secondary findings of Crosby and Keogh (1990 at p. 25) was that 
rating valuers might have adopted out-of-date techniques, appropriate to the 
preparation of the 1973 Valuation List, when preparing the 1990 Revaluation 
(at least for retail property).
To verify that traditional yet up-to-date methods were used by the Valuation 
Office, an interview was carried out with a representative of the Chief Valuer’s 
office in London (Morgan 1989; 1990). This gave the following information:
The valuation method adopted for the valuation of the property types 
under consideration was the traditional comparative valuation method.
Advice and guidance on the methods of valuation to be employed was 
provided to all local offices by the Chief Valuer’s Office.
The central guidance was not prescriptive: District Valuers and their 
staff were free to use whatever techniques they deemed appropriate in 
arriving at their 1990 Rating List entries.
No local Valuation Office was employing hedonic or other non- 
traditional methods of valuation for the 1990 Rating List.
Each Valuation Office had a list of rental values per m2 for properties of 
different age and type and location. These valuation rates were 
derived from an analysis of transactions in the local authority area of 
the District Valuation Office concerned. The appropriate rate was then 
applied to each property to be valued. Transaction evidence is 
available to the local Valuation Office, who have notice of all
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transactions that take place in the UK and can demand information 
from occupiers using a ‘rent return form’ (see A1.3.1).
The local Valuation Offices were recommended to have control 
properties in their district that would be used to verify the correctness 
of the approach taken.
Monitoring of the figures submitted for inclusion in the rating list was 
carried out by the Chief Valuer’s Office.
Claringbull (1989) confirmed that the comparative method of valuation was 
adopted when the previous valuation list was prepared in 1973. Apart from 
the essential role in calculating the rate burden in 1988, these data are also 
being used as a proxy for rental value in 1973, to facilitate the Pre-test/Post- 
test approach to data analysis.
It was stressed by Morgan (1989) that the idea of using rateable value as a 
surrogate for rental value could not be applied to all types of property. Some 
properties are not valued using the comparative method of valuation. Of the 
three property types considered in this thesis, caution was urged in the 
selection of factories and other industrial buildings where plant or machinery 
could have been assessed (within the rateable value) for rating purposes.
After carrying out these checks, it was judged that the use of rateable values 
as a surrogate for rental values was valid for all three types of property under 
consideration. It was therefore concluded that, for the purpose of the 
empirical work in this thesis, the rateable value in the 1990 Rating List is a 
valid proxy for rental value in April 1988.
It will also be assumed that the rateable value in the 1973 Valuation List was 
a valid proxy for rental value in April 1973, but this is asserted with less 
confidence because, apart from checking that the comparative method of 
valuation was used in the assessment, no validity tests have been carried 
out.
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7.3 CHIEF OBSERVATIONS
To obtain the two principal variables of rental value and rate burden in 1988, 
four chief observations are required for each property.
a. 1990 Rateable Value (representing rental value in April 1988);
b. 1973 Rateable Value;
c. rate poundage for 1987/88 financial year;
d. the size of the property in m2.
This information gives an observation for overall rental value (a.) and will 
allow the overall rate burden of any chosen property to be calculated (b. x c.).
The implicit assumption so far has been that the subject properties are 
identical and that differing rate burden is the only factor influencing the 
tenants’ choice of property (and thus the rental value). In reality, property is a 
composite heterogeneous good and there are many factors in addition to the 
rate burden that will affect the rental value of the properties in the sample.
The most obvious factor is size (d. above). Meaningful analysis requires both 
rate burden and rental value to be expressed in consistent unit terms and for 
this to be possible the size of the property needs to be known or accurately 
estimated. The size of the property is an essential observation, the addition 
of which allows the two principal variables to be expressed in terms of 
pounds per square metre (£m2).
Other factors are considered in 7.5, where the process of matching pairs is 
discussed in detail.
7.4 THE PROBLEM OF SIZE
Even the closest substitute properties (i.e. adjoining units on the same 
estate) will often vary in size and the overall size of a building will influence 
the rent per square metre.
There is a well-developed literature supporting the idea that land prices are 
non-linear (see for example Colwell and Munneke 1997; Lin and Evans
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2000) and larger buildings will tend to enjoy a rent discount per m2over 
smaller buildings. This needs be reflected in the analysis (and was tested for 
in the pilot study in 8.3). The rental variable is expressed in units (m2) and the 
matching criteria take account of overall size, by matching pairs into size 
bands, to take account of any quantity discount that may be present (see
7.5).
Unlike rental value, the size of a property does not change merely with the 
passage of time. Size is fixed unless there is a deliberate decision to extend 
or redevelop a building. Furthermore, at any point in time, size is capable of 
objective quantification. However, size data are not publicly available and, if 
two valuers measure the same building, they may arrive at different sizes, 
despite property size being capable of objective measurement. The problem 
arises through differing assumptions made about the usable area and also 
the existence of different definitions of size, e.g. gross external area, gross 
internal area, etc. To help overcome these problems a Code of Measuring 
Practice is published for use by valuers when measuring buildings (RICS 
1993; RICS 2001).
There are several possible sources of size data for business property. At first 
the choice appeared to be limited to measuring the property on site or scaling 
the building from large scale Ordnance Survey (OS) maps (for an 
explanation and example of this method see Herbert 1961). Other sources of 
size data include information provided by valuers from their files and 
information from the local authority planning and property departments. The 
size required is the size of the rateable hereditament itself (see A2.4) and 
one source that must have fairly accurate and consistent size information on 
all properties is the Valuation Office itself, but they were approached and 
would not assist with provision of data, except in isolated instances.
The use of different methods of obtaining the size observation increases the 
possibility of errors in the recorded size of a property. Just as the accuracy 
and validity of using rateable values as a proxy for rental value was checked, 
the use of size estimates from different sources was also tested.
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Table 7.3: PROPERTY SIZE COMPARISONS Sizes in m2
Percentage difference from Measured Size
Type Address Measured
Size
Agent’s
Size
Planning
Size
Scaled
Size
Industrial London N11 228 - - - - 239 +5%
Industrial London N17 365 380 +4% 385 +6%
CMc -
Industrial London N18 351 358 +2% 362 +3% 352 0%
Industrial London N18 239 257 +8% 281 +18% n/a1 -
Industrial London N18 2,499 - - 2271 -9% n/a2 -
Retail London N12 116 - - - - 124 +7%
Retail London N13 87 93 +7% 86 -1% 86 -1%
Office London N9 298 310 +4% 292 -2% 311 +4%
Office London N13 203 213 +5% - - 207 +2%
Office London WC1 3,232 3,250 +1% - -
CM1
-
Average Differences 4% 2% 3%
All sizes are overall sizes. Percentages are given to nearest whole percentage point. 
Note 1. No OS extract available. Note 2. Scaling not possible
Table 7.3 illustrates the measurement errors that can arise. The comparisons 
are on a control group of ten properties on which detailed measurements of 
size have actually been taken. These properties have been selected 
because of the availability of several figures for size: not because the figures 
illustrate a particular point. The percentage figures indicate the percentage 
difference from the measured size, which should be taken as the most 
accurate observation.
It did not prove possible to obtain a scaled size for four of the properties in 
the table. Where it is stated that scaling is not possible (Note 2) this is 
because the accommodation is arranged on more than one floor, a fact that 
can most easily be established by a field survey and which is known for 
these buildings because they have been measured. Where a property has 
not been inspected, scaling alone is an unacceptable method.
This demonstrates the extent of variation between the various sources that 
could be used for the size observation. It shows how the use of several 
different sources could lead to errors in the data. It could be argued that it is
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better to stick to one method -  such as scaling OS plans -  and accept that all 
observations will have the same chance of random error, but this approach is 
not possible for all properties. Whilst the method may give acceptable results 
for single-storey properties, such as retail or industrial premises (subject to 
verification during the field survey), it is less easy to apply to offices or multi­
storey buildings. Even for retail property, the need to take account of the 
more valuable retail frontage and to apply a discount to non-selling space 
makes scaling less acceptable. In addition, there is the important distinction 
between the property and the rating unit, which needs to be taken into 
account (see A2.4).
Against this background, the likelihood that the size data would have to be 
drawn from various sources was accepted, along with the fact that some 
observations would be more accurate than others. The size observation is 
considered the least reliable of the chief observations used to calculate the 
two principal variables, but it seems reasonable to assume that systematic 
errors would not be present within the size data if they were collected in this 
way.
These checking procedures were carried out to determine the validity of 
alternative approaches to the collection of size data. They do not provide any 
check on the accuracy of the actual sample data collected and it was 
considered worthwhile to devise a test of the main hypothesis that is 
independent of the size observation. A longitudinal test is used for the 
secondary analysis of rental growth after 1990 and this is constructed to be 
independent of the property size (see 8.8). In Appendix 9 this test is applied 
to the data used for the primary analysis as a cross-check on the size 
observation.
7.5 MATCHING OF PAIRS
As explained in Chapter 6, it was decided to use a matched pairs approach
to the selection of properties for the analysis. This involves carefully selecting
properties that are matched according to the hypothesis set out in 6.2. The 
matching approach minimises the number and variety of control variables 
needed in the analysis itself, but it must be used with care.
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The selection of pairs in matched pairs design commonly appears to adopt 
non-rigorous sampling methods (see for example O'Farrell and Hitchens 
1989; O'Farrell et al. 1992; Westhead 1995). When choosing which 
properties to include in the pairings (and therefore the data-set) the selection 
was based on judgement within a rigorous selection framework.
A more rigorous selection framework was adopted when matching pairs for 
use in the primary analysis than was used for matching pairs for use in the 
secondary analysis. Each of these analyses used a different data-set and the 
reasons for this are discussed and explained in 6.7. The matching approach 
is set out at 7.5.1 for the primary analysis data and at 7.5.2 for the secondary 
analysis data. The data collection process is explained in 7.6.
It is important to note that, to guard against any bias, apart from a 
categorisation of size, the other variables that were used in the analysis itself 
were explicitly ignored when matching the pairs together. No calculations 
were carried out until after the pairs were chosen and no regard was given to 
the rateable value of a property in the matching process.
7.5.1 PRIMARY ANALYSIS MATCHING CRITERIA
For each data-set used in the primary analysis, the initial goal was to identify 
two types of pairings: fully-matched and partly-matched. The aim was to 
carry out an analysis for the set of fully-matched pairs and further analyses 
for the partly-matched pairs that were expected to form a larger data-set. 
However, it did not prove possible to identify a meaningful set of partly- 
matched properties for either retail or office property (see Tables 7.4, 7.5 and 
7.6 for a description of the data-sets used in the main analysis).
Only pairs of properties that were closely matched, one in each local 
authority area, are included in the primary data analysis.
The pairs of properties have been chosen to match on the basis of the 
following five major criteria:
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Physical
Size pairs must be in the same size category;
Location pairs must be in close proximity to each other;
Physical pairs must match in terms of age and physical characteristics;
User pairs must match in terms of building and planning use;
Technical pairs must meet certain rating and other criteria.
These major matching criteria are divided into detailed characteristics. These 
are explained in the following list which outlines the control variables and 
other property characteristics that were used in the pairing exercise.
Location
Measures to rank properties by quality of location 
Access to the road network and other transport links
A measure of the quality and construction of the building 
A measure of the physical arrangement of the property 
A description of the construction 
The approximate date of construction 
The apparent state of repair of the property 
Other relevant physical characteristics of the property
The planning use of the property 
The physical use of the property
Technical
Service charge categorisation for the property
Information on alterations to the 1973 Valuation List since 1988
Details of any material alterations to the property since 1988
Status of the property as a composite hereditament
Status as a cross-boundary property
The above list was initially developed for industrial property that was used in 
a trial data collection exercise. The technical heading includes aspects of the 
rating system and the hypothetical tenancy that are discussed in A2.4 and 
A2.5.
User
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When collecting the data, a number of observations were recorded for each 
property. In the case of property information, the control variables are 
typically qualitative data, which are more difficult to deal with than 
quantitative data. Qualitative observations were classified using a five point 
scale (e.g. poor, mediocre, average, good, excellent). Decision rules were 
implemented for other matching criteria that were not categorical (see 
Figures 7.1, 7.2 and Apppendix 10).
Figure 7.1a shows the full list of matching criteria that were used when 
selecting pairs for industrial property. The industrial property that was finally 
selected is predominantly light industrial and warehouse property. Factories 
were generally ineligible because of the need to exclude properties where 
there was an element of plant and machinery in the rating assessment (see
7.2.5).
The chief locational matching criteria for industrial property is distance to the 
nearest major transport route, in this case the A406 North Circular Road or 
the A10 Great Cambridge Road.
The list of matching criteria was revised and amended for the matching of 
office and retail property.
The locational quality of office property was based on travel time to the 
nearest underground station(s). Bus routes were not classified, not because 
they are unimportant, but because access to bus routes was evaluated and 
appeared to be evenly spread throughout the area. Figure 7.1b shows the full 
list of matching criteria that were used when selecting pairs for office 
property.
For office property, the key physical characteristics included the number of 
floors, the type of services such as air conditioning, lifts and modern facilities 
(e.g. random access raised floors).
Office occupiers and a few industrial occupiers are likely to be charged a 
service charge in addition to the rent they pay to the landlord and this is a 
factor that does not affect retail property (of the class used in this study). 
Service charge should be considered as one of the total occupation costs
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that will be taken into account in the location decision but, unlike rent and 
rates, service charge will not differ according to the location of a property. It 
will instead differ according to the level of services provided. The service 
charge is normally based on the costs of supplying and maintaining the 
services to a building.
The RICS Building Cost Information Service maintains detailed information 
on construction and running costs throughout the UK and they confirm that, 
for properties in the same region having a similar age and standard of 
services, it is reasonable to expect the service charge per m2 to be similar 
(Pegg 1999). By matching properties by the overall service package, service 
charge is effectively eliminated from the occupation cost equation and does 
not need to be taken into account in the data analysis.
For retail property, distinctions were made between selling space and non­
selling space and the physical characteristics were expanded to include the 
frontage, pavement width and shop front design.
The locational quality characteristic (prime pitch, secondary pitch, etc.) was 
based on a survey of pedestrian flow in the local shopping area, with a higher 
flow being accorded a better ranking. The final classification of retail pitch 
was settled after discussion with a local firm of chartered surveyors who 
deal with commercial property in this district.
Figure 7.2a shows the full list of matching criteria that were used when 
selecting pairs for retail property. The occupiers of properties were classified 
into groups according to the activity of occupier. This classification and the 
constituent activities are shown in Figure 7.2b.
Appendix 10 gives more detailed information on the way the detailed criteria 
were categorised, setting out the decision rules used to match properties into 
pairs.
Retail properties were the most likely to include a residential component in 
their rating assessment and these ‘composite hereditaments’ (see A2.4) 
were excluded from the matching process.
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Figure 7.1
INDUSTRIAL AND OFFICE MATCHING CRITERIA
SIZE PHYSICAL CONT... USER CONT...
< 1 0 0m 2 
101-200 m2 
201-500 m2 
501-1000 m2 
>1000 m2
Modern framed structure 
Traditional industrial structure 
Load bearing brick structure
Single span
Planning use is B1 
Planning use is B2 
Planning use is B8 
Planning use is sui generis
LOCATION
Estate location
Multiple span Property user is industrial
Apparent state of repair Property user is light industrial
Non-estate location General modernity
Property user is vehicle repair/workshop 
Property user is warehousing and distribution
Property or estate fronts on to A road Eaves height Property user is high tech
Property or estate fronts on to B road Loading bay Property user is officeProperty or estate fronts on to unclassified road
Distance from junction with A10 
Distance from junction with A406
Single-storey accommodation 
Multi-level accommodation
TECHNICAL
Subject to estate charges
Distance to rail or underground station Allocated parking on site Alterations to 1973 List since April 1988
Distance to local shops 
(for convenience of employees)
Allocated parking off site Material alterations since April 1988
Unallocated parking on site 
On street parking without restrictions
Assessed to Net Annual Value in 1973 List 
Cross-boundary property
PHYSICAL On street parking with restrictions Composite hereditament
Age 1975-present Distance to nearest public car park
Age 1960-75
USERAge 1960-75 refurbished
Age 1945-60 Actual user of the building
Age 1945-60 refurbished <5% Office space
Pre-1945 6%-15% Office space
Pre-1945 refurbished 16%-30% Office space 
>30% Office Space
Figure 7.1a: Industrial Matching Criteria
See Appendix 10 for additional breakdown
SIZE PHYSICAL CONT... USER
< 50 m2
Clear space (not subdivided)
Property user is office
51-200 m2 Property user is high tech
201-1000 m2 Subdivided internally (permanent) Planning use is B1
1001-2000 m2 Apparent state of repair Planning use is other office
> 2000 m2 General modernity Planning use is sui generis 
Planning use is unknown
LOCATION Prestige
Distance from nearest underground station Floor to ceiling height TECHNICAL
Distance from Holborn underground station Subject to service charges
Distance from closest northbound bus stop Lift Including lift
Distance from closest southbound bus stop Air conditioning Including lift and reception
Distance from closest eastbound bus stop Suspended ceiling Including lift, reception and security
Distance from closest westbound bus stop Double glazing Alterations to 1973 List since April 1988
Distance from Aldwych Random access raised floor Material alterations since April 1988
PHYSICAL Private entrance Assessed to Net Annual Value in 1973 List
Age 1975-present Shared entrance Cross-boundary property
Age 1960-75 Simple framed structure Composite hereditament
Age 1960-75 refurbished Cantilever framed structure
Age 1945-60 Load bearing brick structure
Age 1945-60 refurbished Allocated parking on site
Pre-1945 Allocated parking off site
Pre-1945 refurbished Unallocated parking on site
Accommodation spans multiple floors On street parking without restrictions
Spans multiple floors (2nd foor and up) On street parking with restrictions
Spans multiple floors (1 st floor and below) Distance to nearest public car park
First floor
Ground floor
Basement
Figure 7.1b: Office Matching Criteria
See Appendix 10 for additional breakdown
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RETAIL MATCHING CRITERIA AND ACTIVITY CLASSIFICATION
S IZE-O VER ALL PHYSICAL CONT... USER
< 50 m2 Actual user of the building
51-100 m2 
101-200 m2
Retail space on ground floor only 
Retail space on ground and first floors Convenience outlet
>  200 m2 Retail space on ground and lower ground floors Comparison outlet
Retail space on three or more floors Service outlet
SIZE -  IN TERMS OF ZONE A Apparent state of repair Catering outlet
<  20 m2 Miscellaneous outlet
2 1 -5 0 m2 Modern shop front
51-100 m2 Non-modern shop front TECHNICAL
> 100 m2 Single display window Alterations to 1973 List since April 1988
LOCATION
Double display window Material alterations since April 1988
Triple display window Assessed to Net Annual Value in 1973 List
Prime pitch Four or more display windows Cross-boundary property
Secondary pitch Composite hereditament
Off pitch Refurbished retail display area
Currently modern overall
Distance (in metres) from pedestrian crossing General modernity
Distance from closest bus stop
Distance from unrestricted on street parking Frontage (in metres)Return frontage (in metres)
Distance from public car park
Distance from Cricklewood rail station Pavement width (in metres)
Distance from Willesden Green underground Roller shutter security Rear delivery access
PHYSICAL Staff parking on site
Age 1970-present Load bearing brick structure
Age 1945-70 Modem framed structure
Age 1945-70 refurbished <10% Ancillary spacePre-1945
Pre-1945 refurbished 11 %-20% Ancillary space>20% Ancillary space
Figure 7.2a: Retail Matching Criteria
See Appendix 10 for additional breakdown
CONVENIENCE OUTLETS COMPARISON OUTLETS SERVICE OUTLETS CATERING OUTLETS
Butchers Booksellers, stationery, cards, printing Banks Caf§s
Bakers Building, DIY, decorating, ironmongers Beauty salons Fast food outlets
Confectioners Camping and outdoor shops Building societies Restaurants
Chemists China and glasswear Hairdressers Take-aways
Greengrocers Department stores Dry cleaners
Fishmongers Fancy goods Estate agents
Florists Footwear shops Shoe repairs
Newsagents, tobacconists Furniture, furnishings and carpets Travel agents
Off-licences General and household goods
Supermarkets, grocers Hi-fi, electrical goods 
Ladies' and girlswear outlets 
Men's and boyswear outlets 
Motor accessories/cycle shops 
Toy and hobby shops
Figure 7.2b: Retail Activity Classification
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7.5.2 SECONDARY ANALYSIS MATCHING CRITERIA
For each property type, a separate, larger, data-set was identified for use in 
the secondary analysis. The reasons for using a different data-set are 
discussed in 6.7 but it is important to explain here that the secondary 
analysis is designed to be a supporting supplementary analysis. For this 
reason, the approach to the data collection, the matching of pairs and the 
analysis itself (see 8.8) are less rigorously specified than for the primary 
analysis.
Nevertheless, the matching process applied to the data used for the 
secondary analysis adopted the same principles that were employed in 
matching the primary data-set: the use of judgement based on a rigorous 
selection framework. However, for the secondary data-sets, the matching 
criteria were significantly fewer, and not every property in the data-set was 
subject to a field survey, which meant that the closeness of the matching is 
less exact.
The secondary data-sets were matched first on the basis of building size 
scaled from the large scale OS maps. The actual analysis of the secondary 
data-sets is independent of property size (see 8.8) but size is still a key 
criterion in matching the pairs for inclusion in the data-set.
It was considered that scaled size could be an adequate proxy for actual size 
in the context of industrial and retail property (see 7.4), but without a field 
survey it was unlikely to be a satisfactory proxy for the rentable area of a 
whole office building, which is likely to be constructed on more than one floor, 
especially in the city centre location that is used in this study.
For retail property the frontage was also used in the matching process and 
for industrial property the site area was used as a secondary size control. 
Both of these were established by scaling from large scale OS maps.
For office property, the scaled size of the building was treated as 
representing a single upper floor in the building. Office properties were only 
included in the analysis if the rating assessment referred to a single whole 
upper floor. In this way, the scaled size acts as a proxy for the size of the 
rateable unit. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it restricts the 
number of properties that can be included in the office data-set for the
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secondary analysis. Ground and lower ground floor accommodation was 
excluded because of the difficulty of approximating the rentable area from a 
scaled size (due to the extent of any reception, circulation and plant space).
There was one further control on size in the secondary matching exercise for 
all three property types: for a property to be selected in the matching process 
the scaled size from the circa. 1990 OS map must correspond with the 
scaled size from the circa. 2000 OS map.
Size alone is not an adequate basis for matching the pairs and for each of 
the three property types, one or two other matching criteria were adopted.
Industrial properties were matched using two additional criteria. Whether or 
not the unit was on an estate or non-estate location and the distance from 
the nearest major road, which is the same locational criterion that was used 
for the primary data matching (see 7.5.1 and. Appendix 10).
Retail properties were matched using a single criterion, adopting the same 
classification of prime pitch that was constructed for the primary matching 
(see 7.5.1) but with the addition of two further classifications, for units within 
a local parade of shops and for single shops (i.e. ‘the corner shop’). This was 
necessary to reflect the wider area covered by the secondary data-set which 
is not restricted to the core high street shopping area.
Office properties were matched using two criteria. The floor within the 
building was matched to within one floor, so that a pairing would only be 
made for units that were on equivalent floors in their respective building, (i.e. 
a unit on the third floor of a building in Westminster would be matched with a 
corresponding unit on the second, third or fourth floor in Camden). The 
locational quality of office property was based on travel time to the nearest 
underground station(s) which is the same criterion that was adopted for the 
primary analysis (see 7.5.1 and Appendix 10).
There are weaknesses in the approach of using so few matching criteria, in 
particular for offices and industrial, where no attempt was made to match on 
the basis of age or quality (this was considered less relevant for the type of 
retail property adopted in this thesis). However, as explained at the beginning 
of this section, the secondary analysis is supplemental in its nature and these 
issues are not considered to be central in the context of the analysis 
undertaken.
179
Chapter 7
7.6 DATA COLLECTION
Data for the main empirical work were collected for three separate property 
types in six London boroughs, with the most extensive data collected for 
industrial properties. The industrial data were collected in Enfield and 
Haringey. The retail data-set was collected in Barnet and Brent and data for 
the study of office properties were collected in Westminster and Camden. A 
review of these six London boroughs was presented in 5.7.
The data collection procedure for each property type involved a systematic 
and iterative process of unit identification, followed by a field survey for each 
property. In most cases, but not all, this involved an internal inspection of the 
building. In addition to the field survey, information on individual properties 
was collected from public and unpublished sources. The rental value was in 
all cases based on the use of the entry in the 1990 Rating List, although 
actual rental value observations were also recorded for many properties in 
each data-set (these were not used in the analysis). Unpublished sources 
include valuers, estate agents, local authority records and the owners and 
occupiers of the buildings themselves.
For each unit, the chief and secondary observations were collected and 
catalogued before the classification was made of any qualitative 
characteristics. Prior to the data collection, a series of checks was carried out 
to give a better understanding of the data, its limitations and the validity of the 
assumptions made (see 7.2). The properties were then matched into pairs 
using the matching criteria set out in 7.5.1.
For each property type, a separate data-set was identified for use in the 
secondary analysis, which tests for differential rental growth following the 
elimination of tax differentials in 1990. The main reason for using a different 
data-set was the difficulty of keeping the matching criteria intact over a 12- 
year period between 1988 and 2000 (see 6.7 for a discussion of the data 
requirements and issues). Another reason was to introduce diversity into the 
data that were used in the empirical work. It also helped to guard against the 
possibility of some systematic bias being present in the data and it allowed a 
larger, albeit less rigorously selected, data-set to be used for this analysis
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(see 7.5.2). The secondary data-sets were used only for this secondary 
analysis, which covers rental growth between 1988 and 1998 (see 8.2 and 
8.8). These additional data-sets had three chief variables: 1990 Rateable 
Value, 1995 Rateable Value and 2000 Rateable Value.
The following sections summarise the data-sets that were collected for each 
property type. The maps referred to below (Figures 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5) are 
used to exemplify the cross boundary areas where data were collected, but 
data were collected from a wider area than the area shown by the figures.
7.6.1 INDUSTRIAL DATA-SETS
Figure 7.3 illustrates one of the main districts in Enfield and Haringey where 
the industrial properties were located. The industrial areas selected do not 
include many properties of institutional investment quality and the units 
selected for this data-set are almost all secondary properties.
Table 7.4: Industrial Property Data-sets
Number
Data-set Name of Cases
Number 
of Pairs
Matching
Criteria Comment
Data-set A -  Industrial 471 - - All primary cases
Data-set A1 -  Industrial 70 35 Full Primary analysis
Data-set A2 -  Industrial 114 57 Part See Appendix 8
Data-set B -Industrial 170 85 Part Secondary analysis
Data-sets A1 and A2 are subsets of Data-set A: the key variables for these data-sets are listed 
in Appendix 7. Figure 7.3 does not illustrate the complete area covered by the data collection.
A total of 471 properties was identified where information was collected on all 
of the four chief observations identified in 7.3. Out of this group (Data-set A in 
Table 7.4), it was possible to identify 35 fully matched pairs and 57 partly 
matched pairs to be used in the primary analysis.
Unit level analysis of size for industrial property was carried out using overall 
size in m2.
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7.6.2 RETAIL DATA-SETS
Figure 7.4 illustrates the main area in Barnet and Brent where the retail 
properties used for the primary analysis were located. This is a local 
shopping centre, comprised of secondary property. At the time of the study 
the majority of units were occupied by small or local businesses and a few 
units were let to national multiple retailers. See Figure 6.1 for a detailed 
extract that shows part of the main shopping area that was used.
Table 7.5: Retail Property Data-sets
Number Number Matching
Data-set Name of Cases of Pairs Criteria Comment
Data-set C -  Retail 224 . . All primary cases
Data-set C1 -  Retail 42 21 Full Primary analysis
Data-set D -  Retail 174 87 Part Secondary analysis
Data-set C1 is a subset of Data-set C: the key variables for this data-set are listed in 
Appendix 7. Figure 7.4 does not illustrate the complete area covered by the data collection.
Data were collected on a total of 224 properties for each of the four chief 
observations identified in 7.3, from which it was possible to identify 21 closely 
matched pairs. It did not prove possible to identify a group of partly matched 
pairs for the retail data-set used in the primary analysis.
For retail property, unit level analysis of size was carried out using zones of 
5m depth and the analysis was made in m2 in terms of zone A (for a full 
explanation of retail zoning see Bassett et al. 1987 at pp. 109-121). The 
majority of shops using in the primary analysis were measured unless 
detailed size information was available from other sources.
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7.6.3 OFFICE DATA-SETS
Figure 7.5 illustrates the district in Westminster and Camden where the office 
property was mainly located. Unlike the properties used for industrial and 
retail, the office data-set is made up of offices that are considered to be 
prime property of institutional investment quality. This is a function of the 
central London location.
Table 7.6: Office Property Data-sets
Number Number Matching
Data-set Name of Cases of Pairs Criteria Comment
Data-set E -  Office 187 - - All primary cases
Data-set E1 -  Office 42 21 Full Primary analysis
Data-set F -  Office 64 32 Part Secondary analysis
Data-set E1 is a subset of Data-set E: the key variables for this data-set are listed in 
Appendix 7. Figure 7.5 does not illustrate the complete area covered by the data collection.
Twenty-one closely matched pairs were identified for office property, out of a 
total of 187 properties for which data were collected on each of the four chief 
observations identified in 7.3. Partly matched pairings did not prove to be 
possible for the data-set used in the primary analysis, nor was it possible to 
collect adequate data to allow pairings of smaller or secondary offices.
Unit level analysis for office property was carried out using overall size in m2. 
The size observation for office properties proved to be the most difficult to 
obtain and the sizes used are mainly letting sizes from the landlord or their 
agents.
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7.7 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, the data required have been identified and evaluated to make 
sure that they can meet the requirements of the research design set out in 
Chapter 6. Where possible the threats to validity have been identified and the 
steps taken to validate the data have been explained.
The detailed criteria for the selection of matched pairs have been explained 
and the different criteria for each property type have been listed. If the 
hypothesised results are to be successfully identified it will be in large part 
due to the quality and control of data collection that has afforded accurate 
analysis.
The data collection process was explained for each of the three property 
types and the data-sets to be used in the analysis were described.
Chapter 8 now explains the statistical analysis undertaken and presents the 
results of that analysis. It introduces a further element of control for the data, 
testing the rental value proxy (in 1988) against market data in a pilot study 
that applies the research design and proposed analysis to letting data for 
office property.
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CHAPTER 8 
DATA: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
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8.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters described the framework for the empirical 
research, setting out the research hypothesis and explaining the research 
design. The key variables that were required for the data collection were 
identified, assumptions about the validity of the data were tested, and the 
data collection process was summarised.
In this chapter the data analysis techniques are explained. The results of the 
analysis are then presented both for the main study and for the pilot study 
that was carried out using market rental values-to triangulate the results 
obtained using the rental value proxy.
The empirical results presented here are for industrial property in the London 
Boroughs of Enfield and Haringey, retail property in the London Boroughs of 
Barnet and Brent, and office property in the City of Westminster and the 
London Borough of Camden. Chapter 5 explained the choice of these six 
London boroughs and showed how the rate burden in these boroughs 
diverged in the 1980s, creating the circumstances that are used in this 
empirical work.
8.2 SUMMARY OF DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
The data analysis procedures used to test the research hypothesis set out in 
6.2 are made up of four specific tests shown in Table 8.1. The tests carried 
out fall into two groups. The primary analysis was based on the cross- 
sectional data. The secondary analysis was designed to provide a 
longitudinal dimension to the study.
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Table 8.1: Data Analysis Tests
Primary Analysis
No. Description Context Type
Test 1 Pre-Divergence Equivalence Pre-test t-test/descriptive stats/ 
comparison of total costs
Test 2 Post-Divergence Impact Post-test t-test/descriptive stats
Test 3 Equalisation of Total Costs Post-test t-test/descriptive stats/ 
comparison of total costs
Secondary Analysis
No. Description Context Type
Test 4 Differential Rental Growth Longitudinal Internal rate of return
The underlying design for the primary analysis is the Pre-test/Post-test 
design that was explained in 6.5. Standard tests of statistical significance 
were used, first to test the data in 1973 before the divergent rate burdens 
emerged (the Pre-test) and then in 1988 after the divergent rate burdens had 
been present for a number of years (the Post-test). The long time period was 
expected to allow the impacts of the differing tax rates to work through to 
differences in rents. There are several analyses undertaken within the 
primary analysis, each of which was applied to the three separate property 
types.
Details of the cross-sectional tests that are used for the primary analysis are 
set out in 8.4.
The primary analysis was supplemented by a secondary analysis that 
introduced a longitudinal dimension and was used as a further check on the 
main findings. This test involved the calculation of rental value growth over 
the period 1988-1998, which was made possible through the use of 
additional data, collected following the introduction of Uniform Business 
Rates in 1990. This is a single test, which was applied to each of the three 
separate property types.
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The longitudinal test used for the secondary analysis is described in more 
detail in 8.8.
Individual observations (or measurements) from the two locations for each 
property type were matched together on the pre-specified criteria that were 
discussed in 7.5. The statistical analysis takes account of the matching and 
statistical methods suitable for paired data were employed where appropriate 
(the pilot study properties were not matched). The test used for each 
analysis is dependent on the distribution of the differences between the two 
locations. If the differences are normally distributed, a paired t-test can be 
used and this proved to be acceptable for all variables in the analysis. The t- 
distribution is appropriate for tests of significance when the sample size is 
small.
By applying the paired t-test to investigate the difference between the two 
samples means it is possible to ascertain whether the sample variances are 
sufficiently alike to justify the assumption that they are independent estimates 
from the same population. The significance level p is used to define the 
sensitivity of the test and in this thesis a value of:
p <0.1 will be treated as a statistically significant result.
The smaller the p-value, the greater the significance, but the question of 
precisely what significance level is appropriate is a topic of much debate. 
Significance levels of 0.05 and below have customarily been viewed as being 
statistically significant, with anything above being rejected as not statistically 
significant. This level of significance, which has been inherited from the 
natural sciences, may be right for reproducible laboratory experiments, but it 
is not considered appropriate in a study of this type. Recent literature 
confirms a general trend away from ‘interpretative rigidity in the assessment 
of statistical tests of hypotheses’ (Chow 1996) and Sterne and Smith (2001) 
propose that a 90% significance level should be used instead of 95%. They 
go on to suggest that arbitrary thresholds that determine significance should 
not be used in judging results.
All tests of statistical significance, descriptive statistics and other aspects of 
the data analysis were carried out using SPSS software.
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8.3 PILOT STUDY -  TRIANGULATING THE RESULTS
Trial data were initially collected for industrial property in Enfield and 
Haringey and these were used for the data validation and triangulation that 
was carried out in Chapter 7 and it was also intended to use these data to 
test the analysis presented here. However, Ian Sibley kindly made available 
the data-set from his study of office property (see 4.6.4), which was 
published in 1989 and it was decided to use these data for the pilot study. 
One powerful feature of Sibley’s data is that all observations are for open 
market lettings (representing market rental value, not estimated rental value).
The aims of the pilot study were to gain a better understanding of the 
analysis process, to help make decisions about the most appropriate 
statistical approach for the main study and, importantly, to triangulate the 
main results (which are based entirely on the rateable value proxy) against 
real data. Although the validity of the data collection process was carefully 
evaluated, it was still felt important to have the results tested against actual 
rental evidence.
An additional aim was to see if more robust results could be obtained for 
Sibley’s office data than were presented by Sibley himself, who made no 
tests for statistical significance.
8.3.1 PILOT STUDY DATA-SET
The data were reviewed and analysed without change or adjustment. No 
time was spent refining the data collection or in collecting additional data 
attributes.
Table 8.2: Sibley’s Office Property Data-set
Year
Number 
of Cases
Number 
of Pairs
Matching
Criteria Comment
1983 14 7 - Not matched
1984 18 9 - Not matched
1985 34 17 - Not matched
Total 66 33
The key variables for this data-set are listed in Appendix 7. Letting dates for each property 
within the year of observation vary.
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For each property in the data-set the following observations were available:
YEAR in which rent was agreed (1983,1984,1985)
SIZE of property in m2
1973 RATEABLE VALUE
TAX RATE in YEAR
TAX BURDEN in m2
RENT agreed on a new letting in YEAR
LOCATION (either Westminster or Camden)
The data collected by Sibley were not cross-sectional, relying on rental 
observations in three separate years, yet it is not a true time series because 
the data are collected from different subjects (in this case properties) in each 
year. Most longitudinal designs use panel data, which involves tracking the 
same subject over time and, where this is not the case, it is more properly 
referred to as a ‘quasi-longitudinal’ design (de Vaus 2001 at p. 129).
Regression analysis was used in an analysis of the whole data-set, to control 
for the year in which the rent was measured but this type of analysis is not 
used elsewhere as part of the primary or secondary analysis procedures.
The results and procedures for the regression analysis are set out at 8.3.2.
The pilot study data were also analysed using each of the four tests set out in 
Table 8.1. This analysis took Sibley’s 1985 data subset and treated it as a 
single data-set. The results from the analysis of the pilot data are presented 
later in this chapter, following the explanation of the analysis methods and 
their supporting statistical hypotheses. For the primary analysis, the relevant 
pilot study results are presented at 8.4.4; for the secondary analysis, the pilot 
study results are presented at 8.8.2.
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8.3.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PILOT DATA-SET
In order to control for the year in which the rent was observed, regression 
analysis was used to examine the effect on this variable for the complete 
data-set from Table 8.2 (covering 1983,1984 and 1985).
The difference between the locations was examined for a single outcome 
variable, namely the rent.
A linear model was adopted using a single empirical equation. The value for 
any given property ‘ i ’ is:
Yj = Po + £  pj Xjj + £j for j=1...m, i=1...n, for constants p0 — Pm
where
Yj = outcome rent for property i
Xjj = explanatory variable j for property i
Ej = residual for property i
One of the assumptions of linear regression is that the residuals (the 
differences between the predicted outcomes from the regression model and 
the actual outcomes) are normally distributed, which is often the case if the 
outcome variable is normally distributed. An examination of the relevant 
variables indicated that this assumption was satisfied and the variables were 
analysed on their original scale.
The first stage in the analysis was to see if the properties were drawn from 
the same population in 1973. This is Test 1 from Table 8.1, which is 
explained in more detail in 8.4.1 below. The results of this test are set out in 
Table 8.3.
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Table 8.3: Pre-Divergence Equivalence in 1973
Sibley’s Office Data-set -  66 cases 
Variable: 1973 Rental Value per m2
Number Standard Standard
Local Authority of Cases Mean Deviation Error
Westminster 33 38.11 15.875 2.764
Camden 33 36.47 10.268 1.787
Independent Samples t Degrees of 2-tailed
T-Test Value Freedom P-Value
Equality of mean values -0.497 64 .621
The results indicate no evidence of any differences between the two 
locations in 1973, before the period of tax rate divergence (p=0.621). It 
should be remembered that this table is based on the 1973 Rateable Value 
acting as a proxy for rental value (and not actual market rents).
The next stage in the analysis was to compare the difference in locations in 
the period 1983-1985.
Regression analysis allowed the introduction of an additional control, which 
was added to see if there was a non-linear relationship between overall 
property size and rent per m2. If found, this relationship might need to be 
addressed in the primary analysis carried out for this thesis. The analysis 
was made both unadjusted and adjusted for the confounding factor of size (in 
m2). Even the ‘unadjusted’ relationship was actually adjusted for the year that 
the property was let, whilst the adjusted relationship controlled for both year 
and size. This analysis is based on rental values from open market lettings.
The results are summarised in Table 8.4. The figures reported are a measure 
of the difference in Camden relative to Westminster, together with the 
corresponding confidence interval (Cl) at 90%.
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Table 8.4: Post-Divergence Impact -  Regression Analysis
Sibley’s Office Data-set -  66 cases
Outcome
Unadjusted 
Coefficient P-Value
(90% Cl)
Adjusted 
Coefficient P-Value
(90% Cl)
Rent -9.80 (-21.1, 1.48) 0.09 -9.84 (-21.2, 1.50) 0.09
The comparison of the two locations showed that, by 1985, there was some 
evidence of a difference in rent between the two locations with the 
statistically significant results at the 9% level (p=0.09). Rents in Camden are 
about 10 units lower than Westminster. This is the outcome that is predicted 
and it confirms the central research hypothesis of this thesis, suggesting that 
the rent in Camden has adjusted downwards to reflect the higher tax burden, 
leading towards an equalisation of total costs.
The unadjusted and adjusted analyses give almost identical results, which 
suggests that overall size in the case of offices has little influence on the rent 
paid (per unit measure). This result may not hold true for retail or industrial 
property and indeed the theory would suggest that it would not be expected 
to apply to retail property (due to the progressive decrease in rental value 
from front to rear) and for industrial property there may be a general quantity 
discount. However, this factor is assumed to be handled in the matching 
process (and the zoning of retail property) and no further consideration is 
given in this thesis to the possibility that there is a non-linear relationship 
between property size and rent per m2.
8.4 PRIMARY ANALYSIS -  CROSS-SECTIONAL TESTS
The three tests in the primary analysis are based chiefly on tests of statistical 
significance, with the use of descriptive statistics as an adjunct to the 
experimental approach. The statistical tests used and the significance levels 
adopted were discussed in 8.2.
The approach adopted is the standard null hypothesis significance testing 
procedure. There have been many criticisms of null hypothesis significance
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testing, mostly suggesting when it should not be used (Cohen 1995 is a 
ferocious critic; but see Newton and Rudestam 1999 for a discussion of the 
arguments). Frick (1996), on the other hand, explores the circumstances 
when the procedure is appropriate and Chow (1996) presents a careful 
defence of the procedure putting it on a firm logical foundation, which is 
followed in this thesis. He argues that null hypothesis tests of statistical 
significance are ideal for ‘theory corroboration’ and he addresses the major 
criticisms of the procedure, which frequently stem from inappropriate 
applications (and an inappropriate choice of p-va!ue discussed at 8.2 
above).
When setting out statistical hypotheses that test for the difference between 
two means, it is a convention that the null hypothesis (H0) will test that there 
is no difference between the two sample means and this is the approach that 
will be adopted in this thesis. The null hypothesis is ‘commonly known as the 
hypothesis of no difference’ (Chow 1996 at p. 3). Using this approach, it is 
usually expected that the null hypothesis will be rejected and that some 
alternative hypothesis (H^ will be accepted but, in this work, there are some 
tests where it is the null hypothesis that is expected to be accepted (implying 
that the sample means are equal) and, in these cases, no alternative 
hypothesis is specified.
8.4.1 TEST 1: PRE-DIVERGENCE EQUIVALENCE IN 1973
An underlying assumption of the research design is that, in 1973, for any pair 
of boroughs, the two sets of observations represent different data drawn from 
the same normally distributed population.
By testing the mean of the 1973 Rateable Value per m2 (acting as a proxy for 
rental value), the samples were checked to see if both were drawn from the 
same population before emergence of rate differentials. If there is no 
difference in rents between the two areas (before the rate burdens diverged) 
and if the population mean for each area is denoted by j i i  and \ i 2 the 
following statistical hypothesis can be tested:
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Hypothesis 1
Ho: m = |^ 2
A paired samples t-test is applied and the predicted outcome is that 
there is no significant difference between samples, i.e. the null 
hypothesis is accepted.
This pre-divergence test is important, not only because it helps to verify the 
basic premise of pre-divergence equivalence, but also because it eliminated 
the need to consider the separate but related problem of high rate areas 
having low property values. If it can be shown that properties in what became 
the high rated areas are part of the same population before the tax rate 
divergence emerged, then no further consideration needs to be given to this 
issue in the analysis.
Assuming that the matching of pairs dealt adequately with service charge 
costs, rental values and total occupation costs can be treated as one and the 
same in 1973. There is no need to take into account the rate burden because 
the rate poundage at this point in time was not divergent (and there had not 
been a lengthy period of high differentials in the preceding years).
This test is supported by descriptive statistics to help understand the extent 
to which rental values (and total occupation costs) were equal in 1973. The 
average rental values of properties between boroughs are compared to 
observe the extent to which rental values per m2 (denoted by Rv-i and Rv2) 
were level before the emergence of high rate differentials:
Hypothesis 2
H0: Rvi = Rv2
Descriptive statistics are calculated. It is predicted that rental values 
between boroughs will tend towards equality, i.e. the null hypothesis is 
accepted.
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Hypothesis 2 relies on the mean of 1973 Rateable Value per m2 (as a proxy 
for rental value) and illustrates how total occupation costs (represented by 
the rental value) are expected to be equalised.
8.4.2 TEST 2: POST-DIVERGENCE IMPACT IN 1988
This is one of the key tests for tax capitalisation: if the two sets of 
measurements for outcome rental value in 1988 can be shown to have been 
drawn from different sample populations after rates diverged, then the tax 
can be shown to have been (at least partly) capitalised. It is a basic 
prediction of this thesis that rental values will adjust to reflect differing rate 
burdens. This test assumes that any changes that take place reflect 
adjustments in the direction expected and Test 3 below is designed to 
confirm that any observed effect is consistent with capitalisation (i.e. takes 
place in the expected direction).
If the sample was drawn from the same population in 1973 (see 8.4.1), then 
it is expected that the two sets of observations for each borough will, by 
1988, have adjusted to the extent that they no longer represent data drawn 
from the same normally distributed population.
The mean of the 1988 Rateable Value per m2 was tested following the period 
of high rate differentials to see if there is a statistically significant difference in 
rents between the high rated area and the low rated area following the period 
of divergent rate burdens. If the population mean for each area is denoted by 
jlx 1 and j l i 2 the following hypothesis can be tested:
Hypothesis 3
H0: fii = \i2
H i : fJ.i ^  ^2
A paired samples t-test is applied with the predicted outcome that there 
is a significant difference between samples, i.e. the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted.
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8.4.3 TEST 3: EQUALISATION OF TOTAL OCCUPATION COSTS 
IN 1988
This is a test of capitalisation. The principal prediction in this work is that, 
over time, total occupation costs between the high rate and the low rate 
areas will be equalised. Total occupation costs are defined to comprise rental 
value plus rate burden. Service charge differences were handled as part of 
the matching process (see 7.5.2) and are therefore not treated within the 
definition of total costs.
If there is no difference in total occupation costs between the high rated area 
and the low rated area, and if the population mean for each area is denoted 
by jLi i and jll2 the following hypothesis can be tested:
Hypothesis 4
H0: m = 2^
A paired samples t-test was applied and the predicted outcome is that 
there is no significant difference between samples, i.e. the null 
hypothesis is accepted.
Hypothesis 4 is the Post-test equivalent to Hypothesis 1, which was applied 
in Test 1, before the rate burdens diverged (see 8.4.1). Hypothesis 1 applied 
to occupation costs before the emergence of high differences in the tax rate 
and the proposition is that, for the variable of total occupation costs, the 
samples will again be drawn from the same population following the period of 
high tax rate differentials.
Descriptive statistics help to explain the total occupation costs and the sum 
of the average rental value and the average rate burden are compared to see 
the extent to which total occupation costs per m2 (denoted by Oc, and Oc2) 
have equalised:
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Hypothesis 5
H0: Oci = Oc2
Descriptive statistics are calculated. It is predicted that total occupation 
costs will tend towards equalisation, i.e. the null hypothesis is 
accepted.
Hypothesis 5 illustrates how total occupation costs are expected to be 
equalised and, by taking the mean of 1988 Total Occupation Costs per m2, it 
is possible to see whether, after the period of equalisation, properties in the 
two boroughs now share equal total occupation costs.
8.4.4 PRIMARY ANALYSIS OF 1985 PILOT STUDY SUBSET
The pilot study discussed in 8.3 is based on office data for actual lettings in 
the City of Westminster and the London Borough of Camden. The three tests 
that together make up the primary analysis set out above were applied using 
the 1985 data subset from Table 8.2. There were 34 properties in the subset, 
made up of 17 in each borough, but these properties were not matched into 
pairs and an independent samples t-test was applied to the analysis of these 
data in place of the paired samples t-test that was specified for the main data 
analysis.
In Westminster and Camden, like the other London boroughs used for this 
study, there was marked divergence of rate burdens after 1979 (see Figure 
5.7).
First, the data-set was tested for equivalence in 1973, at the beginning of the 
period using the test that was explained in 8.4.1.
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Table 8.5: Pre-Divergence Equivalence in 1973
Sibley’s 1985 Office Data-set -  34 cases 
Variable: 1973 Rental Value per m2
Number
Local Authority of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Westminster 17 33.59 9.303 2.256
Camden 17 35.94 10.667 2.587
Independent Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values -0.684 32 .499
This test of Hypothesis 1 confirms the underlying assumption that the data 
were drawn from the same population of properties in 1973 before the rate 
burdens diverged (p=0.499). The null hypothesis (H0) is accepted, there 
being no statistically significant relationship, and this is the predicted 
outcome.
Table 8.5 also shows the average rental value per m2 for office property in 
1973, representing a test of Hypothesis 2. There is a difference between 
boroughs of 6.5%, with Camden (the eventual high rate borough) having a 
slightly higher rental value base.
As well as being a test of rental value equivalence in 1973, this can also be 
viewed as a test for parity of total occupation costs at that date (discussed at 
8.4.1).
The next stage of the analysis is to compare the difference between locations 
in 1985, using the test described in 8.4.2.
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Table 8.6: Post-Divergence Impact in 1985
Sibley’s 1985 Office Data-set -  34 cases 
Variable: 1985 Rent per m2
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Westminster 17 154.52 25.925 6.2878
Camden 17 131.52 21.032 5.1009
Independent Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values 2.840 32 .08
Table 8.6 shows the results of testing Hypothesis 3 to see if the rents have 
diverged in 1985, following the period of rate differentials. The null hypothesis 
(H0) is rejected and the alternative hypothesis (H^ is accepted. The results 
confirm the prediction that rental values will adjust to reflect the differing rate 
burden and this is confirmed at the 8% significance level. The result 
presented here is slightly stronger than the result obtained from the 
regression analysis that was applied to the whole data-set (see Table 8.4), 
where a significance level of 9% was found for the equivalent test of post­
divergence impact for 1983-1985.
The final stage of the analysis is to apply the tests described in 8.4.3, which 
are designed to test for equalisation of total occupation costs.
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Table 8.7: Total Occupation Costs in 1985
Sibley’s 1985 Office Data-set -  34 cases
Variable: Total Occupation Costs per m2 (Rent + Rate Burden)
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Westminster 17 211.22 29.292 7.1043
Camden 17 213.32 36.398 8.8277
Independent Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values -0.186 32 .854
Table 8.7 shows a result for Hypothesis 4 that is not statistically significant 
(p=0.854), which is the predicted outcome (H0 is accepted). The result 
suggests that the total occupation costs for the properties across the two 
boroughs are part of the same population. This evidence tends to confirm the 
central research hypothesis of this thesis, namely that total occupation costs 
are equalised.
Table 8.8: Equalisation of Total Occupation Costs in 1985
Sibley’s 1985 Office Data-set -  34 cases
Number
Cost of Cases Westminster Camden
Percentage
Difference
Average Rate Burden 17 £56.70 m2 £81.80 m2 30.7%
Average Rental Value 17 £154.52 m2 £131.52 m2 -17.5%
Total Occupation Costs £211.22 m2 £213.32 m2 1.0%
Table 8.8 shows the results from testing Hypothesis 5. The comparison of 
total occupation costs shows that, even by 1985, the combination of rent plus 
rate burden was equalised for the sample data used here.
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A comparison of total costs was also undertaken by Sibley in his own study 
but his methodology did not isolate the results in this way; nor did Sibley use 
any statistical tests to validate and support his findings.
The strength of these findings is a strong validation of the Pre-test/Post-test 
design and the cross-sectional statistical methodology that is used in this 
study. The use of market letting data provides triangulation of the results.
Pilot study data were not checked or verified and Sibley made no attempt to 
match his data into pairs, (although he did select an equal number of 
properties for each year in his data-set). Nevertheless, the results show that, 
by 1985, the influence of the differences in rate burden was apparent in 
rents, through the different level of rents between locations.
It is expected that the impact of high rates will be more clearly shown in the 
main study in 1988, due both to the controls that are imposed by the use of 
matched pairs, as well as the extra time that has elapsed to allow for the 
adjustment. Table 8.9 shows an extract from the Investors Chronicle/Hillier 
Parker (ICHP) Rent Index. The index for the period 1985-1988 confirms that 
this was a period of high rental growth.
Table 8.9: ICHP Rent Index -1983-1988
Offices -  London Mid-Town
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Q1 40 40 44 50 59 92
Q2 40 40 47 51 63 100
Q3 40 40 48 53 73 108
Q4 40 41 49 55 85 116
Source: CB Hillier Parker (ICHP 1989)
Table 8.9 also reveals that the 1983-1985 period, covered by Sibley’s data, 
was a time of comparatively low rental growth, which may also help to 
explain the weaker results obtained when making the regression analysis 
that included data from earlier years (see 8.3.2 above and also Sibley 1989).
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8.5 PRIMARY INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY ANALYSIS
The industrial property was located in the London Boroughs of Enfield and 
Haringey. Figure 5.5 illustrated the diverging rate burden in Enfield and 
Haringey for the period under study.
The tables that follow show the results from the analysis of Data-set A1 (see 
Table 7.4), which contains fully matched industrial property pairs. These 
results can be compared to the results in Appendix 8, which sets out the 
same analysis for the partly matched pairs in Industrial Data-set A2.
The first stage in the analysis was to see if the properties were drawn from 
the same population in 1973 using Test 1 which is explained in 8.4.1.
Table 8.10: Pre-Divergence Equivalence in 1973
Industrial Data-set A1: Fully matched pairs: 70 cases, 35 pairs 
Variable: 1973 Rental Value per m2
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Enfield 35 6.98 1.604 .2711
Haringey 35 6.76 1.163 .1965
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom P-Value
Equality of mean values .696 34 .491
Table 8.10 shows the results from testing Hypothesis 1 for industrial 
property. The result is not statistically significant (p=0.491) and the null 
hypothesis is accepted. This conforms to the predicted outcome and 
confirms the hypothesis that the data within Industrial Data-set A1 are drawn 
from the same population of properties in 1973, before the rate burdens 
diverged.
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Table 8.11: Equality of Total Occupation Costs in 1973
Industrial Data-set A1: Fully matched pairs: 70 cases, 35 pairs 
Variable: 1973 Rental Value per m2
Number Percentage
Cost of Pairs Enfield Haringey Difference
Average Rental Value 35 £6.98 m2 £6.76m2 -3.3%
Hypothesis 2 is tested in Table 8.11. The average rental value per m2 for 
industrial property in 1973 (using rateable value as a proxy) can be seen to 
be close, with a small difference between boroughs of 3.3%, with Haringey 
having slightly lower values.
The results of the Pre-Test analysis for industrial property suggest no 
evidence of any difference between locations in 1973, which means we can 
now discuss the suggestion that high rate areas have lower rents. The next 
stage in the analysis was to compare the difference in locations in 1988 
using Test 2, as discussed in 8.4.2.
Table 8.12: Post-Divergence Impact in 1988
Industrial Data-set A1: Fully matched pairs: 70 cases, 35 pairs 
Variable: 1988 Rental Value per m2
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Enfield 35 42.88 12.96 2.189
Haringey 35 38.42 7.68 1.298
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values 1.968 34 .057
The results of testing Hypothesis 3 are shown in Table 8.12 with the null 
hypothesis rejected, this being the predicted outcome. The alternative 
hypothesis (H^ is accepted and this applies at a 5.7% level of significance,
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at which level the prediction that the level of rents has adjusted to reflect the 
differing rate burden is confirmed. This provides strong support for the 
underlying hypothesis that, over time, property tax burdens are capitalised.
Finally, the analysis set out in 8.4.3 (Test 3) is undertaken to see if Total 
Occupation Costs in 1988 are equalised.
Table 8.13: Total Occupation Costs in 1988
Industrial Data-set A1: Fully matched pairs: 70 cases, 35 pairs 
Variable: Total Occupation Costs per m2 (Rent + Rate Burden)
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Enfield 35 55.82 15.561 2.6303
Haringey 35 56.65 10.133 1.7128
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values -0.298 34 .768
Table 8.13 shows the results of testing Hypothesis 4. The results are not 
statistically significant (p=0.768), leading to acceptance of the null 
hypothesis, which is the predicted outcome. This suggests that the total 
occupation costs for the properties in the data-set across the two boroughs 
are part of the same population. This finding provides strong support for the 
hypothesis that total occupation costs, over time, will be equalised.
Table 8.14: Equalisation of Total Occupation Costs in 1988
Industrial Data-set A1: Fully matched pairs: 70 cases, 35 pairs 
Variable: Total Occupation Costs per m2 (Rent + Rate Burden)
Number
Cost of Cases Enfield Haringey
Percentage
Difference
Average Rate Burden 35 £12.94 m2 £18.23 m2 29.0%
Average Rental Value 35 £42.88 m2 £38.42 m2 -11.6%
Total Occupation Costs £55.82 m2 £56.65 m2 1.5%
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Table 8.14 is a test of Hypothesis 5, which is accepted. This shows that total 
occupation costs between the two boroughs have tended to be equalised, 
with only a 1.5% difference between total costs in 1988, following the period 
of high rate differentials. These results provide further confirmation of the 
hypothesis that total occupation costs will be equalised, given sufficient time 
for the rents to adjust.
8.6 PRIMARY RETAIL PROPERTY ANALYSIS
Retail property in Data-set C1 (see Table 7.5) is located in the London 
Boroughs of Barnet and Brent, where there was marked divergence of rate 
burdens after 1979 (see Figure 5.6).
Again, the first stage of analysis was to test for differences between locations 
in 1973. This is Test 1, which is explained in 8.4.1.
Table 8.15: Pre-Divergence Equivalence in 1973
Retail Data-set C1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs 
Variable: 1973 Rental Value per m2
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Barnet 21 17.15 3.407 0.7434
Brent 21 17.79 2.441 0.5328
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values -0.666 20 .513
Table 8.15 shows the results from the testing of Hypothesis 1 for retail 
property using Data-set C1, containing fully matched retail property pairs. 
The result is not statistically significant (p=0.513) and the null hypothesis is 
accepted, which is the predicted outcome. This confirms the assumption that 
the data within Retail Data-set C1 are drawn from the same population of 
properties in 1973, before the rate burdens diverged.
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Table 8.16: Equality of Total Occupation Costs in 1973
Retail Data-set C1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs 
Variable: 1973 Rental Value per m2
Number Percentage
Cost of Pairs Barnet Brent Difference
Average Rental Value 21 £17.15 m2 £17.79m2 3.6%
In Table 8.16 the average rental value per m2 for retail property in 1973 can 
be seen to be close, with a small difference between boroughs of 3.6% for 
Hypothesis 2. In this case, Brent (which later becomes the high rate 
borough), has a slightly higher level of rental values than Barnet.
The results of the Pre-Test analysis for retail property, shown in Tables 8.15 
and 8.16, suggest no evidence of any significant difference between 
locations and this suggested that it was worthwhile to examine the outcome 
variables in 1988. The second stage of the analysis was to compare the 
difference in locations in 1988.
Table 8.17: Post-Divergence Impact in 1988
Retail Data-set C1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs 
Variable: 1988 Rental Value per m2
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Barnet 21 125.45 23.173 5.0567
Brent 21 114.89 10.639 2.3217
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values 1.822 20 .083
Table 8.17 shows the results of testing Hypothesis 3 for retail property. The 
null hypothesis for Test 2 is rejected and the alternative hypothesis (H^ is
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accepted at an 8.3% level of significance, which is in line with the predicted 
outcome that the level of rents will adjust to reflect the differing rate burden. 
This provides support for the underlying hypothesis that, over time, property 
tax burdens are capitalised.
The final stage of the analysis is to compare Total Occupation Costs in 1988 
to see if they are equalised (see 8.4.3).
Table 8.18: Total Occupation Costs in 1988
Retail Data-set C1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs 
Variable: Total Occupation Costs per m2 (Rent + Rate Burden)
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Barnet 21 157.16 27.025 5.8974
Brent 21 152.86 14.580 3.1815
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values .619 20 .543
Table 8.18 shows the results of testing Hypothesis 4, which confirms the 
prediction that the average total occupation costs across the borough 
boundary are drawn from the same population (p=0.543). The result confirms 
the null hypothesis, which was the predicted outcome and this provides 
strong support for the hypothesis that total occupation costs will be 
equalised, given sufficient time for the rents to adjust.
Table 8.19: Equalisation of Total Occupation Costs in 1988
Retail Data-set C1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs 
Variable: Total Occupation Costs per m2 (Rent + Rate Burden)
Number
Cost of Cases Barnet Brent
Percentage
Difference
Average Rate Burden 21 £31.71 m2 £37.97 m2 16.5%
Average Rental Value 21 £125.45 m2 £114.89m2 -9.2%
Total Occupation Costs £157.16 m2 £152.86 m2 -2.8%
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Table 8.19 is a test of Hypothesis 5 which shows that total occupation costs 
per m2tend to be equalised for retail property. Total occupation costs in Brent 
are 2.8% lower than in Barnet in 1988 following the period of high rate 
differentials. Again, this finding provides confirmation of the hypothesis that 
total occupation costs will be equalised, given sufficient time for the rents to 
adjust.
8.7 PRIMARY OFFICE PROPERTY ANALYSIS
Data-set E1 (see Table 7.6) contains fully matched pairs of office properties 
in the City of Westminster and the London Borough of Camden, which are 
the same boroughs that were used for the pilot study (see 8.3). Like the other 
London boroughs used in this thesis, there was marked divergence of rate 
burdens after 1979 between Westminster and Camden (see Figure 5.7).
Firstly, the pre-divergence analysis was undertaken to see if the properties 
were drawn from the same population in 1973.
Table 8.20: Pre-Divergence Equivalence in 1973
Office Data-set E1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs 
Variable: 1973 Rental Value per m2
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Westminster 21 34.89 9.059 1.977
Camden 21 36.48 17.062 3.723
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values .362 20 .721
Table 8.20 shows the results from testing Hypothesis 1 for office property 
using Data-set E1 containing fully matched pairs. The null hypothesis for 
Hypothesis 1 is accepted (p=0.721), which is the predicted outcome. This 
confirms the underlying premise that the data within Office Data-set E1 were 
drawn from the same population in 1973, before rate burdens diverged.
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Table 8.21: Equality of Total Occupation Costs in 1973
Office Data-set E1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs 
Variable: 1973 Rental Value per m2
Number Percentage
Cost of Pairs Westminster Camden Difference
Average Rental Value 21 £34.89m2 £36.48m2 4.4%
Table 8.21 shows the average rental value per m2 for office property in 1973. 
The rents are close, with a difference between boroughs of 4.4%. This is the 
largest pre-divergence difference between boroughs for Hypothesis 2 (for the 
primary analysis). Camden has a slightly higher rental value base in 1973, 
and as with retail property in Barnet/Brent, the borough with the highest rate 
burden in 1988 is starting with a slightly higher rental value base in 1973.
The results of the Pre-Test analysis for office property suggest no evidence 
of any significant difference between locations in 1973 and the overall results 
from the pre-divergence investigation suggested that it was acceptable to 
move on to test the 1988 outcome variables. The next stage in the analysis 
was to compare the differences in locations at that time.
Table 8.22: Post-Divergence Impact in 1988
Office Data-set E1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs
Variable: 1988 Rental Value per m2
Number Standard Standard
Local Authority of Cases Mean Deviation Error
Westminster 21 294.66 51.239 11.181
Camden 21 264.56 38.559 8.414
Paired Samples t Degrees of 2-tailed
T-Test Value Freedom P-Value
Equality of mean values -2.078 20 .051
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Table 8.22 is a test of Hypothesis 3, in which the null hypothesis is rejected. 
This is the predicted outcome and, for office property, the alternative 
hypothesis (H^ is confirmed at a 5.1% significance level. It confirms the 
prediction that rental values will adjust to reflect the differing rate burden. 
This provides strong support for the underlying hypothesis that, over time, 
property tax burdens are capitalised.
Finally the analysis set out in 8.4.3 (Test 3) is undertaken to see if Total 
Occupation Costs in 1988 are equalised.
Table 8.23: Total Occupation Costs in 1988
Office Data-set E1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs 
Variable: Total Occupation Costs per m2 (Rent + Rate Burden)
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Westminster 21 351.49 57.550 12.559
Camden 21 349.08 68.215 14.886
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tailed
P-Value
Equality of mean values -1.12 20 .912
Table 8.23 shows the results of testing for Hypothesis 4. The results are not 
statistically significant (p=0.912) so the null hypothesis is accepted. This 
suggests that for the outcome variable of total occupation costs, the sample 
properties across the borough boundary are drawn from the same 
population. This finding provides strong support for the hypothesis that total 
occupation costs will be equalised, given sufficient time for the rents to 
adjust.
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Table 8.24: Equalisation of Total Occupation Costs in 1988
Office Data-set E1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs 
Variable: Total Occupation Costs per m2 (Rent + Rate Burden)
Number
Cost of Cases Westminster Camden
Percentage
Difference
Average Rate Burden 21 £56.83 m2 £84.52 m2 32.7%
Average Rental Value 21 £294.66 m2 £264.56 m2 -11.4%
Total Occupation Costs £351.49 m2 £349.08 m2 -0.7%
The results of testing Hypothesis 5 are shown in Table 8.24. The null 
hypothesis is accepted, as predicted. This shows that total occupation costs 
between the two boroughs have tended to be equalised, with only a 0.7% 
difference between total costs in 1988 following the period of high rate 
differentials. The total costs in Westminster are slightly higher than the costs 
in Camden which provides support for the hypothesis that total occupation 
costs will be equalised, given sufficient time for the rents to adjust.
In the case of office properties, the post-divergence results can be compared 
to the results of the pilot study shown in Tables 8.7 and 8.8, which shows the 
position for office property in the same locations in 1985. These are pilot 
study data and they are for different properties but a comparison of the 
results suggests that a progressive equalisation of total occupation costs is 
taking place over time. They also provide triangulation of the results from the 
analysis using rental proxy data against market letting data.
8.8 SECONDARY ANALYSIS -  RENTAL GROWTH TEST
Due to the difficulty of obtaining and maintaining a consistent single data-set 
over the time frame of this research, the secondary analysis uses a different 
data-set to the primary analysis (see 6.7). This secondary analysis is 
designed to give additional insights into the tax capitalisation effect over time. 
This is a longitudinal test which goes beyond the cross-sectional approach 
that is adopted for the primary analysis, although it is intended only to 
supplement that analysis and is therefore not as comprehensively specified.
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It has been emphasised that the process of adjustment of rents to reflect 
higher business rates takes a long time and that it will come about through 
changes in the rate of rental value growth. Given the equalisation of total 
occupation costs that took place between 1973 and 1988, it is expected that 
rental growth between high rate and low rate areas will differ following the 
introduction of the Uniform Business Rate. This is caused by the upward 
adjustment of previously depressed rents in the high rate area. The formerly 
low rate areas are expected to show lower annual rental growth than high 
rate areas.
This secondary investigation will give an added dimension to the empirical 
study and help to explain the impact of the Uniform Business Rate (UBR) on 
property values in the period 1988-1998.
8.8.1 TEST 4: DIFFERENTIAL RENTAL GROWTH TEST
By calculating rental growth (Rg) based on the overall rateable value (acting 
as a proxy for rental value), a test is made that is independent of the size 
observation. This made it possible to use a larger data-set for the secondary 
analysis (by removing the need to collect size measurements) and it also 
provided a cross-check against the primary analysis that does not rely on the 
measurement of size (see Appendix 9).
In the hypotheses below, the sample from the area that had low rates in the 
past (Pre-UBR) is denoted by Rg! and the sample from the area that had 
high rates by Rg2:
Hypothesis 6
Ho: Rgi Rg2
H i: Rgi < Rg2 (Post-UBR growth)
H2: Rgi > Rg2 (Pre-UBR growth)
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By calculating the average annual rental growth between the two 
samples for each property type, the difference in rental growth can be 
investigated.
It is expected that the rate of rental growth between boroughs will differ. For 
the 1988-98 analysis it is expected that there will be higher rental growth in 
the formerly high rate area, i.e. the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis (H^ is accepted. Where the test is applied to data for 
the period 1973-1988, it is expected that higher growth rates will be found in 
the low rate borough and this is represented by Hypothesis H2.
The annual rate of rental growth is calculated as the compound annual 
growth rate.
8.8.2 SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF 1985 PILOT STUDY SUBSET
Once again, the pilot data that were used to validate the methodology and to 
triangulate the results against market data were used to evaluate the 
proposed approach. Taking the same 1985 subset of pilot data that was used 
to test the primary analysis (see 8.3.1), a calculation was made for rental 
growth for the period 1973-1985, in the terms of Test 4 set out above.
It should be noted that the results of this growth analysis for the pilot data do 
not add to the results set out in 8.4.4. The primary analysis of the pilot data 
provided strong evidence to support the hypothesis that the UK property tax 
is capitalised: if rents between locations were the same in 1973 and had 
diverged by 1985 (1988 for the main analysis), it automatically follows that 
rates of rental growth must also have diverged (given the measurement at 
only two points in time). Consequently, there is no analytical purpose in 
carrying out this rental growth test for the primary data. It is calculated here in 
order to prove the efficacy of Test 4 and to provide triangulation of results 
against market data.
The annual rental growth was calculated for the period 1973 through to the 
date of the market letting in 1985, but only the outcome variable of rent in
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1988 is based on a market letting. The 1973 Rateable Value is used as a 
proxy for rental value in 1973.
Table 8.25: Average Annual Rental Growth -1973-1985
Sibley’s 1985 Office Data-set -  34 observations
Local Authority Cases 1973-1985
Westminster 17 13.8% pa
Camden 17 11.8% pa
The results shown in Table 8.25 are, as predicted, that rental growth in 
Westminster is higher than rental growth in Camden (H2 is accepted). This 
result suggested that it would be worthwhile to collect and analyse data for 
the period following the introduction of the Uniform Business Rate in 1990, a 
period for which the primary analysis provides no answers.
It has already been explained that there is little analytical advantage in 
making this rental growth analysis for the primary data. However, the growth 
calculation itself is carried out without regard to property size and Appendix 9 
contains an analysis of growth for the primary data over the period 1973- 
1988. This is presented as a confirmatory analysis, and it is included in this 
thesis as a check on the primary results because size is the least accurately 
measured of the four chief variables (see 7.4).
8.8.3 DIFFERENTIAL RENTAL GROWTH -  1988-98
The data collected for this test used the same principles that were 
established in Chapter 6, with the rateable value acting as a proxy for rental 
value.
Since the Uniform Business Rate was introduced in 1990, there have been 
two additional revaluations, the first in 1995 and the most recent in 2000. The 
variables used for the calculation of rental growth are the rateable value in 
1990, the rateable value in 1995 and the rateable value in 2000. Just as the 
1990 Rating List was based on an antecedent valuation date of April 1988,
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so the subsequent rating lists have been based on a valuation date that is 
two years earlier (see A2.5 and Figure 1.1). The 1995 Rating List is based on 
values in April 1993 and the 2000 Rating List is based on values in April 
1998: rental value proxy is therefore based on valuation dates of April 1988, 
April 1993 and April 1998.
The chief test for differential rental growth covers rental values in the period 
1988-1998 and it was applied to a different set of data to that which was 
collected for the primary analysis. Rental growth is calculated separately for 
three periods, 1988-1993,1993-1998 and for the whole period 1988-1998. 
This shows rental growth over a period of ten years.
One specific anomaly that is not addressed in this analysis is the fact that 
Uniform Business Rates were not introduced until 1990, yet the initial rental 
value observations are from 1988. The survey of occupiers (see Appendix 6) 
showed that occupiers were unlikely to have reflected expected future rate 
burdens in their rental bids before 1990. This means that the period of time in 
which rental growth rates can adjust to reflect the elimination of rate 
differentials is eight years, not ten, as might be implied by the data.
A second factor that was ignored in this analysis of rental growth is the 
impact of Transitional Relief (see A1.4). Increases (and decreases) in rate 
burden were phased in following the introduction of each new rating list under 
the new system. No account is taken of this phasing in the secondary 
analysis presented here.
Table 8.26: Average Annual Rental Growth -1988-1998
Industrial Data-set B: part matched pairs: 170 cases, 85 pairs
Local Authority Cases 1988-1993 1993-1998 1988-1998
Enfield 85 0.6% pa 0.9% pa 0.7% pa
Haringey 85 1.5% pa 1.2% pa 1.2% pa
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Table 8.26 is a test of Hypothesis 6 for industrial property, with the 
expectation that alternative hypothesis (H^ will be accepted. This predicts 
that rental growth will be higher in Haringey than in Enfield. For the whole 
period 1988-1998, the annual rental growth in Haringey is 0.5% higher than 
in Enfield. For all periods calculated, the annual average rental growth is 
higher in Haringey than Enfield, which confirms the hypothesis.
Table 8.27: Average Annual Rental Growth -1988-1998
Retail Data-set D: part matched pairs: 174 cases, 87 pairs
Local Authority Cases 1988-1993 1993-1998 1988-1998
Barnet 87 0.4% pa 1.2% pa 0.8% pa
Brent 87 4.2% pa 1.1% pa 2.6% pa
Table 8.27 is a test of Hypothesis 6 for retail property, again with the 
expectation that alternative hypothesis (H^ will be accepted. This predicts 
that rental growth will be higher in Brent than Barnet. For the whole period 
1988-1998, the annual rental growth in Brent is 1.8% higher than in Barnet, 
confirming the hypothesis for the overall period. For the other periods 
calculated, the annual average rental growth varies, being nearly 4.0% 
higher in Brent in the period 1988-1993, but during the period 1993-1998 
rental growth is slightly higher in Barnet (the low rate borough) than in Brent 
(by 0.1%). Such a small difference is not considered relevant in the context 
of the overall results obtained.
Table 8.28: Average Annual Rental Growth -1988-1998
Office Data-set F: part matched pairs: 64 cases, 32 pairs
Local Authority Cases 1988-1993 1993-1998 1988-1998
Westminster 32 -16.3% pa 6.9% pa -5.4% pa
Camden 32 -6.9% pa 6.4% pa -0.5% pa
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Table 8.28 shows the results from testing Hypothesis 6 for office property, 
again with the expectation that alternative hypothesis (Hi) will be accepted. 
This predicts that rental growth will be higher in Camden than Westminster.
Rental growth for the whole period 1988-1998 in both Camden and 
Westminster is negative, but the negative growth rate is still nearly 5.0% per 
annum lower in Camden than in Westminster, confirming the hypothesis for 
the overall period. For the intermediate periods, the annual average rental 
growth varies. For the period 1988-1993 rental growth is negative in both 
boroughs with a difference in annual rental growth between boroughs of 
nearly 10%, and again, the negative growth takes place in accordance with 
the predictions of the hypothesis, with a lower rate of negative growth in 
Camden. Negative growth in this period is attributed to the 1988-1994 
property recession. Growth in the period 1993-1998 is positive, with a 
slightly higher rate of growth in Westminster (0.5% per annum). It may be 
that the sharp fall in rental values in Westminster during the first period is 
being adjusted in the subsequent period, although the magnitude of the 
adjustment does not fully account for the fall in values in the previous period. 
This result must be viewed in the context of the overall results, which clearly 
show that Camden experienced better rental value growth, in accordance 
with the predicted outcome for this test.
The property recession is certainly likely to have affected the results of the 
secondary analysis for all three property types and other factors will also 
influence rents. These are not held constant in this analysis, which is not 
intended to be as rigorous as the primary analysis.
Another explanation of the negative growth shown for office property and for 
the generally small differences shown between boroughs could be the impact 
of Transitional Relief (see Appendix 1) which has not been controlled for in 
the analysis, and which implicitly assumes level rate burdens between 
properties across the borough boundary. Transitional Relief applies to the 
tenant and not the property (but this analysis is undertaken at property unit 
level without regard to the tenant).
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8.9 CONCLUSIONS
The combined results presented in this chapter provide strong evidence to 
support the central hypothesis of this thesis: that the UK property tax is 
capitalised into property values. Indeed, in statistical terms, the results 
suggest that the extent to which property taxes are capitalised over time 
does not differ significantly from 100%. This is confirmed for all three types of 
property that are included in the empirical research, albeit with differing levels 
of significance, ranging from just over 5% in the case of offices to better than 
9% in the case of retail (for the outcome variable of rent in 1988). These 
results are supported by the finding that total occupation costs do tend to be 
equalised in the long term.
The results of the primary analysis are supported by the secondary analysis 
of rental value growth, which brings a longitudinal dimension to the study and 
presents results for the period 1988-1998 following the introduction of the 
Uniform Business Rate.
By adopting a series of statistical significance tests supported by descriptive 
statistics and other tests, no undue reliance is placed on any single analytical 
technique. Statistical tests of significance provide an objective measure in 
the verification of hypotheses, but they do not on their own provide a full 
explanation of the results. The statistical tests have been augmented by 
comparative information to confirm and support the chief findings, but the use 
of critical judgement in considering the results is paramount and the 
concluding chapter of this thesis summarises the key findings and discusses 
their significance, relating them to the theory and considering them in the 
light of previous empirical research.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
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9.1 INTRODUCTION
This thesis has examined the effect of the UK business property tax on 
business property values in London: specifically whether and to what extent 
the tax is transferred into rents and thus capitalised.
The final chapter restates the research problem and reviews the 
methodology used in this study. This is followed by a summary of the results, 
a discussion of their relationship to the empirical literature and their 
implications for property owners and also for government tax policy. Finally, 
consideration is given to areas for further research.
9.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODOLGY USED
Taxation today is by far the most important source of government revenue 
and business rates are the fifth largest source of tax revenue, representing 
5% of the total.
Taxes represent a transfer of resources from the private sector to the public 
sector and in the process they may introduce distortions into the economy 
and impose an additional burden on the community, over and above the 
amount of tax paid. This thesis has examined the possible impacts of the 
property tax and has explored the extent to which the UK property tax is 
shifted in to rents and thus capitalised.
Business rates in England were the subject of major reform in 1990 and, by 
taking advantage of the circumstances of this change, it was possible to 
examine the impact of the tax on business property values. Prior to the 
change there were wide discrepancies in the tax rates between otherwise 
comparable properties. Rental differences between these properties and how 
they have adjusted in response to the tax have allowed the tax impact to be 
investigated.
The central research hypothesis can be stated as follows:
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Following a period of years during which differing property tax 
burdens are applied to otherwise comparable properties, the 
rental values of those properties will adjust to a level whereby 
total occupation costs are equalised.
Chapters 2 and 3 provided the theoretical background to the research 
question and a review of the empirical literature was made in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 outlined the practical and political aspects of the UK property tax. 
The empirical study carried out for this thesis was presented in Chapters 6, 7 
and 8.
The theory of rental value determination was considered in Chapter 2. A 
model of rental value determination was developed and used to explain how 
a tax on occupiers would affect rental values. Chapter 2 also identified and 
discussed the three property types used in the empirical study and a review 
of demand and supply effects on rental value determination was made for 
each.
In Chapter 3 the economics of taxation and tax capitalisation were reviewed 
and a model of tax capitalisation was developed. A critical evaluation was 
made in Chapters 3 and 4 of the literature on tax capitalisation. Most of the 
theoretical literature originates in the US where the debate has been 
focussed on residential property and what applies in the US context cannot 
be taken as automatically applying in the UK, where there are fewer local 
authorities and a much greater homogeneity between local services (Evans 
1985). This uniformity has tended to increase with greater centralisation and 
there are fewer and fewer opportunities for differentiation in local authority 
services in the UK, particularly to the business sector. This trend acts to 
neutralise any differential benefit effects that may arise between local 
authority areas, especially in London, where key services to business 
occupiers are provided across the conurbation (e.g. fire, police).
Chapter 4 contained a careful review of the important property tax studies 
that have been made in both the US and the UK. Each study was 
categorised according to its geographical area, the property type and the 
underlying data approach used. The categories for approach used included
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both micro and macro data as well as studies of a tax change. Whilst there is 
a considerable body of literature devoted to residential property, there are 
few studies that consider business property. This is the least well developed 
part of the literature in both the UK and the US.
The study carried out in this thesis is a contribution to the literature in the 
category of micro-studies of business property tax capitalisation, based on 
the circumstances existing as a result of a tax change. The unit of 
observation is the individual property and the analysis considers inter- 
jurisdictional tax differences.
Each study reviewed in Chapter 4 was different but several themes emerged 
repeatedly. The time horizon used for the analysis was too short; the analysis 
was frequently at the wrong scale, using aggregate data at a national or 
regional level; the data were inadequate or difficult to obtain (and where 
obtained were often inappropriate to the problem); the modelling technique 
used was unsuitable or flawed in its implementation.
Chapter 5 examined the practical aspects of the UK property tax. It gave a 
brief overview of the technical aspects of the UK tax (expanded in Appendix 
1) and reviewed the political circumstances leading to the 1990 reforms. In 
this chapter, the six London boroughs used in the empirical research were 
identified and discussed.
In Chapter 6 the research problem was defined, the methodology developed 
and the data requirements discussed. Chapter 7 considered the availability of 
data. This thesis uses micro-level data for individual properties to investigate 
the extent to which business rates are transferred into lower rental values 
(and are thus capitalised).
The possibility of benefits being received in return for the tax payment was 
discussed in 6.4. The differential benefits to business occupiers between 
local authority areas are likely to be small and the evidence suggests that the 
important business-focused services are homogenous between London 
boroughs. Consequently, tax benefits were not explicitly taken into account in 
the analysis.
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The methodology used one important new technique, this being the adoption 
of rateable value as a proxy for rental value. Great care was taken to verify 
this approach and the results achieved were triangulated against actual 
letting observations. The assumptions embodied in the data were tested in 
Chapter 7 and the pilot study results presented in Chapter 8 were undertaken 
using market data to verify and validate both the statistical approach adopted 
and the results obtained. The adoption of a proxy is a useful approach in the 
context of business property and it avoids the problems of data availability 
experienced continually in this field. Used with appropriate caution, this 
technique could be applied to future research projects in the business 
property arena.
A unique feature of the selected rental value proxy is that it can be used to 
provide complete knowledge of (estimated) rental value for all business 
properties. There are several benefits of the approach: all rental value 
estimates are based on the same assumptions and the same letting terms 
(the hypothetical tenancy); it makes no difference if a property is vacant, let 
or owner-occupied; there is no need for adjustments resulting from 
contractual differences between lettings (which are only possible if the 
information is available in the first place); and there is no need to rely on 
estimates of rental value that are made for portfolio valuation purposes, 
where different valuers make their estimates on different assumptions that 
reflect their individual biases. Finally, provided the rating valuation dates are 
acceptable, there is no need to rebase the rental value observations against 
index figures to bring valuations at different dates into line. The rateable 
value proxy is well suited to the cross-sectional nature of the present study.
From the lessons learnt through the evaluation of earlier research, this work 
has avoided the pitfalls that hampered those studies. The time horizon is 
appropriate to the problem and this is a key difference between this and 
most other studies. Another key difference is that, given that rateable value 
is a valid proxy for rents, the data were appropriate for testing the 
hypothesis, because they are related directly to the variables to which the 
theory directs our attention. The matched pairs are individual observations 
and so the approach is the equivalent of a fully specified hedonic
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regression model for practical purposes and leaves only the main outcome 
variable of rent free to vary.
For the primary analysis in 1988 there are no obvious confounding market 
trends to handle: the 1973 property recession was a distant memory; the 
relaxation of planning use legislation in 1987 was considered too recent to 
have affected market values, and the prolonged recession that began in 
1989 was not predicted or expected at the time of the cross-sectional study. 
Being an inter-jurisdictional study, these external facts are much less 
important, unless they vary across the borough boundary. They are 
significant because changes arising through other influences are likely to 
make the tax effect more difficult to isolate, and the parsimonious model 
adopted did not attempt to handle any of these variables explicitly.
This study employs the well established technique of using matched pairs. It 
demonstrates that there is a considerable research pay-off to basing the 
definition of relevant data explicitly and precisely in relevant theory and then 
investing substantial effort in collecting the data and cleaning the data-set 
meticulously.
9.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The empirical results set out in Chapter 8 present for the first time a complete 
set of results on the long-term impact of the property tax on industrial, retail 
and office property. The findings show that property tax differentials in the six 
London boroughs under study were shifted to rental values and thus 
capitalised into property values. This shifting effect was measured in 1988 
and followed a prolonged period of high tax rate differentials, which was 
present in these areas from 1979 onwards.
The basic design was a Pre-test/Post-test design using cross-sectional data 
for the primary analysis. The results of the Pre-test analysis for all property 
types suggested that the properties were drawn from the same population in 
1973 (Test 1 at 8.4.1).
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The results of Post-test analysis included two separate tests of statistical 
significance on two outcome variables (rental value and total occupation 
costs) in 1988. The first was for the impact of tax rate divergence on the 
rental value (Test 2) and the second for equalisation of total occupation 
costs (Test 3).
Test 2 was a test of post-divergence impact on the rental value in 1988. It 
was expected that rents in each location would be different (see 8.4.2). This 
is one of the key tests for tax capitalisation: if the two sets of observations for 
rental value in 1988 can be shown to have been drawn from different sample 
populations after tax rates diverged, then it can be concluded that rents have 
adjusted to reflect the tax differentials.
Results of the test for post-divergence impact on rental values were found to 
have a statistical significance level of 5.7% for industrial property, a 
significance level of 8.3% for retail property, and a significance level of 5.1% 
for office property.
In statistical terms these results suggest that the extent to which property 
taxes are capitalised over time does not differ significantly from 100%.
Test 3 was the test of post-divergence equalisation of total occupation costs 
(defined as rent plus rate burden) in 1988. It was expected that total costs in 
each location would tend towards equalisation (see 8.4.3). This is another 
key test: if the two sets of observations for total occupation costs in 1988 can 
be shown to have been drawn from the same sample populations after rates 
diverged, then it can be concluded that total occupation costs have been 
equalised.
Results from all three property types for equalisation of total costs were not 
found to be statistically significant (as predicted), suggesting that the two sets 
of observations for each borough were drawn from the same population. The 
significance level for industrial property was 77%, for retail property 55% and 
for office property the level was 92%.
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In statistical terms these results suggest that the total occupation costs have 
been equalised, thereby confirming the central research hypothesis of this 
thesis. Test 3 also specified a comparison of the total occupation costs in 
each borough. This analysis showed an average difference ranging from less 
than 1 % in the case of office property rising to 2.8% for retail property, 
illustrating that total costs were equalised.
A secondary analysis extended the time frame of the empirical work to cover 
the period following the introduction of Uniform Business Rates, by testing for 
differential rental growth between boroughs between 1988 and 1998 (Test 4 
at 8.8.1). These subsidiary findings suggest that the same conditions that led 
to the tax being capitalised by 1988 also resulted in differing rental value 
growth rates in the ten-year period following the introduction of Uniform 
Business Rates.
If the results from the six London boroughs can be generalised and the 
assumption of no differential tax benefits holds at the necessary geographic 
scale, it can be concluded that, over the longer term, it is likely that the full 
amount of the UK property tax is capitalised (through changes in rental 
value) and that the tax is borne by owners of property, both investors and 
owner occupiers, rather than leasehold occupiers.
The study undertaken for this thesis uses cross-sectional data for its primary 
empirical analysis, but it is nonetheless a study of the long-term impacts of 
the UK property tax. The results cover an overall period of 25 years and no 
other UK studies have been made on a similar time horizon.
There are two specific caveats that must be kept in mind when considering 
the results. The relatively small size of the paired data-sets for all property 
types in the cross-sectional study suggests the need for care in interpreting 
the statistical significance of the results, although the use of fully matched 
pairs should help to minimise this concern. The employment of a rental value 
proxy in place of actual lettings is also a potential concern that must be borne 
in mind when considering the findings though, as explained in Chapter 7, the 
use of this proxy was carefully verified before it was adopted and both the 
proxy itself and the results obtained were triangulated against letting market
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data. One strong message that is plain from the empirical literature reviewed 
in Chapter 4 is the importance of having access to data at the appropriate 
level of detail and the difficulty of obtaining that data.
Cheshire and Mills (1999 at p. 1324) suggest one ‘ lesson for researchers 
about the very basics of good applied work: it derives from theoretical insight 
and a careful, even frugal, concern for data. Are these data appropriate for 
answering the questions that theory suggests are relevant?’ While there may 
be some issues with respect to the data employed in this study, they do 
relate to the appropriate variables and great care has been taken to cross­
check their validity as measures of those variables as well as eliminate 
sources of measurement error.
It was evident from the empirical literature that the model specification itself 
can play a central part in the results obtained when attempting to identify the 
extent of tax shifting (see 4.2).
The approach of this study has been to combine a meticulous approach to 
the data collection with a straightforward but robust statistical framework: the 
aim was to adopt a methodology that was simple but convincing and that 
combined a series of tests that help to increase confidence in the results. 
Whilst regression analysis was used when it was needed to analyse the 
longitudinal data in the pilot study, the model adopted for the primary analysis 
did not require the specification of a complex regression equation and no 
attempt was made to design a predictive model of tax capitalisation.
The choice of appropriate statistical significance level is a subject of 
considerable debate and a lengthy discussion could be pursued regarding 
the choice of a 10% level used to indicate statistical significance in this thesis 
(see 8.2). The convention of using a 1% or 5% level is, for many 
researchers, enshrined as the threshold value for declaring statistical 
significance. It is argued that this is too stringent for a problem of the type 
being studied in this thesis: ultimately, the choice of decision rule is arbitrary 
and this more demanding level from the natural sciences is often employed 
by social scientists without adequate reflection.
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The results presented here are, of course, a product of time and place but 
they are not merely an observation of local conditions at one point in time. 
This study has taken deliberate advantage of a particular set of 
circumstances that have allowed the extent to which the tax is reflected in 
reduced rents to be identified. This work is properly related both to the 
theoretical and the empirical literature, takes careful account of previous 
research undertaken, and builds on the results of earlier studies. Whilst it is 
not suggested that the results obtained can simply be generalised and 
applied anywhere in the UK, they are considered to be indicative of the long­
term impact of the UK property tax. The relatively inelastic supply in London 
for all three property types is thought to have played an important part in 
allowing the identification of long-term tax impacts and, given relative 
similarity in supply conditions, similar results would be expected elsewhere in 
the UK, subject to adjustment for appropriate differences in local conditions.
An important conclusion of this study relates to the crucial role played by the 
institutional setting, which dominates the way in which the expected tax 
impacts will operate. In the context of this study, where there are no benefit 
differentials, the tax is a deadweight payment and is fully capitalised through 
reduced rents. If the value of the benefits are equal to the tax payment, the 
value of the benefits will offset the payment, in which case there would be no 
change in rents (and if the value of the benefits is greater than the tax 
payment the benefits themselves may be capitalised resulting in increased 
rents).
The empirical results bear out the theoretical hypothesis of Fraser (1985) 
who postulated the complete abolition of the UK property tax. They build on 
the aggregate level empirical work which was considered in Chapter 4.
Whilst it should be interpreted with care, this aggregate level research has 
shown that the incidence of the property tax in the UK is borne on capital in 
the short term and in particular on the owners of business. The micro-level 
study by Bennett and Fearnehough (1987) did not seek to identify the extent 
of property tax capitalisation, concentrating on the short-term impact of the 
tax, which was found to bear on capital in the form of reduced profits to 
business owners. These studies examined the first round effects of the tax 
and none of them attempted to identify any further impacts, partly because of
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the nature of the data that were used, but also because of the time frame 
adopted by the authors. The time scale required for the analysis in the UK is 
necessarily long term because of the characteristics of the institutional lease 
and of the property market itself.
The findings in this thesis build on these earlier studies of short- and 
medium-term incidence, showing that, in the long term, the impact of the tax 
is shifted away from business occupiers and onto the owners of the property.
A more closely related strand of the literature has sought to identify the 
impact of the tax on property values in the UK. This began in 1989 with 
Sibley’s study and ended with the work of Bond et al. in 1996, and this 
present work can be viewed as the concluding episode in this group of 
studies.
The findings presented here fill in the gaps in the previous results and this 
study addresses methodological flaws in relation to the data, the scale and 
the time frame of those earlier analyses.
The results for all three property types are the first such results in the UK for 
business properties over the long term. For industrial and retail, the data-sets 
are made up of secondary property, whereas the office data-set is made up 
of prime property. For industrial property there have been no published 
results from studies of tax impact in the UK. There have been two previous 
studies of retail property, one of which suggested weak short-term evidence 
of tax capitalisation for prime shops. For prime offices there has been one 
earlier study of tax impacts, which did not report statistically significant 
results.
For retail property, the results provide answers that eluded Crosby and 
Keogh (1990) in their study of shops in Nottingham. Typical of many prime 
city centre shopping areas, Nottingham is multi-centric and the authors found 
noteworthy results about the nature and importance of micro-location in a 
central shopping centre but there was a severe problem controlling for all the 
variables affecting the rents, to isolate the specific effect of the property tax. 
The use of matched pairs in the present study is considered to be a central
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part of the methodology that helped to overcome and control for variations 
between individual properties.
This thesis extends the work of Bond et al. (1996a) who published 
statistically significant results for short-term tax impacts on prime retail 
property. However, the findings of their study, which was carried out at an 
aggregate level, are not convincing and they need to be treated with 
considerable caution (see 4.6.6).
Sibley (1989), working with office property in Westminster and Camden, 
found weak evidence of tax capitalisation. His data collection was careful and 
complete and was based on market evidence, but the model he employed 
was flawed. Sibley did not include any tests for statistical significance in his 
data analysis and he was also hampered by the recurring problem of a short 
time horizon (because of the way he specified his model).
This thesis takes Sibley’s work in these two boroughs further, using his data 
for the pilot study and collecting further data that confirm in statistically 
significant terms that the tax is indeed capitalised in the circumstances that 
prevailed in the years leading up to 1988. Sibley’s data covered the period 
1983-85 and they were used in the pilot study (see 8.3) to triangulate the 
results of this work against market data.
The pilot study adopted the same methodology that was used for the primary 
cross-sectional analysis and this was augmented by a regression analysis 
that took account of the longitudinal nature of Sibley’s data. The results of the 
pilot study, when compared to Sibley’s own findings, illustrate the importance 
of both the research design and model specification to the successful 
analysis of tax impacts.
Comparison of results between the pilot study and the main analysis gives a 
further insight into how evidence of tax shifting becomes increasingly 
apparent over the longer time frame.
The results presented here for the outcome variable of rent in 1988 are 
strongest for office property and industrial property and weakest for retail
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property. The strength of the results for office property is perhaps the least 
expected on theoretical grounds. There are several possible explanations for 
the strength of these results. It could simply be that the pairs for office 
property are better matched or that supply conditions differ in this market.
The use of prime office property in Westminster/Camden could account for 
the difference. Although there is little empirical evidence to suggest that 
prime properties perform any differently from secondary properties per se, it 
is possible that secondary properties tend to be older and, due to 
depreciation (caused by obsolescence), they might experience slower rates 
of rental growth (see Baum 1991 at p. 60; or Fraser 1993 at p. 138).
Another possible explanation could be the quality of information that is 
utilised by occupiers in the prime office market. There is considerable 
evidence that occupiers of prime quality property normally rely on 
professional advice (see for example DOE 1995a). It is suggested that the 
superior advice available or sought by office occupiers may lead to more 
informed decision making, which could result in quicker adjustment. As early 
as 1983, market reports by one London agent identified high rates as an 
important component in total occupation costs for offices (Debenham 
Tewson & Chinnocks 1983).
The weaker results for retail property are understandable. Out of the types of 
business property considered here, the theory of rent as a surplus predicts 
the closest relationship for shops (the theory will be most valid for 100% 
prime pitches) but the nature of shop data gives rise to difficulties of analysis. 
This is primarily caused by the complications of micro-location within a 
shopping area (see Crosby and Keogh’s 1990 study). The difficulty of 
accurately matching retail properties together could well have influenced the 
results because of the difficulties for the matching process of fully allowing for 
the nuances of micro-location in the shopping area. Whilst recognising this 
complexity, it is assumed that the pairings did adequately account for the 
principal aspects of retail location but there is simply more statistical noise in 
the data.
A further factor that may explain the relative weakness of the findings for 
retail property compared to the other two property types is that the tax rate
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divergence emerged later in Barnet/Brent than in Enfield/Haringey and 
Westminster/Camden -  this will have meant a shorter time scale for 
adjustment of rental values for retail property (see 5.7).
The difference in the significance of the results between office and industrial 
property is probably not statistically different (just over 0.5%). What is 
important is that this discussion of the disparity between results for the 
outcome variable of rent in 1988 be considered in conjunction with the results 
for total occupation costs in 1988, which for all three property types were 
found to be equalised.
A subsidiary finding of this research suggests that letting markets, at least in 
the areas studied, are efficient: indeed, equalisation of total costs requires 
the operation of the letting market to be efficient. This would perhaps be 
expected for the prime office property in Westminster/Camden, which is a 
key national UK office market and the availability of information has already 
been discussed above. Wheaton et al. (1997) discuss the process of search 
by tenants for space in the context of the central London office market. They 
relate it to a ‘modern theory of search’ in which market prices are the result of 
matching and bargaining between buyer and seller (Wheaton 1990). Others 
have tried to apply to property markets the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
from the world of finance (see for example Brown 1991 pp. 62-138; Brown 
and Matysiak 2000 pp. 431-462; or Wang 2000). For property this would be 
the weak version of the EMH, but the results presented here cannot be 
convincingly extended in support of this specialised theory. The chief 
conclusion from the present study on market efficiency is to confirm the 
theoretical insights of Evans (1995) who put forward the idea that property 
markets offer ‘efficiency over time’. This work suggests that, in the long term, 
the discounted average annual expectation of future tax liabilities is reflected 
in the tenant’s rental bid and to this extent the results do tend to confirm the 
long-run efficiency of the UK business property letting market.
In the context of market efficiency, it was possible that the changes 
introduced in 1990 would act to confound the research effort, especially if the 
market accurately reflected all available knowledge. This concern fails to take 
account of the delays in the operation of the property market and the
236
Chapter 9
important policy decision to have an antecedent valuation date two years 
earlier than the date of the new rating list. Furthermore, the changes 
introduced by the new legislation were announced and implemented at 
comparatively short notice. Many believed that the consultation period was 
inadequate (Guy 1989) and some of the legislation was not in place even as 
late as January 1990 (DOE 1990). This meant that future expectations 
arising from this change were not reflected in the values used for the cross- 
sectional study, and the telephone survey of occupiers discussed in 6.3 
confirmed that occupiers had little knowledge of the new system in 
November 1989, less than six months before it was introduced.
9.4 OF POLITICS AND POLICY
This positive economic study of tax impacts has purposely made little 
consideration of political and policy issues. It has been shown in this thesis 
that the UK property tax is not economically neutral, but property taxes 
remain relatively neutral compared to most other taxes, as witnessed by the 
popularity of the single-tax movement promoted by Henry George (1879). 
From the perspective of tax efficiency and equity, the government has 
addressed most of the criticisms that were levelled against business rates 
before the 1990 reforms and the UK property tax now better meets the equity 
criterion of fairness, in that owners of property in similar circumstances are 
treated equally.
Given that tax rates are uniform and that the tax is capitalised, it might be 
argued that the incidence of the tax is really neutral. This argument would be 
wrong: the tax capitalisation effects may, ceteris paribus, impact on all 
properties equally, but the tax burden still falls on property owners, 
introducing a potential distortion into the economy and allowing the burden to 
be shifted from tenants to property owners. It should be noted that the 
equalisation of the capitalisation effect will only arise after sufficient time has 
elapsed for the uniform tax to be reflected in rents. It also requires regular 
revaluations to be undertaken to ensure that ongoing inequalities do not arise 
through changes in the underlying tax base.
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Tax capitalisation has an impact on holders of the affected asset at the time 
the capitalisation takes place. For property assets in the context of the UK 
property tax, this group of losers will be made up of many people because of 
the lengthy time scale for tax effects to have an impact. When the tax rate 
differentials existed, property owners in high rate areas were penalised but, 
following the introduction of uniform tax rates, these property owners will 
have benefited from improved property values. The tax-attributable 
differences in property values that existed before 1990 were expected to 
adjust away, as indicated by the reversal of rental growth rates between 
boroughs since that time (see 8.8.3). The gainers would be purchasers of 
property in a high rate area in 1990: they could expect to benefit over the 
following years from the introduction of Uniform Business Rates. A closely 
related point is that the (short-term) burden of business rates on occupiers 
will have no impact on tenants who take occupation after the rents have 
adjusted.
Now that business rates are uniform, the differential tax rates are clearly no 
longer of importance, but this does not mean that tax impacts are 
unimportant, because increases in tax rates are still expected to be 
transferred to property owners over time.
A more important problem is perhaps the need to keep the tax base up-to- 
date. The five-yearly pattern of revaluations that has been maintained since 
1990 does help to address the repeated criticism of the irregular and delayed 
revaluations suffered by taxpayers under the old system. However, even with 
regular revaluations, there can still be considerable differences in rental 
growth between regions and these will be reflected at the revaluation, 
resulting in an ongoing process of capital value adjustments as local and 
regional property market trends are reflected in the periodic revaluations of 
the tax base. See IOD (1995 at p. 28) for a discussion of regional differences 
that occurred between the 1990 Revaluation and the 1995 Revaluation. The 
differences have been so marked in some cases that a three-yearly 
revaluation period has been recommended (RICS 1996 at p. 12) to prevent 
structural changes in property markets from distorting the even distribution of 
the tax impact. This problem will affect both the taxpayer in the short term 
and the property owner in the longer term.
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It has been government policy to provide transitional relief (phasing of 
increases and decreases in tax burden) to occupiers for all revaluations 
since the Uniform Business Rate was implemented in 1990. Transitional 
relief is likely to even out the worst effects of periodic revaluations of the tax 
base, but it is only available to occupiers who meet certain pre-set criteria. 
Given that the short-term impact of changes in the tax burden have been 
shown to fall on the occupier, this means that the benefits of transitional relief 
are likely to be relatively well targeted, accruing to occupiers in the short term 
(Bond et al. 1996a at p. 30).
Two consequences follow from the transitional relief scheme as it is presently 
organised. First, the tax principle of certainty is compromised because of the 
complexity of the transitional relief scheme. The UK property tax has the 
advantage of simplicity and transparency, but this is eroded by elaborate 
transitional arrangements. A second more serious criticism is that the current 
transitional relief scheme compromises the principle of equity between 
taxpayers. The transitional relief scheme is designed to be self-funding over 
the life of each rating revaluation, with both increases and decreases in tax 
liability being phased (see A1.4). The consequence of this is that those 
taxpayers who would be entitled to a reduction in their tax liability (as a result 
of a tax base revaluation) are required to pay in excess of their correct tax 
payment, in order to fund the reduction for those who would otherwise have 
been faced with an increase. If it is government policy that increases should 
be phased in following a revaluation, these should be funded centrally to 
remove this inequality from the present system.
Today, business rates are a national tax collected by local authorities on 
behalf of central government. No answers are given about the effect this has 
on local democracy: it is another part of the ongoing centralisation of the past 
50 years and Britain is now ‘one of the most centralised democracies in the 
world’ (Travers 2002). The benefits to business from local authority services 
are increasingly uniform as the trend of centralisation and central control has 
continued. Output measures, championed by the government since 1997, 
promote increased uniformity of local government services and this is likely
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to further smooth any differential benefit effects between local authority 
areas.
A relatively minor criticism of the administration of the Uniform Business Rate 
is that tax demands sent to occupiers by local government do not make it 
plain that the tax is paid to central government and it is thought that many 
taxpayers do not appreciate that the role of the local authority is merely that 
of tax collector (RICS 1998 at para. 4.3).
One interesting and important finding from this study is that in the UK -  or 
more strictly London -  the evidence is consistent with there being no benefits 
specific to the local authority that are generated by property tax differences. 
This is probably a reflection of the institutional setting, where the focus of 
local authority policy has typically been on the residential sector of the local 
population and this problem has been exacerbated by the Uniform Business 
Rate. From the perspective of business input to local democracy, the position 
has rarely been worse: not only are local authorities funded from the centre 
but many of their actions are undertaken as agents for the centre. There is a 
lack of incentive for local authorities to encourage business development.
The main impact is to eliminate the incentives for local authorities to grant 
planning permission or encourage local economic development because 
development now has no direct impact on local revenues.
Up until 1969, local business could vote in local elections and local business 
people could stand as local councillors. The Rates Act 1984 provided for 
consultation with business representatives when setting the rates, but this 
was abolished in the 1990 reforms. A recent Green Paper, Modernising Local 
Government Finance, suggested a possible role for business involvement in 
local decision making (DETR 1998), but these ideas have been criticised by 
the business lobby (see for example RICS 1998 at para. 4.4).
The 1998 Green Paper also suggested the reintroduction of limited local 
control over the level of the rates, but this was rejected by business, and 
research by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Emmerson and Hall 1998 at p.
30) found that this proposal is likely to have the ‘opposite effect’ of restoring 
local accountability.
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The most recent proposals in the development of local government finance 
are embodied in the Local Government Bill 2002/03 that was presented to 
the House of Lords in March 2003. These proposals are not considered in 
this thesis.
9.5 FUTURE RESEARCH
The results of this study indicate that future research on UK property tax 
impacts should generally take a long-term view; the short-term position is 
well established from the aggregate level studies and those short-term 
studies of the tax impact on property values have typically failed to provide 
the expected results.
This study has found evidence that is consistent with the tax being fully 
capitalised into rents but it is only an assumption that this rent reduction will 
be transmitted directly to a reduction in capital values. No account was taken 
of changes to investors’ required yields (if any) that might result from the tax. 
This possibility was considered in 2.9 and, in view of the results of this 
present study, this is one area for future research. Much will depend on how 
efficiently the property investment market operates. Given the lengthy time 
period for tax adjustments to manifest themselves, investment yields may be 
expected to rise in the shorter term, to compensate purchasers for future falls 
that are expected to occur as a result of the tax. This is a complex issue, 
influenced by the gradual effect of tax shifting on the rent and the difficulty of 
anticipating how future trends in the local property market will affect the tax 
base. It would require a dynamic model of tax impacts (discussed later in this 
section) and data availability will be crucial in the success of any such 
research.
A related point concerns freehold owner occupiers. Baum and Crosby (1995 
at p. 15) observe that ‘a distinction may be made between property owned for 
occupation (although there may be a simultaneous investment service 
performed by that property) and property owned for investment perse’. This 
particular group of occupiers is worthy of further discussion. The capital 
value of a business property is a reflection of the expected future income 
flows from that property. This capitalisation of income applies as much to
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owner occupied property as it does to properties that are held as pure 
investments, and the same model of valuation is adopted. The market rental 
value of a property is the same regardless of the nature of the ownership 
interest (although the yield may perhaps differ for an owner occupied 
property) and the impact of the property tax in lowering rental values will 
affect the capital values of owner occupied property in just the same way as 
it affects freeholds that are held as an investment. On the other hand, it could 
be argued that the position of an owner occupier relative to a leasehold 
occupier puts the leaseholder at an advantage (through being able to shift 
the tax onto the owner). The way in which the property tax introduces 
distortions between pure investors, freehold owner occupiers and leasehold 
occupiers is another topic that could benefit from further research.
The shifting effect itself is dependent on a series of complex factors that vary 
between locations, including the value of differential tax benefits where they 
exist and the relative elasticities of supply and demand in each local property 
market. The results of this thesis are grounded in theory and they are 
indicative of the general case. Whilst it is possible to draw the conclusion that 
business rates are likely to be capitalised into property values, given 
sufficient time for the impact to work through to rents, it is not expected that 
this would be the same for all property types in every location at any time. 
Further research on the long-term impact of the UK property tax in other 
geographical areas would make a worthy extension to the analysis and 
would help to confirm the general applicability of the findings reported in this 
thesis.
This study presented results for both prime and secondary property, and the 
findings suggest that tax capitalisation takes place for both types of property. 
It is possible that rental growth rates for prime property are faster, due to 
more frequent refurbishment and correspondingly slower depreciation (of the 
buildings) and the results for prime office property discussed above perhaps 
suggest as much. It would be of great interest to carry out research to further 
illuminate the tax impacts between different classes of prime investment 
property.
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The matched pairs approach limited the size of the data-set employed in the 
primary analysis, which did not permit a detailed evaluation of differences in 
capitalisation according to property-specific characteristics. With a larger 
data-set it would be possible to investigate the extent to which individual 
property characteristics might influence the extent of tax capitalisation. Such 
an analysis could take account of the impact of physical size, the effect of 
property value, as well as whether age, physical characteristics and planning 
class result in differences in the capitalisation effect.
The design and methodology adopted is considered to be reproducible and, 
given adequate resources, this would permit a wider study of property tax 
impacts. It would also allow the question of differing impacts in different 
regions to be investigated. As a part of any such work, it would be fruitful to 
explore the tax capitalisation effect for properties in locations with supply 
elasticities that differ from the London area, where supply is relatively 
inelastic. This is affected by the basic availability of land, as well as by the 
impact of planning policies. The way in which national and local planning 
policies impact on the speed and magnitude of tax capitalisation is another 
issue worth exploring.
Any research that sought to quantify the factors that affect the magnitude of 
the capitalisation effect would be of considerable interest and this could 
perhaps also take account of changes to investment yields arising from the 
tax (if any) discussed above. A long-term study using a dynamic model is 
perhaps the next logical development in this field. This could be used to 
explain the influence of different factors, using control variables and it may be 
possible to predict the magnitude of the tax impact in different circumstances. 
Development of an econometric model to take account of short-, medium- 
and long-term effects could also be considered and this might allow the 
speed of capitalisation to be identified or predicted. The latest developments 
in rent models (e.g. Hendershott et al. 2002) take no account of taxes in their 
analysis: the only dynamic model of tax capitalisation developed for business 
property in the UK was developed by Bond et al. (1996a). This model was 
based on short time series data and it failed to make any meaningful 
predictions. A hedonic approach is suggested as being most likely to give 
results but hedonic methodology has not been successfully applied to
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business property in the UK and any such research would also have to 
overcome some intricate methodological difficulties. The chief obstacle to 
any such research would be the availability of suitable data.
In this study careful attention was given to any offsetting benefits received by 
taxpayers from local authority services. Previous research (Bennett and 
Krebs 1988) has found that benefit offsets do not occur for business in Britain 
and in this thesis it was assumed that, for the most part, benefits were equal 
between the local authority areas under study, and that any unequal benefits 
that did exist between local authorities were overwhelmed by the scale of the 
rate differentials that form the backdrop to this study. Whilst the benefit offset 
is not thought to be a major concern in the UK, at least in the context of taxes 
on business property, it remains an area for future research, especially under 
current conditions (of uniform tax rates), where attention could be paid both 
to benefit offsets of the tax in general and to differential benefits between 
local authority areas.
Another finding of general significance for future researchers in this field is 
that attention to the data is of prime importance. This has been a recurrent 
theme in this thesis and the importance is borne out by the careful approach 
to micro-level data collection and the corresponding results in this thesis, 
which for the first time show the long-term impact of the UK business 
property tax.
9.6 CONCLUSIONS
The results presented in this thesis add to the overall understanding of 
property tax capitalisation and the ways in which rents and therefore capital 
values adjust. This thesis provides strong support for the underlying 
hypothesis that, over time, property tax burdens are fully capitalised (in the 
absence of offsetting differentials in locally financed public services or public 
goods).
In even broader terms it has significant implications for the efficiency of 
property letting markets: it suggests they are closer to being efficient markets 
than some commentators or market operators have suggested, not in the 
sense of stock market efficiency proposed by Fama (1970), but more in the
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way suspected by Evans (1995): a long-term efficiency that suggests rational 
decisions by market operators.
This research suggests that the UK property tax will be capitalised into 
business property values in the long term. The findings are applicable to 
properties in London and can perhaps be applied to similar property types in 
any of the major British conurbations. The extent of tax capitalisation will 
depend on the precise market conditions that apply and to the value of local 
benefits that might in principle be generated in return for the tax payment. 
Whilst this may result in significant variation in the short- to medium-term 
impacts of the property tax, in the long term it is suggested that rents will 
adjust to reflect the amount of the tax.
A corpus of work in the 1980s found that short-term tax impacts were on the 
firm and owners of capital, being borne in the form of reduced profits to 
shareholders. The results of this thesis complement that research by 
identifying the longer-term impacts of the tax as being shifted backwards 
again, onto owners of other capital in the form of property.
A small group of UK studies has attempted to identify the property impacts of 
business rates. This present work contributes to that body of research, 
adopting a long-term time frame that is appropriate to the problem, and 
obtaining answers where others have not found results. A tightly controlled 
methodology was applied to a rigorous and simple cross-sectional design: 
the results obtained are the reward for the care taken in data collection, 
problem definition and research design.
The findings in this thesis provide strong support for the underlying economic 
theory of rental value determination. It is apparent that rent is a residual, 
represented by the surplus left after allowing for all other costs, including 
owners’ profit. They also confirm the predictions of neoclassical economic 
theory on the impact of a tax such as business rates: namely that the tax will 
be capitalised.
This research thus supports the predictions of theory and also confirms the 
widely held anecdotal view amongst property professionals about the impact
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of the UK property tax. The fact that the tax is no longer levied at a 
differential rate is no reason to assume that the impact of the tax is no longer 
of importance, but these historic circumstances were used as an analytical 
device to provide empirical answers for the first time to the question of UK 
property tax incidence, originally posed by Alfred Marshall in 1890.
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APPENDIX 1 
BUSINESS RATES: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
247
Appendix 1
A1.1 INTRODUCTION
This appendix outlines the legal framework of UK property tax, providing an 
outline of how the rating system is implemented. Some of the more technical 
aspects of rating valuation are considered in Appendix 2.
After a brief history of rating in the UK, this appendix considers the operation 
of the system before 1990 and summarises the changes following the major 
reforms of 1990, which introduced Uniform Business Rates in England and 
Wales. No specific consideration is given to Scotland, where the Uniform 
Business Rate was introduced in 1995, or to Northern Ireland, where it has 
yet to be introduced.
For a comprehensive description of the structure of local government finance 
under the pre-1990 system see Hepworth (1984), or for technical coverage 
of rating valuation see Bean and Lockwood’s Rating and Valuation Practice 
(Bassett et al. 1987).
The 1990 system is governed by the Local Government Finance Act 1988 
and this is fully covered in Ryde on Rating and the Council Tax, the standard 
text on rating (Ryde and Roots 1990) and more concisely by Askham (1995).
A1.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The emergence of rating as a form of local government finance dates back 
over 700 years, but the Poor Relief Act of 1601 marks the foundation of the 
modern national rating system. This Act provided for a local tax to be levied 
in every parish in the country at regular intervals. The list of those liable was 
comprehensive, including ‘every inhabitant, parson, vicar, and ... every other 
occupier of land ... in the parish’.
The Act of 1601 did not set out the basis of assessment and for some time 
rates were assessed on both immovable and movable property, such as 
stock-in-trade. This absence of a statutory assessment basis was finally
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addressed by The Parochial Assessment Act 1836, which, for the first time, 
set out a definite basis of assessment. It provided that rates were only valid if 
they were assessed on an estimate of the Net Annual Value of the property 
rated. Net Annual Value meant:
the rent at which the property might reasonably be expected to be let 
from year to year, free from all usual tenant’s rates and taxes, if any, 
and deducting therefrom the probable average annual cost of the 
repairs, insurance and other expenses, if any, necessary to maintain 
[it] in a state to command such rent.
Rating of movable property stopped soon afterwards with the Poor Rate 
Exemption Act of 1840, since when rates in the UK have applied only to 
immovable property.
This early legislation established the most distinctive features of the rating 
system as it applied until the major reforms of 1990, namely that it was a 
local tax on occupiers based on the rental value of the property.
A1.3 THE RATING SYSTEM BEFORE 1990
Until 1990 the property tax was called the General Rate in England and 
Wales and it was governed by The General Rate Act 1967, as amended by 
the Local Government Act 1972 and supported by a large body of case law.
It is not intended to go into any depth in considering the administration of the 
tax here, but basic principles are set out in so far as they affect the subject 
matter of this thesis. This section is based on Principles & Practice of Rating 
Valuation (Emeny and Wilks 1984), which provides wide-ranging coverage of 
the Rating System before 1990.
A1.3.1 TAX BASE
The rateable value of a property was the basis against which the rates 
payable were calculated and the rateable value of all properties was set out 
in the valuation list (General Rate Act 1967 Part V).
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Each property in a rating area had a rateable value that was equal to its net 
annual value (General Rate Act 1967 s. 19). Properties were either 
assessed to gross annual value or to net annual value for rating purposes. 
Gross annual value assumed that the landlord was responsible for repair, 
maintenance and insurance; a statutory deduction was applied to arrive at 
the net annual value. The net annual value is assessed by reference to the 
annual rental value of the property under a hypothetical tenancy, which is 
examined in more detail in A2.4.
The Rating & Valuation Act 1925 provided for a new valuation list to be 
prepared every five years, a process referred to as the quinquennial 
revaluation. This process was not accorded a high importance and new 
valuation lists came into force in 1933-4,1956, 1963 and 1973. The 
infrequency of valuations caused criticism of the rating system (discussed at 
5.3) and gave rise to inequities due to changing property values not being 
reflected adequately in the tax base (Cunnane and Walker 1989).
Since February 1950, the preparation of each valuation list in England and 
Wales was in the hands of a valuation officer, who is an official of the Inland 
Revenue, and is known as the District Valuer. The role of maintaining rating 
lists is today handled by the Valuation Office Agency which is an executive 
agency of the Inland Revenue (since September 1991). The whole of 
England and Wales is divided into Districts with a District Valuer in charge of 
each and a Chief Valuer in overall charge of the Valuation Office.
Given the long periods that passed between rating revaluations, there were 
many cases where the valuation list needed to be altered between 
revaluations. There were special provisions in the legislation to ensure that 
the value entered in the list following an alteration reflected the general level 
of values that applied when the list was made. This is referred to as the tone 
of the list (General Rate Act 1967 s. 20, as amended).
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In addition, the valuation officer had the power to require a ‘return’ from the 
property owner, occupier or lessee, containing information about the rent or 
any other particulars that might be required by the valuation officer to assess 
the rateable value for an entry in the valuation list (General Rate Act 1967 s. 
82). Rent return forms were sent to most occupiers in preparation for the 
1990 Revaluation.
A1.3.2 TAX RATE
Up to April 1990, the tax rate was determined by the local rating authority 
(General Rate Act 1967 Part I) and the principle that the rating authority was 
responsible for setting the tax rate went back to the Poor Relief Act of 1601.
The annual tax rate was expressed in pence per pound of rateable value 
which was known as the rate poundage, e.g. 70p or 130p (in the £). This 
represented the tax rate that was levied against ratepayers, based on the 
rateable value of the property they occupied as shown in the valuation list.
If the rate poundage is 70 pence in the pound and the rateable 
value of a property is £5,000, then the rates (tax) payable will be 
£3,500 for the year.
In setting the tax rate the rating authority decided on the total revenue to be 
raised in the year, having regard to its planned expenditures. The amount of 
the rate poundage was found by dividing the sum to be raised by the 
aggregate rateable value for the area. The same system applied to both 
domestic and non-domestic rates and it was common for there to be a higher 
tax rate for non-domestic rates.
If the local authority wishes to raise £12 million and the total rateable 
value of all properties in its area is £24 million then a rate of 50 pence 
in the pound would be levied.
A1.3.3 RATEABLE OCCUPATION
The tax was payable by a rateable occupier and strictly speaking it was the 
occupier who was rated, not the land; the occupier was taxed in respect of
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the land he occupied (General Rate Act 1967 Part III and supporting case 
law). There is no need to examine here the intricacies of what constitutes 
rateable occupation.
For many years empty premises were not rated, although they still benefited 
from local services, such as police and fire service. The Local Government 
Act 1966 introduced a power to allow local authorities the discretion to 
charge an unoccupied rate, which many local authorities implemented as a 
reduced charge on empty buildings. This was bolstered by a mandatory 
rating surcharge on unoccupied business property, introduced in the Local 
Government Act 1974 as a stepped penalty surcharge designed to 
discourage property developers, especially in central London, from leaving 
buildings unlet.
A1.3.4 RATING AUTHORITIES
Inside Greater London, the rating authorities were the 32 London boroughs 
plus the City of London and a few anomalous authorities such as the Inner 
and Middle Temple. These arrangements for London were in place from 
1965. Outside London, the rating authorities were the metropolitan and non­
metropolitan district councils, although the competent rating authority in any 
particular area may have changed over time with successive local 
government reorganisations.
The income from rates must be spent on the provision of local services but 
only local authorities defined as rating authorities had the right to set and 
collect rates, and this generally meant district councils outside London.
County councils (and some other public bodies) also provided local services, 
but they had no power to set or collect rates. They obtained their local 
funding by issuing a ‘precept’ on the local authority (General Rate Act 1967 
Part II). This was known as the county precept and the rating authority then 
had to increase the general rate by the amount of the precept. In London, 
precepting powers were held by the GLC until it was abolished, when they 
passed to the London Residuary Body. The extant regional authority in
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London levied its precept on all London boroughs. Additional precepts were 
levied by the Metropolitan Police and also on the 13 inner London boroughs 
by the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA). In 1990 the ILEA was 
abolished and responsibility for education passed back to the local 
authorities concerned.
Other precepts that were commonly charged with the local authority rates 
included water and sewerage charges, before privatisation of the water 
industry in September 1989.
Rating Authorities were able to levy a supplementary rate at any time, 
depending on the needs of their area, or if required to meet any precept.
A1.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AFTER 1990
The Local Government Finance Act (1988) introduced the most 
comprehensive change to local taxation in England and Wales for over 70 
years, but in many particulars the system outlined above remained intact and 
much of the case law that had built up over the years remained valid.
There were three main changes to the rating system outlined above, with 
effect from April 1990.
1. The first revaluation in England and Wales for 17 years. The last 
revaluation was in 1973.
The new system provided for a valuation date two years earlier than 
the date of the rating list itself. The 1990 Rating List, which came into 
force in April 1990, is based rental value in April 1988. The valuation 
date is considered in A2.5.
2. The introduction of the Uniform Business Rate to replace individual 
rate poundages set by local rating authorities. There are now separate 
Uniform Business Rate multipliers in place for England, Wales and 
Scotland.
Rate capping and other powers taken by central government in the 
1980s had introduced some controls on local government tax rates
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but, for the first time, the tax rate itself was to be set by central 
government. The Uniform Business Rate was still to be collected by 
local authorities but it was then gathered into a national pool and 
redistributed back to local authorities in proportion to their population.
3. Abolition of domestic rates and the introduction of the Community 
Charge in their place. This was introduced in Scotland one year 
earlier.
The community charge was a poll tax, payable by all adults, at a level 
set by the local authority and having no element of property value as 
its basis. This tax was quickly abandoned and it was replaced in April 
1993 with the present system of a Council Tax, which is chiefly a 
property tax based on the capital value of domestic property but which 
includes a personal element.
The impact of the new system on taxpayers was recognised as likely to 
cause some redistributional effects, exacerbated by the long period that had 
elapsed since the 1973 Valuation List. To counter the worst effects of this 
problem, the government introduced a system of transitional relief, designed 
to postpone some of the largest increases in tax liability by phasing the 
introduction of the new system. Increases in tax liability were phased over 
five years and reductions in tax liability were also phased, so that the 
transitional relief system was designed to be self-financing.
In addition to the major changes listed above, the new system was a chance 
to introduce other changes and improvements to the day-to-day operation of 
the rating system.
Under the Local Government Finance Act 1988, the definition of rateable 
value was redefined. The distinction between gross annual value and net 
annual value was removed and rateable value was adopted as the rating 
definition for all classes of business property. The definition of rateable value 
in the 1988 legislation is key to this thesis, because the rental proxy for April 
1988 is based on the rateable value that is so defined. The statutory 
definition of rateable value and the hypothetical tenancy that follows is 
examined in Appendix 2 where the pre-1990 definition is also compared: the 
1973 rental proxy is dependent on the earlier definition.
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The term ‘valuation list’ was replaced by the term ‘rating list’, and a central 
rating list was introduced. Under s. 52 of the 1988 Act there are some 
properties that get entered into a central rating list. This includes the rateable 
values of properties that span the country, typically railways, and other types 
of former statutory undertakings (Plimmer 1998 at p. 123).
Collection of rates under the new system was still by local authorities but 
they now took the role of billing authorities (not rating authorities).
A number of other changes took place to the detailed operation of the 
system, including amendments to a number of established rating terms, such 
as ‘tone of the list’ and use of the term ‘composite’ instead of ‘mixed’ for 
premises that include both business and residential property, e.g. a shop 
with a flat above (Askham and Mackmin 1995 at p. 6).
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A2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this appendix there is a discussion of the difference between rental value 
set in the market place and a rental valuation prepared by a valuer. This is 
relevant because the availability of transaction data from the market place is 
scarce and this study relies on a rental proxy that is based on a valuation 
opinion of market rental value. Open market transactions are not always 
comparable and consideration is given to the difficulties of analysing this 
evidence for use in rental valuations.
Finally, the terms of the hypothetical tenancy used in rating valuation are 
reviewed and the date of valuation is considered. This discussion 
complements the overview of the UK rating system that is set out in 
Appendix 1.
A2.2 RENTAL VALUE VERSUS PRICE
Rent in the property market is the price paid for the occupation of a property. 
This price is set in the letting market by the forces of demand and supply, 
and the economic determination of rental value was examined in Chapter 2.
Compared with price, a rental valuation represents an opinion by a valuer of 
the price (rent) at which a property might let and any such opinion is based 
on a series of assumptions, as well as an analysis of comparable evidence 
from similar transactions that have taken place.
Today there are published definitions of rental value available, the latest 
being set out in the RICS Appraisal and Valuation Standards (2003): these 
are technical definitions designed to meet specific needs of asset valuations 
for use by pension funds, company balance sheets, banks and the like. 
These definitions do not need to be considered further here.
The essential question within this current work is whether rental valuations 
can act as a good proxy for prices. The whole question of valuations versus
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transaction evidence is a much debated topic in the valuation literature and 
Dunse et al. (1998) comment that ‘there is now an extensive literature on the 
accuracy of valuations’.
One such debate took place in the mid 1980s when Hager and Lord (1985) 
published a high-profile paper criticising the valuation profession. In a reply 
to this criticism, Brown (1985) considered ‘valuations versus prices’ and he 
presented strong evidence that market valuations can be a good proxy for 
prices. This is discussed further in Brown (1991 pp. 241-245). Whilst Brown 
was considering capital values, this necessarily included rental values and 
there is no reason to suppose that his findings would not hold true for rental 
valuations.
A comparison of market rents with the rental value proxy used in this thesis 
is set out in 7.2.2.
A2.3 ANALYSIS OF COMPARABLES
Crosby and Murdoch (2000) analyse the influence of procedure on rent 
determination and they conclude that the best comparable evidence is from 
transactions that took place in the open market.
There are a number of issues that make the analysis of open market lettings 
complicated and this in turn means that the use of comparable evidence 
when making a valuation can be difficult (even though it is essential). The 
chief difficulty is that each lease contract will be different, making the 
standardisation of market lettings problematic.
In the first place it is necessary to have a full breakdown of the lease terms 
and this must cover the rent review pattern, the basis of rent review, the 
permitted users under the lease, the repairing covenants, details of any 
option for the tenant to break the lease, details of any premium paid, details 
of any rent free period and any other relevant information that would have 
influenced the tenant when making a rental bid. It is not always possible to 
get such a detailed breakdown of the lease terms, either due to lack of
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knowledge of market transactions or, in some cases, through confidentiality 
agreements between landlord and tenant.
The use of rateable values as a rental value proxy removes from this work 
the difficulty of analysing comparables: the problem falls to the local 
valuation office, who must make the necessary adjustments to get rents onto 
a comparable basis for use in the valuation or rating list. Rating valuers refer 
to this process of analysis as ‘devaluation’.
A2.4 HYPOTHETICAL TENANCY
In Chapter 7 the matching criteria that were used to match properties into 
pairs from a physical and locational perspective were described. This 
matching exercise would be meaningless if the legal aspects were not also 
carefully matched. Crosby (1985b at p. 19) commented on this in the 
following terms The property with identical locational and physical 
characteristics is not enough. The lease structure must also be identical.’
In this thesis, the difficulty of getting sufficient comparable transaction data 
was considered to be too great and that is why the rental proxy was 
adopted. It has the advantage of allowing a standard set of assumptions to 
be made about lease terms, thereby solving the problem of legal 
comparability. This is achieved by the use of a hypothetical tenancy, which, 
in the case of the rental proxy adopted here, is a well-established principle 
from rating law and practice.
This approach has established precedents. Baum (1989 at p. 79) uses a 
‘panel of three surveyors familiar with the study area ... to produce a 
consensus view of the current rental value’ and this valuation opinion is 
based on a hypothetical tenancy that Baum adopts to standardise the data 
for letting market anomalies that would arise from real market data.
Rateable values represent a rental valuation at a given date and they are 
carried out on the following statutory assumptions:
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The rateable value of a non-domestic hereditament shall be taken to 
be an amount equal to the rent at which it is estimated the 
hereditament might reasonably be expected to let from year to year if 
the tenant undertook to pay all usual tenant’s rates and taxes and to 
bear the cost of the repairs and insurance and other expenses (if any) 
necessary to maintain the hereditament in a state to command that 
rent (Local Government Finance Act 1988 Schedule 6 (2)).
This definition was used to set rateable values in the 1990 Rating List, which 
are used as the proxy for the outcome variable of rent in 1988.
Rateable values from the 1973 Valuation List were used as the proxy for 
1973 rental value and the definition of rateable value above is almost the 
same as the definition used in the 1973 Valuation List under the General 
Rate Act 1967 (s. 19) where it was called net annual value.
Under the 1988 legislation, all properties are valued to rateable value, which 
means that the outcome variable of rental value in 1988 is estimated on the 
assumption of a full repairing and insuring lease, whereas in previous 
legislation properties could be valued either to gross annual value or to net 
annual value. Gross annual value assumes that the landlord is responsible 
for repairs and insurance and there is a statutory deduction to arrive at the 
rateable value. When dealing with the 1973 rental values, the net annual 
value from the 1973 Valuation List is used.
This 1988 definition of rateable value was amended by the Rating 
(Valuation) Act 1999 but it remained substantially the same and no account 
was taken of this recent amendment when making the analysis of rental 
growth in 8.8.
The statutory definition of the term rateable value has given rise to a 
hypothetical tenancy, which also implies a hypothetical landlord and 
hypothetical tenant. While these terms are not defined in the legislation, they 
have been the subject of considerable litigation over a period of 140 years 
that has defined their precise meaning (Ryde and Roots 1990 at p. 162).
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Hereditament in rating is an archaic term, simply meaning the ‘property that 
may become liable to a rate’ being that part of the property that would be 
shown separately in the valuation list (General Rate Act 1967 s. 115). It is 
worth mentioning that, whilst there is a range of assumptions about the 
hypothetical tenancy, the hereditament is not hypothetical. It is to be valued 
as it stands with all of its advantages and disadvantages. This supports the 
use of matching criteria based on the physical characteristics of the property.
The rent to be estimated is such rent as might reasonably be expected for 
the hereditament if ‘let from year to year’, but this is not to suggest that it is 
let on a yearly tenancy. This is taken to mean a letting with a ‘reasonable 
prospect of continuance’ (Bond and Brown 2002 at p. 70) and it has been 
settled in the courts that, for business premises, this is akin to a tenancy 
under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part II.
It is important to note that the rent being assessed is an annual rent and the 
hereditament is assumed to be vacant and to let (Emeny and Wilks 1984 at 
p. 146).
The hypothetical tenant is ‘assumed to inspect the hereditament at the date 
of valuation and having made reasonable enquiries as to the property, 
locality etc., to make a rental bid at that time’ (Plimmer 1998 at p. 68).
The tenant is assumed to be responsible for repairs and the hereditament is 
also assumed to be in a reasonable state of repair at the commencement of 
the hypothetical tenancy. According to Bond and Brown (2002 at p. 74) this 
standard of repair is taken to mean ‘the general state of repair of a particular 
class of property in a particular locality’.
The statutory definition refers to ‘tenant’s rates and taxes’. In the past there 
may have been others, but business rates will now ‘be the most significant 
and normally the only tax’ falling within this phrase (Ryde and Roots 1990 at 
p. 184). The tenant’s responsibility for the payment of business rates within 
the valuation definition is in line with the theory of rent as a residual, which 
was explained in 2.6. Perhaps more importantly, this provision has the effect
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of making rateable value equivalent to a rent exclusive of rates, which is 
necessary for the purpose of the rental proxy in this thesis.
The assumption of hypothetical parties to the tenancy means that the actual 
occupier must be disregarded, for example, if the building is owner occupied, 
but it should be noted that physical use of the hereditament (in actual or 
planning terms) must be taken into account (Bassett et al. 1987). Any part of 
a hereditament that is used for a ‘wholly different purpose and ... is capable 
of separate occupation ... will form a separate hereditament’ (Bond and 
Brown 2002).
Special problems arise under the 1990 system when it comes to composite 
hereditaments, which are defined as ‘composite if part... consists of 
domestic property’ (Local Government Finance Act 1988 s. 64(9)). This is 
particularly common in relation to shops with residential accommodation 
above and composite hereditaments were excluded from the matched pairs 
used for the empirical work in this thesis.
For this particular study there is a further class of hereditament that was 
encountered more frequently than normal and that is the cross-boundary 
property. Prior to 1990, each local authority levied its own rate, at a rate 
poundage of its own choosing and, if a hereditament straddled the boundary 
of a rating area, it was treated as two or more hereditaments. With the 
introduction of the Uniform Business Rate it was decided that these artificial 
hereditaments could be abolished (see Bond and Brown 2002 at p. 28). The 
Non Domestic Rating (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 1989 provided 
that cross-boundary properties should be treated as one hereditament and 
as being situated in the area of only one billing authority for the duration of 
the rating list. This change in treatment to cross-boundary properties during 
the time frame of the empirical study meant that they were excluded from the 
matching process.
This set of assumptions relating to the hypothetical tenancy can be 
considered as equivalent to a letting of a property in the open market on a 
modern lease. It follows that the rateable value can be viewed as a good
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proxy for rental value (see also 7.2) and the proxy should therefore allow the 
impact of rate burden to be examined and explained.
A2.5 VALUATION DATES
The date that the 1973 Valuation List came into effect and the date of 
valuation for that list was the same. Preparation of a new valuation or rating 
list takes place in advance of the date that the list comes into effect. The 
Valuation Office had to anticipate rental values in advance of the 1973 
Valuation List, and in a time of changing market circumstances, this was 
difficult.
For the 1990 Revaluation and for subsequent revaluations, the date of 
valuation is set at an antecedent date, giving time for the collection and 
analysis of evidence prior to the introduction of the list. For the 1990 Rating 
List, the antecedent date was April 1988, for the 1995 List it was April 1993 
and for the 2000 List it was April 1998.
The antecedent valuation date is the date that is used for setting the level of 
values, or the ‘tone of the list’. However, the hereditaments to be valued 
must be valued as they were at the date of the list itself. For the 1990 Rating 
List, this means that the property is valued as it stood at April 1990 but 
according the level of values in April 1988.
This idea of valuing the property as it stands is a cornerstone of rating 
practice, represented by the maxim rebus sic stantibus. The hereditament is 
to be valued as it actually stands, subject to the hypothetical tenancy. This 
includes the actual use of the hereditament, as well as the ‘mode or 
category’ of occupation, which means that a ‘shop is valued as a shop, but 
not a specific type of shop’ (Askham and Mackmin 1995 at p. 22).
For the properties used in the main analysis, it was important to match as far 
as possible the extent of the hereditament entered in the rating list with the 
physical premises during the field survey. For office and industrial property 
this was not straightforward: it was not always possible to ascertain the
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precise extent of the rateable hereditament, in which case the property was 
excluded from the matching process.
It was also necessary to have information about the state of repair, the user 
and any alterations since the date of the rating list, especially if this resulted 
in a change of floor areas. This information needed to be taken into account 
when matching properties together and to ensure comparability between the 
rental proxies in 1973 and in 1988. In practice this meant that properties that 
were altered substantially between April 1990 and the date of field survey 
were excluded.
The values taken from the valuation list were not constantly updated, to 
reflect the current state of rating appeals. The values were taken from the 
valuation or rating list as it stood on the date when the list was consulted and 
they were not subsequently reviewed. Some of the entries may have been 
altered at that time, and others could have been in the process of alteration. 
This applies to rateable values from all four lists consulted for this thesis (the 
1973 Valuation List and the 1990, 1995, and 2000 Rating Lists).
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A3.1 GEARING EFFECT OF COST INCREASES
This appendix illustrates the gearing effect of increased costs, showing the 
volatility of the residual as costs change. Tenants’ target profits are included 
in the figure for costs and the residual shown here is representing the rent 
available to the landlord.
Table A3.1 shows the impact on the residual rent in the circumstances of 
rising incomes matched by a similar rise in costs. Table A3.2 shows the 
impact on the rent in the circumstances of costs rising faster than incomes.
Table A3.1: Gearing Effect for Equal Rates of Increase
Income and Costs each rise by 20%
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Income £100,000 £120,000 £144,000 £172,800
Costs £80,000 £96,000 £115,200 £138,240
Residual (Rent) £20,000 £24,000 £28,800 £34,560
Residual Growth Rate - 20% 20% 20%
Table A3.1 assumes that both revenue and costs increase each year by 
20%. In this situation rental growth takes place at the same annual rate.
Table A3.2: Gearing Effect for Differing Rates of Increase
Income rises by 20% and Costs rise by 22.5%
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Income £100,000 £120,000 £144,000 £172,800
Costs £80,000 £98,000 £120,050 £147,061
Residual (Rent) £20,000 £22,000 £23,950 £25,739
Residual Growth Rate - 10% 8.86% 7.47%
In Table A3.2, income growth is maintained each year at 20%, but costs 
increase at a slightly higher annual rate of 22.5%. This results in a marked 
fall in the rate of rental growth each year, although rent does still increase.
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A4.1 INTRODUCTION
The studies set out in this appendix cover residential property in both the UK 
and North America. They are classified in accordance with the principles set 
out in 4.3.
Four studies (Orr 1968; Heinberg and Oates 1970; Hyman and Pasour 1973; 
Dusansky et al. 1981) differ markedly from the rest in that they deal with 
residential rents in the US and these are not considered here.
A4.2 AGGREGATE LEVEL RESIDENTIAL STUDIES
These studies have been carried out using the Tiebout-Oates model (see 
4.2.1) and the majority of these studies were made before 1985, when 
modelling methods were still in their infancy.
Aggregate level studies have met with mixed results. Most have tended to 
confirm the hypothesis that the property tax is to some extent capitalised, 
with the majority finding capitalisation rates of between 50% and 100% (see 
for example Oates 1973; Edel and Sclar 1974; Meadows 1976; King 1977; 
Rosen and Fulleton 1977 ; Goodman 1983). Then again, Gronberg (1979), 
in a study of Chicago, finds the opposite to be true and identifies no 
capitalisation effect.
UK literature for residential property during this productive period is notable 
for its absence. Aggregate level studies in the UK at that time were focused 
on the issue of fiscal migration. Aronson (1974), using Leeds and 
Manchester, concentrated on the identification of any household relocation 
that might arise from high differential tax rates. Davies (1982) did the same 
for Greater London, basing his work on the model developed by Aronson.
As more knowledge was gained by researchers, and particularly following 
the definitive analysis by Yinger et al. (1988), the trend has been to adopt 
micro-level data rather than aggregate level data for tax incidence studies.
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Few recent aggregate level studies have been undertaken. In 1991 
Linneman and Voith (1991) employed Annual Housing Survey Data to 
estimate the housing price functions. Based in Philadelphia in 1982, 
Linneman found a mean annual capitalisation rate of 10%.
A less typical approach was adopted by Wassmer (1993) who examines 62 
US cities, using national statistics to test the new view of the property tax. He 
concludes that ‘local property taxes affect local property values in the 
manner predicted by the new view’.
A4.3 MICRO-LEVEL RESIDENTIAL STUDIES
Just like the aggregate level studies, this part of the literature has largely 
been carried out in a Tiebout-Oates framework.
Tax capitalisation is found by most studies in this group, ranging from 30% 
up to full capitalisation (see as examples King 1973; Edelstein 1974;
Hamilton 1979). In two cases over-capitalisation of the tax was found 
(Church 1974; Noto 1976), both of which were studies in California. And 
again some studies find no capitalisation effect, for example Wales and 
Wiens (1974) in Vancouver and Chinloy (1978) whose work is also in 
Canada. This is at least partly explained by the different tax regime in 
Canada where tax credits mitigate the capitalisation effect.
More recent micro-level studies have confirmed the general picture, that the 
property tax is capitalised, with work by Eisenberg (1996) in Syracuse finding 
100% capitalisation and Palmon and Smith (1998b) in Houston finding 62% 
capitalisation. Bartolome and Rosenthal (1999) adopt a different approach, 
attempting to take into account the federal income tax position of home 
owners and finding 40% capitalisation.
In the UK, there are again notably fewer studies. A study by Topham and 
Ward (1992) used hedonic price estimation to identify the degree of tax 
capitalisation for residential property in Manchester. This study used a large 
data-set containing over 5,000 properties and it adopted the ACORN 
classification for residential neighbourhoods (CACI Market Analysis 1988). 
The approach was successful, finding that, for Greater Manchester in 1985-
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6, even a small increase in effective tax rates resulted in a reduction in the 
expected value of residential housing.
Lately there have been studies of the Council Tax impacts in Britain (see for 
example Bancroft 1995), but these are not considered in this review of the 
property tax literature.
A4.4 RESIDENTIAL TAX RATE CHANGE STUDIES
There are six residential tax change studies in the US and the empirical work 
in this thesis falls into this category of study.
Wicks, et al. (1968) and Smith (1970) each study jurisdiction-wide tax base 
revaluations, to see if the resulting changes in tax payments allow the 
capitalisation effects to be studied. Both studies found that capitalisation 
does take place. The Wicks study took data in one county in Montana, which 
had a county-wide reassessment of the tax base in 1965. For the sample 
data, which consisted of property sales subsequent to the November 1965 
tax base revaluation, the following variables were recorded: 1965 taxes,
1964 taxes, the sale value and the assessed value. Smith used a similar set 
of circumstances in San Francisco, where property owners were faced with a 
revaluation in November 1967 and he took his data from ‘a relatively 
homogenous section of San Francisco, after a street by street examination’.
Gabriel (1981) and Rosen (1982) both take California’s famous Proposition 
13, the Jarvis-Gann initiative, as the tax change that allows them to study the 
tax capitalisation effect. Proposition 13, the first of several ‘popular’ revolts 
against tax levels, was a voter-led initiative that resulted in large property tax 
changes. Both studies use individual house prices and both identify tax 
capitalisation. Rosen states:
the results of this study provide the strongest confirmation yet of 
interjurisdictional capitalization described by Oates. Each dollar 
decrease in relative property taxes appears to increase relative 
property values.
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In a comprehensive investigation, Yinger et al. (1988) examine intra- 
jurisdictional tax capitalisation in seven Massachusetts communities. Taking 
data on individual houses that sold twice, once before and once after a court 
mandated tax base revaluation, they find strong evidence of tax 
capitalisation. The study takes account of numerous housing and 
neighbourhood characteristics, and even controls for anticipated tax 
capitalisation on sales that occur after the revaluation is announced, but 
before it has been carried out.
Do and Sirmans (1994), in San Diego, exploit an unusual infrastructure 
financing technique available in California as a result of Proposition 13. 
Known as Mello-Roos Infrastructure Financing, it requires houses in new 
developments to pay for any added infrastructure costs they impose. This 
allowed the authors to estimate the inter-jurisdictional tax capitalisation by 
comparing new houses with those in established neighbouring communities. 
They find that property tax capitalisation is complete over a 25 year time 
horizon, which is the duration of the added infrastructure fee on the new 
houses.
A related strand of the literature concerns impact fees, which are 
increasingly used in the US as an alternative to property taxes. Unlike the 
infrastructure fees investigated by Do and Sirmans, which were charged to 
home owners and amortised over time, impact fees are a capital charge to 
the property developer for the provision of local government infrastructure. 
They are closely related to planning agreements used in the UK by Local 
Planning Authorities (Town & Country Planning Act 1990, s. 106) which are 
discussed by Evans (1999 at p. 1653). An emerging literature in the US 
examines the economic incidence of impact fees -  who actually bears the 
burden of the fees -  a topic that is obviously close to the questions 
examined in this thesis. Impact fees and planning agreements are not 
considered further here, but papers by Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2002) 
and Baden and Coursey (2002) represents the current state of the art.
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A4.5 CONCLUSIONS
With the few notable exceptions (Wales and Wiens 1974; Chinloy 1978; 
Gronberg 1979), all residential studies find statistical evidence of 
capitalisation, in spite of some severe data limitations and numerous 
methodological problems. These problems may explain in part the large 
variation in the extent of property tax capitalisation reported from study to 
study. Palmon and Smith (1998b) observe that ‘the estimates of property tax 
capitalization have not converged to a consensus rate’. This statement 
reveals a fairly common idea in much of the US literature, namely that it is 
possible to identify some universal tax capitalisation rate. This is not seen as 
a realistic or attainable goal given the complex influences that affect the 
process of property tax capitalisation: Trussler (1982) observes (at p. 262) 
that ‘in incidence analysis, the number of factors to be considered is so 
formidable that no single study is ever likely to provide definitive answers to 
empirical questions’.
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Table A5.1: Results of Local Government Elections
London Borough of Enfield
Election Date CON LAB LD OTH TO TA L
02.05.02 39 24 - - 63
07.05.98 23 43 - - 66
05.05.94 25 41 - - 66
03.05.90 34 32 - - 66
08.05.86 38 28 - - 66
06.05.82 47 19 - - 60
04.05.78 41 19 - - 60
04.05.74 30 29 1 - 60
13.05.71 32 28 - - 60
09.05.68 51 9 - - 60
07.05.64 29 31 - - 60
Source: London Borough Council Elections (Minors and Grenham 
1998), Updated with local election results.
Table A5.2: Results of Local Government Elections
London Borough of Haringey
Election Date CON LAB LD OTH TOTAL
02.05.02 - 42 15 - 57
07.05.98 2 54 3 - 59
05.05.94 2 57 - - 59
03.05.90 17 42 - - 59
08.05.86 16 42 1 - 59
06.05.82 22 33 - 4 59
04.05.78 17 42 - - 59
04.05.74 19 40 - 1 60
13.05.71 19 41 - - 60
09.05.68 53 7 - - 60
07.05.64 19 41 - - 60
Source: London Borough Council Elections (Minors and Grenham
1998), Updated with local election results.
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Table A5.3: Results of Local Government Elections
London Borough of Barnet
Election Date CON LAB LD OTH TOTAL
02.05.02 33 24 6 - 63
07.05.98 28 26 6 - 60
05.05.94 29 25 6 - 60
03.05.90 39 18 3 - 60
08.05.86 39 18 3 - 60
06.05.82 48 12 - - 60
04.05.78 49 10 - 1 60
04.05.74 42 17 - 1 60
13.05.71 43 17 - - 60
09.05.68 56 3 1 - 60
07.05.64 37 13 6 - 56
Source: London Borough Council Elections (Minors and Grenham 
1998), Updated with local election results.
Table A5.4: Results of Local Government Elections
London Borough of Brent
Election Date CON LAB LD OTH TO TA L
02.05.02 16 35 9 - 60
07.05.98 19 43 4 - 66
05.05.94 33 28 5 - 66
03.05.90 31 29 6 - 66
08.05.86 20 43 3 - 66
06.05.82 30 33 3 - 66
04.05.78 27 39 - - 66
04.05.74 25 35 - - 60
13.05.71 22 38 - - 60
09.05.68 49 11 - - 60
07.05.64 26 34 - - 60
Source: London Borough Council Elections (Minors and Grenham
1998), Updated with local election results.
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Table A5.5: Results of Local Government Elections
W estm inster C ity Council
Election Date CON LAB LD OTH TOTAL
02.05.02 48 12 - - 60
07.05.98 43 23 - - 66
05.05.94 41 25 - - 66
03.05.90 34 32 - - 66
08.05.86 38 28 - - 66
06.05.82 47 19 - - 66
04.05.78 41 19 - - 60
04.05.74 30 29 1 - 60
13.05.71 32 28 - - 60
09.05.68 51 9 - - 60
07.05.64 29 31 - - 60
Source: London Borough Council Elections (Minors and Grenham
1998), Updated with local election results.
Table A5.6: Results of Local Government Elections
London Borough of Cam den
Election Date CON LAB LD OTH TO TA L
02.05.02 11 35 8 - 54
07.05.98 10 43 6 - 59
05.05.94 7 47 5 - 59
03.05.90 15 42 2 - 59
08.05.86 13 44 2 - 59
06.05.82 26 33 - - 59
04.05.78 26 33 - - 59
04.05.74 12 48 - - 60
13.05.71 11 49 - - 60
09.05.68 42 18 - - 60
07.05.64 26 34 - - 60
Source: London Borough Council Elections (Minors and Grenham
1998), Updated with local election results.
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A6.1 INTRODUCTION
The telephone survey was designed following advice contained in Survey 
Research Practice (Hoinville and Jowell 1978) and it was based on the 
experience of Rogers (1976).
The co-operation of a local firm of chartered surveyors was obtained for this 
survey. The firm maintains a list of applicants registered as seeking a 
business property. At 1 st November 1989 there were 743 applicants looking 
for industrial premises. Of these, 592 were companies already in business, 
the remainder being start up businesses or individuals. The firm is based in 
the London Borough of Enfield and the applicants were looking for premises 
predominantly in the London Boroughs of Enfield and Haringey.
A sample of 60 companies (10%) was surveyed during the first week of 
November 1989. The prospective occupiers were sorted in alphabetical order 
and every thirtieth name was extracted from the database. Most of the 
companies were seeking to hold the premises under an occupational lease 
and some would consider either freehold or leasehold. Both of these 
categories of company were included in the selection, but any business 
seeking only freehold ownership was excluded. A firm was selected if it was 
a single branch business looking to relocate. Multi-branch businesses were 
excluded but, beyond that, no attempt was made to control for comparability 
between businesses and no regard was paid to the business sector of the 
firm.
The target for this survey was to achieve 30 responses, which represents 5% 
of the total population. The survey was stopped once this response level was 
reached.
A6.2 SURVEY QUESTION ANALYSIS
The Questionnaire used is included at the end of this appendix. The analysis 
of questions below is restricted to the substantive questions that help to give 
an understanding of prospective occupiers’ attitudes.
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A6.2.1 RATES AS A BUSINESS COST
Q2. What annual costs do you take into account when considering a 
property?
The question was asked without prompting for possible answers. No 
attempt was made to rank costs in order of importance.
Rent 86.7%
Rates 70.0%
Finance Costs 16.7%
Service Charge 10.0%
Other 6.7%
Energy 0.0%
Items mentioned under the heading of other costs tended to relate to 
maintenance costs and repair costs. Those people who did not 
mention rates turned out to prefer freehold owner occupation to rental.
It can be seen that rates are second in importance only to rental costs.
Q3. At what point in a purchase do you check the rateable value and 
rate burden for a property you are considering?
Respondents were only permitted to choose one answer.
Pre-Inspection 30.0%
Pre-Offer 33.3%
Pre-Exchange 20.0%
Post-Exchange 16.7%
Total 100.0%
Only following exchange of contracts is the occupier committed to that 
property. Up to that point it is possible to withdraw (or renegotiate 
terms).
Only 16.7% of occupiers enter into a binding commitment to take 
premises without full knowledge of the rates. It is suggested that even 
these occupiers will in fact have prior notice of the rate liability (through
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their solicitors). Perhaps they only take notice of rate liability if it is 
especially large: it is possible that, for these businesses, premises are 
not a large proportion of their overheads. No consideration has been 
given to industry class in this survey.
Q4a. Are there any local authority areas where you would avoid 
taking a property?
The question was asked without prompting for possible answers but, 
by this stage of the survey, rate burden would have been uppermost in 
the mind of the respondent.
Haringey 53.3%
Waltham Forest 6.7% 
Enfield 6.7%
Hackney 3.3%
Camden 3.3%
Barnet 0.0%
Brent 0.0%
Haringey is cited by 53% as being an area that would be avoided. 
Interestingly, Enfield is also cited by some respondents.
Q4b. What are the reasons you would avoid those local authority 
areas?
Most respondents gave high rates as the reason but, as explained 
above, rate burden would have been the issue in the respondents’ 
mind when answering this question.
The reasons given for avoiding an area were not restricted to rate 
burden. Other factors that influenced the choice of boroughs to avoid 
were political aversion to Labour and, in one case, Conservative local 
authorities. Planning policies were also stated as a reason in both 
Haringey and Enfield.
High Rates 63.3%
Politics of Borough 16.6%
Planning Policies 10.0%
Other 3.3%
No reason given 6.7%
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Outlying boroughs were mentioned only a few times. This can be 
explained in that applicants registered on this mailing list are generally 
looking in Enfield or Haringey.
Q5a. Are there any local authority areas where you would prefer to 
be located?
The question was asked without prompting for possible answers.
Enfield 58.4%
Barnet 13.4%
Waltham Forest 0.0% 
Hackney 0.0%
Camden 0.0%
Haringey 0.0%
Brent 0.0%
Enfield is stated by 58.4% as being an area that would be preferred 
and this is mainly because the rates are lower. This of course reflects 
a direct opposite of the tendency to avoid Haringey, answered by the 
respondents in Q4.
Q5b. What are the reasons you would prefer those local authority 
areas?
No respondent preferred to locate in a high rate area and none 
considered the possibility of better local services in one area over 
another. The chief explanation of a preference to be in Enfield and to a 
lesser extent Barnet is that the rates are lower (see Figure 5.5).
A6.2.2 UNIFORM BUSINESS RATE
Q6. Are you aware of the new system of business rates from 
next year [1990]?
Yes 57%
No 43%
Obviously a small majority of respondents were aware of changes in 
the system. Even so, 43% is a large number with no awareness of 
changes in hand within the next six months.
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Q7. How familiar would you say you are with the way the new system 
works?
This question was asked to those who responded Yes to question 5.
Very familiar 18.0%
Some idea 12.0%
No real knowledge 70.0%
Total 100.0%
Clearly the majority had ‘no real knowledge’ of the way the new 
system works. Aggregating the ‘Very familiar’ and the ‘Some idea’ 
respondents together and grouping those who responded ‘No’ to 
question five with those who had no real knowledge, we get the 
following information for the total sample.
Knowledgeable 16.7%
No real knowledge 83.3%
A surprising proportion had no knowledge of the new system. The 
importance of this is that the ‘efficient market’ hypothesis will not 
invalidate the research. In an efficient market, rational occupiers will 
adjust their rental bids to reflect all knowledge that is available. This 
would result in increased bids for high rate areas in the knowledge that 
the high rate burden will soon be removed.
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Figure A6.1
TELEPHONE SURVEY FORM
TELEPHONE SURVEY
M  )
Nigel Mehdi 
Nov 1989
Time DateCall N°
Company Name
Contact Tel N‘
You are registered with us looking for a commercial property. I am undertaking some research into business 
location decisions.
1. Can I take a couple of minutes of your time? Yes No
2. What are the annual costs that you take into account when considering a property? (respondent not to be prompted)
Rent Rates Energy Service Chg Finance Other
Others
If Rates not mentioned discontinue the Interview, go to 8 below.
' -------  . . . . . . . . . . .  ,
3. You mentioned rates as an important cost for your business. At what point do you check the rateable value and
rate burden for a property you are considering?
Pre Inspection Pre Offer Pre Exchange Post Exchange
4a Are there any LA areas where you would avoid taking a property? (respondent not to be prompted)
>
Enf Barnt Hgy Hckny WalF Cam Brent
4b. What are the reasons you would avoid these areas.
5a Are there any LA areas where you would prefer to be located? (respondent not to be prompted)
Enf Barnt Hgy Hckny WalF Cam Brent
5b. What are the reasons you would prefer these areas.
6. Are you aware of the new system of business rates from next year? Yes No
7. How familiar would you say you were with the way the new system works?
'
Very Familiar Some Idea No Real Knowledge
8. Thank you for your time. Would you be prepared to take part in a similar survey in the future?
Entered
Figure A6.1: Form Used For Telephone Survey
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The data-sets used in the primary analysis are set out in this appendix. 
These data-sets and the data collection process are described more 
fully in 7.5.
Table A7.1 gives an explanation of the abbreviated column headings 
used for the key variables that are listed. Not every data-set has all 
columns present.
Table A7.1: Variable Descriptions used in Data-set Listings
Abbreviation Description
Comment
PRN Property Reference Number
A unique identifier for each property: allocated at the point of data 
entry it is not consecutive across the final data used in the analysis.
YEAR Year in which the outcome variable of rent is observed.
LOC Dummy variable used to handle the local authority area in 
the analysis.
RENT73 Rental value per m2 in 1973.
RENT88 Outcome variable of rent per m2 in 1988.
RATES88 Rate burden per m2 in 1988.
TOTOC88 Total occupation costs (rent + rates) per m2 in 1988.
RENT8X Outcome variable of rent per m2 in year from YEAR column.
RATES8x Rate burden per m2 in year from YEAR column.
TOTOC8X Total occupation costs (rent + rates) per m2 in year from 
YEAR column.
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Table A7.2: Industrial Data-set A1
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
007-ENI 1988 1 5.01 25.74 9.30 35.04
018-ENI 1988 1 6.04 27.19 11.21 38.40
042-ENI 1988 1 6.09 30.26 11.30 41.56
063-ENI 1988 1 5.20 26.35 9.65 36.00
070-ENI 1988 1 3.21 21.67 5.95 27.62
144-ENI 1988 1 5.82 39.19 10.80 49.99
151-ENI 1988 1 7.23 43.91 13.42 57.33
184-ENI 1988 1 8.10 59.21 15.03 74.24
185-ENI 1988 1 10.97 63.60 20.34 83.94
189-ENI 1988 1 8.77 60.31 16.27 76.58
197-ENI 1988 1 7.83 57.89 14.51 72.40
205-ENI 1988 1 5.30 26.18 9.82 36.00
219-ENI 1988 1 7.23 41.55 13.42 54.97
231-ENI 1988 1 6.60 29.65 12.25 41.90
253-ENI 1988 1 8.52 53.57 15.80 69.37
263-ENI 1988 1 6.86 51.08 12.73 63.81
276-ENI 1988 1 7.49 41.24 13.90 55.14
298-ENI 1988 1 6.77 40.24 12.56 52.80
303-ENI 1988 1 6.70 42.98 12.43 55.41
304-ENI 1988 1 5.68 35.92 10.54 46.46
325-ENI 1988 1 6.52 31.14 12.10 43.24
353-ENI 1988 1 5.84 31.74 10.84 42.58
378-ENI 1988 1 6.09 40.95 11.30 52.25
387-ENI 1988 1 8.84 58.17 16.41 74.58
390-ENI 1988 1 7.01 60.44 13.01 73.45
398-ENI 1988 1 8.05 53.99 14.93 68.92
445-ENI 1988 1 8.24 59.34 15.29 74.63
458-ENI 1988 1 6.99 43.52 12.96 56.48
460-ENI 1988 1 3.47 19.15 6.44 25.59
Table continued...
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Table continuation...
Table A7.2: Industrial Data-set A1
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
466-ENI 1988 1 9.94 45.60 18.43 64.03
541 -ENI 1988 1 7.86 54.88 14.58 69.46
647-ENI 1988 1 6.53 36.00 12.12 48.12
704-ENI 1988 1 8.89 62.50 16.50 79.00
726-ENI 1988 1 7.63 43.22 14.15 57.37
854-ENI 1988 1 6.90 42.24 12.79 55.03
025-HAI 1988 2 6.34 24.88 17.09 41.97
049-HAI 1988 2 4.87 33.56 13.12 46.68
058-HAI 1988 2 5.58 23.18 15.05 38.23
157-HAI 1988 2 5.95 32.14 16.05 48.19
169-HAI 1988 2 6.07 35.77 16.36 52.13
180-HAI 1988 2 6.90 43.32 18.61 61.93
212-HAI 1988 2 9.17 55.91 24.71 80.62
225-HAI 1988 2 7.58 39.39 20.43 59.82
241 -HAI 1988 2 5.78 32.84 15.58 48.42
244-HAI 1988 2 7.24 45.68 19.51 65.19
255-HAI 1988 2 5.29 29.36 14.25 43.61
268-HAI 1988 2 6.69 37.17 18.03 55.20
291-HAI 1988 2 7.26 42.80 19.56 62.36
295-HAI 1988 2 7.59 40.49 20.47 60.96
308-HAI 1988 2 8.32 47.07 22.43 69.50
313-HAI 1988 2 8.26 55.06 22.27 77.33
337-HAI 1988 2 6.46 40.29 17.41 57.70
341-HAI 1988 2 7.25 38.94 19.54 58.48
350-HA I 1988 2 7.46 47.30 20.11 67.41
364-HAI 1988 2 5.68 32.61 15.32 47.93
376-HAI 1988 2 7.26 41.98 19.58 61.56
385-HAI 1988 2 4.98 26.46 13.43 39.89
Table continued...
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Table continuation...
Table A7.2: Industrial Data-set A1
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
392-HAI 1988 2 6.27 38.01 16.90 54.91
424-HAI 1988 2 4.43 42.82 11.94 54.76
429-HAI 1988 2 8.47 38.41 22.83 61.24
431-HAI 1988 2 6.61 35.10 17.81 52.91
447-HAI 1988 2 6.21 33.69 16.74 50.43
448-HAI 1988 2 7.68 42.60 20.71 63.31
461-HAI 1988 2 6.28 34.80 16.92 51.72
469-HAI 1988 2 8.44 42.18 22.76 64.94
502-HA I 1988 2 6.16 37.43 16.61 54.04
549-HAI 1988 2 6.38 34.85 17.20 52.05
656-HAI 1988 2 5.50 31.20 14.82 46.02
873-HAI 1988 2 8.19 34.92 22.07 56.99
933-HAI 1988 2 8.13 52.50 21.91 74.41
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Table A7.3: Retail Data-set C1
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
346-BAR 1988 3 15.33 97.15 28.35 125.49
382-BAR 1988 3 13.62 108.25 25.19 133.45
473-BAR 1988 3 13.76 110.01 25.45 135.45
485-BAR 1988 3 19.10 141.17 35.32 176.49
493-BAR 1988 3 20.14 155.49 37.23 192.72
496-BAR 1988 3 13.09 105.39 24.20 129.58
516-BAR 1988 3 20.44 115.42 37.80 153.22
554-BAR 1988 3 18.60 118.10 34.39 152.49
560-BAR 1988 3 19.72 121.90 36.46 158.35
569-BAR 1988 3 14.67 117.66 27.13 144.80
573-BAR 1988 3 11.27 86.21 20.85 107.06
586-BAR 1988 3 16.01 93.89 29.60 123.50
605-BAR 1988 3 17.25 148.10 31.89 179.99
614-BAR 1988 3 22.98 124.16 42.49 166.65
617-BAR 1988 3 12.90 100.46 23.85 124.31
633-BAR 1988 3 18.08 134.44 33.42 167.86
651-BAR 1988 3 13.19 167.28 24.39 191.67
655-BAR 1988 3 16.85 137.66 31.15 168.81
679-BAR 1988 3 20.90 143.60 38.65 182.25
711-BAR 1988 3 21.43 151.69 39.62 191.31
715-BAR 1988 3 20.76 156.32 38.38 194.70
374-BRR 1988 4 14.06 97.48 30.00 127.48
383-BRR 1988 4 18.00 124.66 38.41 163.08
523-BRR 1988 4 21.52 117.72 45.93 163.65
525-BRR 1988 4 16.02 108.16 34.18 142.34
578-BRR 1988 4 15.96 109.43 34.06 143.50
591-BRR 1988 4 15.56 104.95 33.21 138.16
594-BRR 1988 4 17.56 109.09 37.48 146.57
602-BRR 1988 4 16.20 109.38 34.57 143.95
Table continued...
289
Appendix 7
Table continuation...
Table A7.3: Retail Data-set C1
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
620-BRR 1988 4 16.35 110.89 34.89 145.78
649-BRR 1988 4 15.75 106.93 33.62 140.55
666-BRR 1988 4 19.66 138.00 41.95 179.95
677-BRR 1988 4 18.29 122.86 39.03 161.89
683-BRR 1988 4 17.99 109.73 38.39 148.12
695-BRR 1988 4 17.44 107.58 37.21 144.79
698-BRR 1988 4 19.83 121.05 42.32 163.37
707-BRR 1988 4 20.96 127.62 44.73 172.35
731-BRR 1988 4 19.30 111.20 41.18 152.38
763-BRR 1988 4 16.29 99.74 34.77 134.50
788-BRR 1988 4 20.90 133.01 44.60 177.61
816-BRR 1988 4 13.62 120.85 29.07 149.92
935-BRR 1988 4 22.42 122.33 47.83 170.16
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Table A7.4: Office Data-set E1
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
743-WEO 1988 5 21.27 245.61 34.65 280.26
749-WEO 1988 5 43.38 297.09 70.67 367.76
755-WEO 1988 5 54.63 351.34 88.99 440.33
756-WEO 1988 5 42.62 287.18 69.43 356.61
760-WEO 1988 5 31.99 263.33 52.11 315.44
774-WEO 1988 5 33.60 290.12 54.73 344.85
807-WEO 1988 5 28.54 234.00 46.49 280.49
828-WEO 1988 5 33.15 220.70 54.00 274.70
833-WEO 1988 5 36.49 289.60 59.44 349.04
844-WEO 1988 5 31.44 215.28 51.22 266.50
869-WEO 1988 5 32.29 362.48 52.60 415.08
871-WEO 1988 5 51.76 285.43 84.32 369.75
872-WEO 1988 5 23.42 375.00 38.15 413.15
886-WEO 1988 5 43.60 283.71 71.02 354.73
891-WEO 1988 5 34.58 375.57 56.33 431.90
909-WEO 1988 5 22.17 237.94 36.11 274.05
916-WEO 1988 5 36.17 331.26 58.92 390.18
929-WEO 1988 5 22.83 275.72 37.19 312.91
941-WEO 1988 5 36.12 336.23 58.84 395.07
945-WEO 1988 5 31.17 264.79 50.78 315.57
946-WEO 1988 5 41.49 365.43 67.59 433.02
746-CAO 1988 6 10.24 203.13 23.73 226.86
753-CAO 1988 6 10.19 226.02 23.61 249.63
765-CAO 1988 6 31.30 242.65 72.52 315.17
775-CAO 1988 6 42.81 351.24 99.19 450.43
778-CAO 1988 6 53.86 237.68 124.79 362.47
780-CAO 1988 6 39.63 251.05 91.82 342.87
797-CAO 1988 6 31.01 259.35 71.85 331.20
802-CAO 1988 6 53.23 340.48 123.33 463.81
Table continued...
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Table continuation...
Table A7.4: Office Data-set E1
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
811-CAO 1988 6 53.07 229.03 122.96 351.99
817-CAO 1988 6 72.52 325.27 168.03 493.30
824-CAO 1988 6 26.73 243.77 61.93 305.70
826-CAO 1988 6 14.34 243.06 33.23 276.29
834-CAO 1988 6 24.59 291.67 56.98 348.65
842-CAO 1988 6 51.36 245.82 119.00 364.82
852-CAO 1988 6 27.24 281.33 63.12 344.45
855-CAO 1988 6 22.27 232.06 51.60 283.66
860-CAO 1988 6 29.29 243.92 67.86 311.78
911-CAO 1988 6 65.09 288.77 150.81 439.58
924-CAO 1988 6 42.45 273.25 98.36 371.61
939-CAO 1988 6 30.84 261.17 71.46 332.63
947-CAO 1988 6 33.96 285.14 78.69 363.83
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Table A7.5: Sibley’s Office Data-set
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT8x RATES8X TOTOC8X
074-WEO 1983 5 21.12 141.33 32.72 174.05
075-WEO 1983 5 43.06 145.31 66.63 211.94
076-WEO 1983 5 44.05 141.11 68.24 209.36
077-WEO 1983 5 54.56 134.98 84.50 219.48
078-WEO 1983 5 58.88 125.40 91.17 216.57
079-WEO 1983 5 42.83 123.78 66.31 190.09
080-WEO 1983 5 55.63 127.12 86.11 213.23
081-WEO 1984 5 42.40 129.17 66.31 195.47
082-WEO 1984 5 44.91 108.93 70.29 179.22
083-WEO 1984 5 31.93 151.88 49.94 201.82
084-WEO 1984 5 33.92 129.17 53.07 182.23
085-WEO 1984 5 28.83 130.78 45.10 175.88
086-WEO 1984 5 33.41 148.54 52.31 200.85
087-WEO 1984 5 36.18 129.17 56.62 185.79
088-WEO 1984 5 31.69 106.13 49.62 155.75
089-WEO 1984 5 29.37 85.36 45.96 131.32
090-WEO 1985 5 32.57 210.00 53.39 263.39
091-WEO 1985 5 51.21 136.06 84.07 220.12
092-WEO 1985 5 19.71 132.07 32.29 164.36
093-WEO 1985 5 23.98 138.85 39.40 178.25
094-WEO 1985 5 40.31 181.69 70.72 252.41
095-WEO 1985 5 46.28 172.22 75.99 248.22
096-WEO 1985 5 43.73 156.08 71.80 227.87
097-WEO 1985 5 34.08 161.46 55.97 217.43
098-WEO 1985 5 37.18 122.71 61.03 183.74
099-WEO 1985 5 21.92 177.07 35.95 213.02
100-WEO 1985 5 36.88 108.50 60.49 168.99
101-WEO 1985 5 27.00 161.46 44.35 205.81
Table continued...
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Table continuation...
Table A7.5: Sibley’s Office Data-set
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT8x RATES8X TOTOC8x
102-WEO 1985 5 22.62 171.90 37.57 209.47
103-WEO 1985 5 36.01 122.71 80.84 203.55
104-WEO 1985 5 24.65 141.65 40.47 182.13
105-WEO 1985 5 31.29 161.46 51.34 212.80
106-WEO 1985 5 41.60 170.93 68.24 239.17
107-CAO 1983 6 72.71 136.81 150.48 287.29
108-CAO 1983 6 31.04 121.74 64.26 186.00
109-CAO 1983 6 49.42 129.17 102.26 231.42
110-CAO 1983 6 10.51 158.55 21.74 180.30
111-CAO 1983 6 31.04 125.83 64.26 190.09
112-CAO 1983 6 64.77 141.87 134.01 275.88
113-CAO 1983 6 53.70 107.64 111.08 218.72
114-CAO 1984 6 30.18 135.63 66.74 202.36
115-CAO 1984 6 14.07 86.11 31.11 117.22
116-CAO 1984 6 27.18 146.82 60.17 206.99
117-CAO 1984 6 79.56 174.59 175.99 350.58
118-CAO 1984 6 29.69 128.41 65.66 194.07
119-CAO 1984 6 33.56 161.46 74.27 235.73
120-CAO 1984 6 53.98 127.34 119.37 246.71
121-CAO 1984 6 24.25 138.85 53.60 192.46
122-CAO 1984 6 41.11 104.95 90.96 195.90
123-CAO 1985 6 34.58 99.46 78.68 178.14
124-CAO 1985 6 46.75 165.76 106.78 272.54
125-CAO 1985 6 30.18 140.36 68.67 209.04
126-CAO 1985 6 31.58 140.15 71.80 211.94
127-CAO 1985 6 42.34 154.89 96.34 251.23
128-CAO 1985 6 10.95 88.37 24.86 113.24
129-CAO 1985 6 22.06 149.08 50.27 199.35
Table continued...
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Table A7.5: Sibley’s Office Data-set
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT8x RATES8X TOTOC8X
130-CAO 1985 6 42.29 119.05 96.23 215.28
131-CAO 1985 6 39.50 127.77 89.88 217.65
132-CAO 1985 6 42.80 127.44 97.41 224.86
133-CAO 1985 6 53.98 108.72 122.82 231.53
134-CAO 1985 6 31.31 139.93 71.26 211.19
135-CAO 1985 6 26.85 120.34 61.14 181.48
136-CAO 1985 6 38.06 113.02 86.65 199.67
137-CAO 1985 6 51.47 150.69 117.11 267.81
138-CAO 1985 6 33.12 147.68 75.35 223.03
139-CAO 1985 6 33.11 143.16 75.35 218.51
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Table A7.6: Industrial Data-set A2
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
004-ENI 1988 1 4.96 34.74 9.20 43.94
012-ENI 1988 1 6.01 35.51 11.15 46.66
014-ENI 1988 1 6.69 36.74 12.41 49.15
021-ENI 1988 1 7.92 37.51 14.69 52.20
022-ENI 1988 1 3.41 22.50 6.33 28.83
028-ENI 1988 1 6.11 34.40 11.33 45.73
033-ENI 1988 1 6.85 34.00 12.71 46.71
039-ENI 1988 1 6.73 34.54 12.48 47.02
045-ENI 1988 1 6.09 40.94 11.30 52.24
048-ENI 1988 1 4.77 31.20 8.85 40.05
052-ENI 1988 1 6.87 37.75 12.74 50.49
061-ENI 1988 1 7.77 36.58 14.41 50.99
066-ENI 1988 1 8.38 41.10 15.54 56.64
067-ENI 1988 1 9.67 46.50 17.94 64.44
073-ENI 1988 1 4.83 34.00 8.96 42.96
140-ENI 1988 1 5.27 33.21 9.78 42.99
142-ENI 1988 1 5.45 32.28 10.11 42.39
150-ENI 1988 1 10.18 45.80 18.88 64.68
154-ENI 1988 1 7.52 37.12 13.95 51.07
162-ENI 1988 1 7.51 35.77 13.93 49.70
164-ENI 1988 1 7.61 29.13 14.12 43.25
167-ENI 1988 1 5.16 36.99 9.57 46.56
171-ENI 1988 1 5.49 30.81 10.18 40.99
176-ENI 1988 1 6.24 36.22 11.58 47.80
177-ENI 1988 1 6.00 35.47 11.13 46.60
186-ENI 1988 1 6.81 45.21 12.63 57.84
188-ENI 1988 1 5.81 38.49 10.78 49.27
191-ENI 1988 1 5.04 39.51 9.35 48.86
193-ENI 1988 1 4.66 36.00 8.64 44.64
Table continued...
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Table A7.6: Industrial Data-set A2
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
199-ENI 1988 1 9.73 42.78 18.05 60.83
202-ENI 1988 1 4.66 36.63 8.64 45.27
206-ENI 1988 1 7.97 41.40 14.78 56.18
208-ENI 1988 1 7.41 39.74 13.75 53.49
209-ENI 1988 1 8.01 44.63 14.86 59.49
210-ENI 1988 1 7.91 46.74 14.67 61.41
211-ENI 1988 1 7.66 35.98 14.21 50.19
218-ENI 1988 1 5.22 32.58 9.68 42.26
221-ENI 1988 1 5.77 33.29 10.70 43.99
227-ENI 1988 1 7.48 36.51 13.88 50.39
230-ENI 1988 1 7.34 38.25 13.62 51.87
235-ENI 1988 1 4.51 31.48 8.37 39.85
236-ENI 1988 1 6.91 37.76 12.82 50.58
246-ENI 1988 1 8.49 45.75 15.75 61.50
250-ENI 1988 1 7.35 39.44 13.63 53.07
251-ENI 1988 1 6.58 34.45 12.21 46.66
259-ENI 1988 1 8.31 39.38 15.42 54.80
262-ENI 1988 1 5.11 36.21 9.48 45.69
273-ENI 1988 1 6.76 38.63 12.54 51.17
286-ENI 1988 1 5.91 34.28 10.96 45.24
292-ENI 1988 1 5.89 32.10 10.93 43.03
296-ENI 1988 1 8.21 36.80 15.23 52.03
318-ENI 1988 1 8.42 38.60 15.62 54.22
322-ENI 1988 1 7.23 39.49 13.41 52.90
686-ENI 1988 1 6.63 30.21 12.30 42.51
821-ENI 1988 1 5.52 36.45 10.24 46.69
835-ENI 1988 1 7.55 38.90 14.01 52.91
847-ENI 1988 1 8.21 43.63 15.23 58.86
Table continued...
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Table A7.6: Industrial Data-set A2
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
056-HGI 1988 2 8.34 32.89 22.48 55.37
173-HGI 1988 2 6.33 36.85 17.06 53.91
182-HGI 1988 2 7.72 36.04 20.81 56.85
198-HGI 1988 2 6.20 33.11 16.71 49.82
238-HGI 1988 2 8.35 41.23 22.50 63.73
242-HGI 1988 2 8.39 37.31 22.61 59.92
243-HGI 1988 2 6.68 32.67 18.00 50.67
271-HGI 1988 2 6.65 34.54 17.92 52.46
280-HGI 1988 2 8.08 37.14 21.78 58.92
284-HGI 1988 2 8.13 39.64 21.91 61.55
293-HGI 1988 2 4.34 25.00 11.70 36.70
310-HGI 1988 2 8.57 37.52 23.10 60.62
316-HGI 1988 2 6.31 36.51 17.01 53.52
321-HGI 1988 2 8.16 33.82 21.99 55.81
327-HGI 1988 2 6.22 36.27 16.76 53.03
328-HGI 1988 2 7.09 29.44 19.11 48.55
331-HGI 1988 2 5.50 35.78 14.82 50.60
332-HGI 1988 2 7.19 47.25 19.38 66.63
349-HGI 1988 2 6.48 33.45 17.46 50.91
357-HGI 1988 2 6.26 34.36 16.87 51.23
360-HGI 1988 2 6.25 36.15 16.84 52.99
361-HGI 1988 2 4.81 26.65 12.96 39.61
368-HGI 1988 2 7.95 35.77 21.43 57.20
372-HGI 1988 2 6.39 41.54 17.22 58.76
381-HGI 1988 2 7.21 34.10 19.43 53.53
397-HGI 1988 2 5.40 30.59 14.55 45.14
402-HGI 1988 2 8.49 36.22 22.88 59.10
408-HGI 1988 2 5.93 33.03 15.98 49.01
Table continued...
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Table A7.6: Industrial Data-set A2
See Table A7.1 for an explanation of the headings.
PRN YEAR LOC RENT73 RENT88 RATES88 TOTOC88
410-HGI 1988 2 7.13 36.32 19.22 55.54
411-HGI 1988 2 4.49 28.43 12.10 40.53
415-HGI 1988 2 7.64 34.67 20.59 55.26
420-HGI 1988 2 6.59 35.84 17.76 53.60
422-HGI 1988 2 6.41 35.14 17.27 52.41
423-HGI 1988 2 8.15 44.35 21.96 66.31
425-HGI 1988 2 8.51 29.58 22.93 52.51
434-HGI 1988 2 6.21 38.30 16.74 55.04
439-HGI 1988 2 7.26 34.52 19.57 54.09
444-HGI 1988 2 6.19 25.25 16.68 41.93
456-HGI 1988 2 8.28 38.97 22.31 61.28
459-HGI 1988 2 6.51 35.54 17.54 53.08
464-HGI 1988 2 5.28 31.33 14.23 45.56
472-HGI 1988 2 5.09 30.17 13.72 43.89
477-HGI 1988 2 7.68 36.58 20.70 57.28
479-HGI 1988 2 8.55 41.68 23.04 64.72
480-HGI 1988 2 6.10 36.77 16.44 53.21
487-HGI 1988 2 4.33 35.34 11.67 47.01
492-HGI 1988 2 8.60 37.58 23.18 60.76
498-HGI 1988 2 6.17 35.36 16.63 51.99
510-HGI 1988 2 6.24 35.25 16.82 52.07
511-HGI 1988 2 8.44 38.27 22.75 61.02
527-HGI 1988 2 5.45 34.61 14.69 49.30
533-HGI 1988 2 6.24 36.10 16.82 52.92
534-HGI 1988 2 5.67 36.35 15.28 51.63
547-HGI 1988 2 8.19 42.02 22.07 64.09
565-HGI 1988 2 7.26 40.15 19.57 59.72
616-HGI 1988 2 6.44 48.68 17.36 66.04
793-HGI 1988 2 5.71 37.51 15.39 52.90
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A8.1 PARTLY MATCHED PAIRS -  INDUSTRIAL DATA-SET A2
The tables in this appendix show the results from the analysis of Data-set A2, 
which contains 57 industrial property pairs that could not be fully matched 
(see Table 7.4 for a listing of the industrial data-sets that were collected). The 
tests and statistical hypotheses set out in 8.4 are applied to this data.
The industrial matching criteria were set out in Figure 7.1a. The pairs in this 
data-set could only be partly matched, on size and age for all data, but not 
consistently on the other matching criteria.
The results of this analysis are inconclusive, when compared to the same 
results presented for the fully matched pairs (see 8.5), and these findings 
emphasise the importance of the detailed micro-level data collection and 
subsequent matching exercise that was central to this research.
The first stage in the analysis was to see if the properties were drawn from 
the same population in 1973. This is Test 1 which is explained in 8.4.1. The 
results of this test are set out in Table A8.1 and A8.2.
Table A8.1: Pre-Divergence Equivalence in 1973
Industrial Data-set A2: Partly matched pairs: 114 cases, 57 pairs 
Variable: 1973 Rateable Value per m2
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Enfield 57 6.71 1.434 .1899
Haringey 57 6.81 1.203 .1594
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tail
Probability
Equality of mean values -.369 56 .714
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Table A8.1 shows the results from the testing of Hypothesis 1. The result 
conforms to the predicted outcome and the null hypothesis for Test 1 is 
accepted (p=0.714). This confirms the premise that the data within Data-set 
A2 is drawn from the same population of properties in 1973, before the rate 
burdens diverged.
Table A8.2: Equality of Total Occupation Costs in 1973
Industrial Data-set A2: Partly matched pairs: 114 cases, 57 pairs 
Variable: 1973 Rateable Value per m2
Number Percentage
Cost of Cases Enfield Haringey Difference
Average Rental Value 114 £6.71 m2 £6.81 m2 1.5%
In Table A8.2 the average rental value per m2 for industrial property in the 
two boroughs in 1973 is tested for equality (Hypothesis 2). The result can be 
seen to be extremely close.
The results of the Pre-test analysis suggest that the properties were drawn 
from the same population in 1973 and the next stage is to carry out the Post­
test analysis to see if rents have diverged (see 8.4.2).
Table A8.3: Post-Divergence Impact in 1988
Industrial Data-set A2: Partly matched pairs: 114 cases, 57 pairs 
Variable: 1988 Rental Value per m2
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Enfield 57 37.06 4.656 0.6167
Haringey 57 35.71 4.546 0.6022
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tail
Probability
Equality of mean values 1.547 56 .127
302
Appendix 8
Table A8.3 shows the results of testing Hypothesis 3. Contrary to the 
predicted outcome, the null hypothesis for Test 2 is accepted and the central 
hypothesis of this thesis is not confirmed in statistically significant terms (at 
least at the 13% level). There does seem to be some impact on the outcome 
variable of rent, but not at a level that can be treated as significant in the 
terms defined in this thesis (see 8.2).
The last stage in the analysis was to compare the difference in locations in 
the period 1988 to see if total occupation costs had equalised under the Test 
3 hypotheses (see 8.4.3).
Table A8.4: Total Occupation Costs in 1988
Industrial Data-set A2: Partly matched pairs: 114 cases, 57 pairs 
Variable: Total Occupation Costs per m2 (Rent + Rate Burden)
Local Authority
Number 
of Cases Mean
Standard
Deviation
Standard
Error
Enfield 57 49.51 6.773 .8970
Haringey 57 54.07 6.669 .8834
Paired Samples 
T-Test
t
Value
Degrees of 
Freedom
2-tail
Probability
Equality of mean values -3.548 56 .001
Table A8.4 shows the results of testing Hypothesis 4. The result is 
statistically significant (at a better than 1% level), which is not the predicted 
outcome for this test, the proposition being that, after the period of 
equalisation, the properties in the two boroughs will again share equal total 
occupation costs.
This result strongly suggests that the two samples are drawn from different 
populations and, when compared to the results of this test presented earlier 
for fully matched pairs (Table 8.13), the outcome is quite different.
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Table A8.5: Equalisation of Total Occupation Costs in 1988
Industrial Data-set A2: Partly matched pairs: 114 cases, 57 pairs 
Variable: Total Occupation Costs per m2 (Rent + Rate Burden)
Number
Cost of Cases Enfield Haringey
Percentage
Difference
Average Rate Burden 57 £12.45 m2 £18.36 m2 32.2%
Average Rental Value 57 £37.06 m2 £35.71 m2 -3.8%
Total Occupation Costs £49.51 m2 £54.07 m2 8.4%
Table A8.5 is a test of Hypothesis 5 which does not provide strong 
confirmation of the prediction that total occupation costs will be equalised, 
although rents in Haringey are slightly lower (3.8%) than in Enfield. Rents do 
appear to have adjusted in the direction expected, bearing in mind that in 
1973 the rents in Haringey were 1.5% higher than in Enfield. The result must 
be considered in conjunction with the statistical test shown in Table A8.4, 
which confirms the finding that the total occupation costs have not been 
equalised for this sample data.
It was expected that the partly matched pairs would give consistent (but 
weaker) results. This weaker relationship was found for the outcome variable 
of rent in 1988 (the results were statistically significant at a level of 13%) but 
the statistical results for the equalisation of total costs strongly suggest that 
the samples represent two different populations. It could be that the matching 
process is a critical factor in the success of the research design: it is 
undoubtedly important, but the results obtained from applying this design to 
Sibley’s unpaired market data suggest that tight matching is not a necessary 
pre-condition (unless Sibley did in fact pair his data more closely than his 
methodology description would suggest).
Alternatively, there is always a possibility with any sample data that they are 
not a representative sample of the population, and perhaps this applies to the 
partly matched pairs contained in Data-set A2.
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A9.1 INTRODUCTION
The definitional analysis presented in this appendix, which tested for rental 
growth between 1973 and 1988, is based on the same data-sets that were 
used for the primary analysis. This analysis is based on Test 4 (see 8.8.1) 
and it is predicted that the null hypothesis will be rejected and H2 will be 
accepted, with higher rental growth being found in the low rate areas.
The growth calculation is carried out without regard to property size (in m2) 
and it is used to check on the results of the primary analysis because size 
was the least accurately measured of the four main variables (see 7.4).
Two separate variables are used in these calculations of rental growth 
between 1973 and 1988: the 1973 Rateable Value and the 1990 Rateable 
Value, both acting as a proxy for rental value. This shows rental growth over 
a period of fifteen years.
A9.2 DIFFERENTIAL RENTAL GROWTH -  1973-88
The size-independent nature of the test is intended to validate the results 
discussed in Sections 8.5-8.7 above.
Table A9.1: Average Annual Rental Growth -1973-1988
Industrial Data-set A1: Fully matched pairs: 70 cases, 35 pairs
Local Authority Cases 1973-1988
Enfield 35 12.7% pa
Haringey 35 7.5% pa
The result in Table A9.1 is a test of Hypothesis 6 and it confirms the 
prediction that rental growth in the low rate area will be higher than rental 
growth in the high rate area. For Enfield and Haringey this difference is quite 
clear (H2 is accepted).
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Table A9.2: Average Annual Rental Growth -1973-1988
Retail Data-set C1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs
Local Authority Cases 1973-1988
Barnet 21 14.2% pa
Brent 21 13.3% pa
Table A9.2 shows a result that confirms the prediction that rental growth in 
the low rate area will be higher than the high rate area (H2 is accepted), but 
there is not a marked difference, with 0.9% per annum difference between 
Barnet and Brent.
Table A9.3: Average Annual Rental Growth -1973-1988
Office Data-set E1: Fully matched pairs: 42 cases, 21 pairs
Local Authority Cases 1973-1988
Westminster 21 15.4% pa
Camden 21 15.0% pa
Table A9.3 shows the test of Hypothesis 6 for office property in Westminster 
and Camden with H2 being accepted. The difference in rental growth rates is 
small (0.4% per annum) although the rental growth still conforms to the 
prediction of higher growth in the low rate area.
A9.3 DISCUSSION OF SIZE-INDEPENDENT TEST
The rental growth test is a check on the outcome variable of rent in 1988, 
which was analysed as part of the primary analysis in Test 2 (see 8.4.2). This 
test is being used here to provide a cross-check on the primary results that is 
independent of the size observation. It automatically follows that growth must 
have taken place if the outcome variable in 1988 shows tax capitalisation 
(see 8.8.2) and for each property type the predicted relationship is identified, 
with higher growth in the low rate borough.
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The calculation of growth is based on only two observations, one at the start 
and one at the end of the period. This provides no information about differing 
growth rates within the 15-year period that is covered. For office property, for 
example, rental value between 1973 and 1983 showed very poor growth 
(Debenham Tewson & Chinnocks 1983).
There are several possible explanations for the small difference between 
boroughs for offices, but a calculation of office rental growth applied to the 
average rental value per m2 in 1973 and the average rental value per m2 in 
1988, gave a growth differential between Camden and Westminster of 0.5% 
per annum. This result, which takes account of size, tends to confirm the 
validity of the size-independent rental growth test, which gave a difference of 
0.4% per annum between boroughs for office property.
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This appendix sets out additional decision rules that were applied to the 
matching criteria discussed in 7.5. It provides additional information on 
how the properties were matched against the criteria that are shown in 
Figures 7.1a, 7.1b and 7.2a
Table A10.1: Distance from junction with major road
Industrial North Circular Road (A406) - Great Cambridge Road (A10) 
Approximate distance (measured as travel distance by road)
< 0.5 Kilometers 
0.6 -  1.0 Kilometres 
> 1.0 Kilometres
Table A10.2: Distance to nearest rail or underground station
Industrial Approximate distance (measured as travel distance on foot)
< 0.5 Kilometers 
0.6 -  1.0 Kilometres 
> 1.0 Kilometres
Table A10.3: Distance to local shops
Industrial Approximate distance (measured as travel distance on foot)
< 200 metres 
201 -  500 metres 
> 500 metres
Table A10.4: Eaves height
Industrial
< 4.0 metres 
> 4.0 metres
Table A10.5: Distance to parking
Industrial Approximate distance (measured as travel distance on foot)
Used for public car park, restricted and unrestricted on street parking
< 200 metres 
201 -  500 metres 
> 500 metres
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Table A10.6: Travel time from rail or underground station
Offices Approximate time (timed as travel distance on foot)
< 5 minutes
5 - 1 0  minutes 
> 10 minutes
Table A10.7: Distance from closest bus stop
Offices Approximate from ground floor main entrance
< 100 metres 
101 -2 5 0  metres 
251 -  500 
> 500 metres
Table A10.8: Distance from Aldwych
Offices Straight line distance from centre of plot to Bush House, Aldwych
< 250 metres 
251 -  500 metres 
501 -  750 
> 750 metres
Table A10.9: Floor to ceiling height
Offices
< 2.5 metres 
> 2.5 metres
Table A10.10: Distance to parking
Offices Approximate distance (measured as travel distance on foot)
Used for public carpark, restricted and unrestricted on street parking
< 200 metres 
201 -  500 metres 
> 500 metres
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Table A10.11: Distance from pedestrian crossing
Retail From approximate centre point of frontage
< 60 metres 
61 - 1 2 0  metres 
> 120 metres
Table A10.12: Distance from closest bus stop
Retail From approximate centre point of frontage
< 30 metres 
3 1 - 6 0  metres 
> 60 metres
Table A10.13: Distance from on street parking
Retail Restricted and unrestricted on street parking
Approximate distance (measured as travel distance on foot)
< 200 metres 
201 -  500 metres 
> 500 metres
Table A10.14: Distance from public car park
Retail Approximate distance (measured as travel distance on foot)
< 200 metres 
201 -  500 metres 
> 500 metres
Table A10.15: Distance from nearest rail or underground station
Retail Approximate distance (measured as travel distance on foot)
< 500 metres 
501 - 1 0 0 0  metres 
> 1000 metres
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Table A10.16: Frontage and return frontage
Retail
< 6 metres
6 - 1 2  metres 
> 12 metres
Table A10.17: Pavement width
Retail
< 3 metres 
> 3 metres
Table A10.18: Qualitative categories
All Apparent State of Repair, General Modernity, Prestige
Poor
Mediocre
Average
Good
Excellent
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